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Take a walk to Cass and Ferry. Sit on the grass, lean against a tree. Know that the grass and tree 
give off oxygen. Now look east. You won’t have to look hard. It is the massive structure looming 
at the corner of Ferry and Russell, just a few blocks away. That’s the incinerator, the beast, the 
dragon. Look at the tree; effortlessly, it gives…..look at the incinerator; deliberately, it takes. 
– “The dragon,” North Cass Community Union Newsletter
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This project began where most good ideas do, at the breakfast table. 
Over the weekend standard of scrambled eggs, potatoes, toast, coffee, and a Detroit Free 
Press, I came across an article about business owners and residents in Detroit's Midtown 
neighborhood who complained of a bad smell. It came, the paper said, from the city's incinerator 
just across the expressway from the rapidly-gentrifying neighborhood. The putrid scent it sent 
downwind into Midtown made shoppers' stomach turn as they browsed new boutiques in the 
neighborhood. Condo owners in the recently renovated Willy’s Overland Lofts complained that 
they couldn't even open their windows in the summertime. 
As a historian, I was troubled by the way these complaints were decontextualized from 
the area's deeper history: Midtown, which for decades had been known as the Cass Corridor, had 
a long and celebrated history as the center of Detroit's cultural scene. As a result, I wondered, 
why is this news now? What changed?  
What drove my continued curiosity in this story was my interest in issues of urban 
inequality. I grew up in a suburb north of Detroit during the 1990s and 2000s when headlines 
about the city seemed only interested in emphasizing Detroit’s problems. One of my first 
memories of the city was news coverage about Devil's Night, the eve of Halloween ritual in 
which Detroiters burned down abandoned homes in their neighborhoods. Although considered 
by Detroiters as a way to act out their continued frustration with a city government who had 




the events of Devil's Night were framed by suburbanites as lawless destruction, even "Look what 
those people are doing to the city."1 Yet as time went on, I was increasingly confused with the 
divide between city and suburb. I had no good explanation for the unspoken trauma that lay at 
the center of that spatial and mental relationship. As I grew up, I visited the city often with my 
father and was struck with the beauty of the city, its architecture, and public spaces. As an 
undergraduate, I learned more about Detroit and its struggles, both from my coursework and 
from residents themselves. Yet the 2008 financial crisis brought sweeping change to Detroit. In 
the wake of economic fallout, middle-class and predominantly white entrepreneurs began to buy 
cheap property in the city. Artists, restaurants, and new boutiques moved into storefronts in 
Midtown, Eastern Market, and Corktown. Yet beyond the downtown core and its nearest 
neighborhoods, average Detroiters weren’t seeing any of the revitalization and renaissance that 
characterized media coverage about Detroit in the 2010s. Detroit’s growing economic disparity 
in the twenty-first century ultimately motivated and sustained my work to tell this story of 
corporate power and environmental injustice.  
This project examines the planning and construction of the Greater Detroit Resource 
Recovery Authority trash incinerator in the heart of downtown Detroit in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and the opposition that grew against the facility after it became public knowledge. In setting out 
to answer questions about urban inequality as they played out in the saga of the Detroit 
incinerator, I found a story that was equal parts inspiring and tragic, one where at multiple points 
government actors and activists both could have pursued alternative choices that would have 
been better for city finances, for the environment, and for public health. There are few actual 
 




villains in this story and more the critique of a system of corporate power that infiltrated and 
influenced urban governance from many sides. Yet there are also many lessons to be drawn from 
this story, especially in how citizens can hold their local governments accountable in the face of 
growing economic disparity and an ever-worsening climate crisis.   
In this dissertation, I contend that the political and economic realities of the urban crisis 
combined with the rise of new environmental issues – largely the result of increased postwar 
consumerism and capital production – to convince Detroit officials that pursuing an expensive, 
yet unproven technology promoted by the federal government and private corporations in order 
to solve its garbage crisis at the expense of their responsibility to city residents. Detroit’s 
economic stresses created a situation in which municipal officials pursued fiscal policies that 
ultimately prioritized "responsible" financial choices over residents and their needs. The limited 
options available to Detroit to raise revenue beyond the bond market meant that the city’s 
survival became totally sublimated within its financial status and credit rating, so that officials in 
city government were more concerned with the economic frameworks that allowed the city to 
keep functioning, however just, than residents’ well-being. Yet these financial relationships and 
their binding legal implications had the effect of restricting city officials’ ability to broker 
compromise with residents. Whereas citizen activists previously wielded notable power to hold 
their local officials accountable through protest, litigation, and public hearings, the new financial 
arrangements that cities like Detroit needed to participate in in order to survive in the wake of 
federal disinvestment in cities and federally-subsidized suburbanization ultimately obliged cities 




The environmental implications of this story only deepen the tragedy. The economic 
impact of the urban crisis on Detroit forced the city to rely on the limited resources that it had 
and to pursue creative strategies to use those resources. In this context, the logic of turning 
household waste into a valuable and scarce commodity – energy – was extremely powerful. 
Rather than spend money to collect, transport, and dispose of it in a landfill forty miles away 
where it would ultimately sit and rot for years, Detroit could collect its trash, transport it one-
tenth of the distance to a resource recovery plant where it would be burned to create steam and 
electric power the city could use in its downtown buildings and even sell back to the local 
electric utility, Detroit Edison. In this way, resource recovery seemed to present Detroit a way to 
use its own plentiful resources to generate a valuable product within its own boundaries, saving 
money in multiple ways. Yet city officials pursued the project with little technological expertise 
themselves, forcing them to rely on contractors and consultants who, for the most part, lacked 
good data about incineration's real effects on public health and whose vested interest was not in 
interrogating the process's environmental impact any further than they were required by federal 
and local laws. Ultimately, Detroit officials chose to build the world's largest incinerator in the 
middle of downtown because there was a strong logic from private industry, federal officials, and 
other cities that suggested doing so was the best decision for the long-term stability of the city.   
In these ways, Detroit’s experience with resource recovery was not unique. Many other 
cities, including Chicago, Baltimore, Miami, Milwaukee, Honolulu, and Hartford, also built large 
resource recovery systems to dispose of their municipal waste. Many of these systems, too, 
encountered challenges. Some failed magnificently and were forced to close. Others are still in 




successes of the national experiment in resource recovery that swept through the 1970s and 
1980s. But Detroit’s experience is notable for two reasons. First, with a capacity of 3,000 tons of 
waste per day, the Detroit facility was the largest in the United States. Second, no city was more 
deeply impacted by the economic constraints of the urban crisis than Detroit. The massive costs, 
then, associated with building a resource recovery plant - over $500 million in Detroit’s case - 
stressed the Detroit’s finances more than other cities. The Detroit story is important for both its 
similarities with other cities and its extremes. While they chose a path that was walked by many 
other cities across the county, Detroit officials chose to build the largest plant in the most 
financially troubled city in the nation, and it therefore tells a unique and revealing story about 
urban finance and environmental issues during a key moment of change. 
This story draws upon multiple lines of historical inquiry, primarily the urban crisis, 
environmental injustice, science and technology, and the history of capitalism. 
Urban Crisis 
Urban history locates its origins in the urban crisis and changing cities of the 1960s and 
1970s. Following mass suburbanization at the end of World War II and the resultant “white 
flight” as thousands of middle-class whites across America migrated out of the city, social 
scientists and historians began to search for the historical origins of the nation's urban problems. 
As the relationship between people and metropolitan space shifted from urban-centered to more 
decentralized, the character and the physical space of the city underwent significant changes as 




city began to be characterized by the urban crisis, or “concentrated poverty, physical decay, and 
racial isolation.”2  
Thomas Sugrue sought the causes of the “urban crisis” in Detroit’s white neighborhoods, 
focusing on housing and employment as the main sources of contestation between whites and 
blacks in the 1950s and 1960s. As slumping urban housing markets opened new neighborhoods 
in the city to middle-class African American families, Detroit's whites reacted to the economic 
and racial transformation of the city by fashioning a defensive local politics focused on threats to 
property and neighborhoods by blacks and their liberal allies articulated through a rhetoric of 
property values and homeowners’ rights.3 Eventually, those whites who could relocated out to 
the suburbs. It is within this context that the various actors I examine operated. Their perceptions 
of change and crisis as a result of disinvestment and decentralization had very real impacts on 
their actions and words; while some responded to change defensively, other residents, 
particularly African Americans, perceived opportunity in the restructuring of urban relationships.  
In working to combat their city’s perceived problems, Robert Self asserted that black power 
politics in Oakland had limited success in enacting the social vision they articulated because they 
ultimately could not command the same economic and political resources as their suburban 
neighbors, thus reinforcing the “urban crisis” narrative.4 The competition and cooperation is a 
central theme of this story as Detroit was forced to prioritize what to do with its limited 
resources. 
 
2 Thomas J. Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 3. 
 
3 Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 3. 
 





Yet the urban crisis was not simply a demographic trend confined to the physical city, but 
a moral and intellectual crisis that followed suburban migrants out of the city. Examining the 
Jewish community in Detroit, Lila Berman found answers to the intellectual urban crisis in a 
reimagined politics. The intellectual rearrangement of the community’s relationship to the city 
helped to organize the spatial changes they experienced following white flight.5 Likewise, my 
dissertation seeks to understand how different groups in Detroit employed a diverse set of 
strategies – political, economic, and social – to cope with perceptions of urban crisis. Yet such 
tactics did not occur over quite the same broad decentralized space, but in the concentrated 
downtown core thus encouraging more ferocious and rancorous conflict between the various 
stakeholders and presenting a new perspective from which to view the urban crisis on the 
ground.6  
Urban Planning, Urban Renewal, and Development Politics 
Urban renewal serves as a central component of postwar urban historiography. The 
background of the construction of the GDRRA has implications in this narrative. The facility 
was constructed near a neighborhood that had already been severely impacted by the 
construction of the General Motors Detroit/Hamtramck Assembly or “Poletown Plant,” which 
 
5 Lila Berman, Metropolitan Jews: Politics, Race, and Religion in Postwar Detroit (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2015), 107. 
6 Other important works that explore the urban crisis in Detroit include Joe T. Darden, Richard Child Hill, June 
Manning Thomas, and Richard Thomas, Detroit: Race and Uneven Development (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1987); Fine, Violence and the Model City: The Cavanaugh Administration, Race Relations, and the Detroit 
Riot of 1967 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); June Manning Thomas, Redevelopment and Race: 
Planning a Finer City in Postwar Detroit (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Dan Georgakas and 
Marvin Surkin, Detroit, I Do Mind Dying: A Study in Urban Revolution, 2nd Ed. (Boston: South End Press, 1998); 
Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit?: Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2001); Todd C. Shaw, Now is the Time! Detroit Black Politics and Grassroots Activism (Durham: 




displaced 4,200 people and destroyed 1,300 homes, 140 businesses, six churches and one 
hospital in 1981. The remaining racially diverse, working class neighborhood was driven out by 
the smell and noise associated with the plant until the 1990s.  
Foundational works on the topic and much more recent trends inform this dissertation. In 
his depictions of urban renewal in Chicago’s Loop and Hyde Park areas in the 1950s, Arnold 
Hirsch outlines the ways that pro-growth institutions manipulated federal and municipal urban 
policy as a means to ward off decentralization and boost returns on investment.7 Self, while 
echoing some of Hirsch’s conclusions about the strength of institutional forces over the urban 
landscape – especially as it relates to black residents’ lives and spaces – sought to bring more 
agency into the story of urban renewal by emphasizing black activism and the resultant rise of 
black power politics against a growth liberalism coalition that sought the solutions of the urban 
crisis in large-scale public works projects and economic development. Yet this coalition, as in 
Hirsch’s conclusions, more often than not overpowered black activism, dispersing dislocated 
residents into other neighborhoods and creating barriers to successful community-based 
activism.8 This dissertation similarly emphasizes the competition caused by urban renewal as 
different segments of the urban community – divided by race, class, and space – worked towards 
dissimilar goals to ultimately achieve their different cultural visions of the city.  
In his work on Camden, New Jersey, Howard Gillette Jr. emphasized the implications of 
past policy and economic choices on individuals of the present, a method that I also espouse. 
Exploring the impact of the urban crisis on Camden, New Jersey, Gillette argued that the city’s 
 
7 Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983), 100-101, 138. 
 




efforts at regional political cooperation as a means to gain some political or economic advantage 
for the city following federal disinvestment often meant ceding to the visions of state and county 
lawmakers, as well as corporations, rather than improving the lot of residents.9 This was most 
apparent in the creation of large-scale urban renewal projects concentrated on the waterfront and 
in the downtown core and focused on the perceived needs of middle class residents and suburban 
visitors rather than improving the majority of residents’ access to housing, education, and 
environmental protection. Such projects are similarly the focus of this dissertation, yet the 
Detroit incinerator was an infrastructure improvement that did not serve to bring suburbanites 
into the city. This dissertation emphasizes the competition between urban actors for power and 
resources as well as urban-suburban conflict during the urban crisis. 
Pollution and Environmentalism 
Environmental history has been a powerful force in the field in its ability to cross 
historiographical or disciplinary boundaries to reveal deeper connections across class, race, and 
space. Andrew Hurley determined that evidence of systemic racism could be found on the very 
landscape itself. Examining the industrial city of Gary, Indiana, Hurley argued that divisions of 
race and class exploited by the power of private capital were instrumental in creating patterns of 
environmental inequality in the physical urban landscape in the postwar period.10 Hurley’s 
conclusions were echoed both by Ellen Stroud’s examination of race and land use in Portland, 
Oregon and Julie Sze’s analysis of pollution and urban politics in New York City’s minority 
 
9 Howard Gillette. Camden After the Fall: Decline and Renewal in a Post-Industrial City, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005) 96.  
 
10 Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana Chapel Hill: 




neighborhoods.11 These works served to deepen an already well-documented historical record of 
American racism, showing that notions of inferiority and otherness were inscribed on to the 
physical landscape. Yet these works take urban historians’ assertions of systemic racism even 
further, demonstrating that such racism goes deeper than institutions or policies to imbue urban 
space itself, in some ways making inferiority and segregation appear more “naturalized.”  
The narrative of the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority tells a story of 
community organizing and coalition building around environmental justice in Detroit. The health 
risks associated with the incinerator drove a number of Detroiters and surrounding metropolitan 
residents to protest against the facility throughout the 1980s, and continuing even today. The 
inability of the anti-incinerator coalition to halt construction through either political or legal 
means has the potential to add to narratives and analysis surrounding what makes successful or 
unsuccessful community movements and coalition-building.  
Scholars who examine activism during and after the crystallization of the 
environmentalist movement tend to adopt a sociological approach, emphasizing environmental 
justice and community action and behavior without addressing questions of change over time. 
Barbara Allen and Robert Bullard were some of the first sociologists to address issues of 
grassroots environmental activism in their examinations of anti-pollution organizing in the 
Chemical Corridor of Louisiana. Similarly, David Pellow, Elizabeth Blum, and Julie Sze 
investigated environmental organizing in cities, focusing on coalition-building and the means by 
 
11 Ellen Stroud, “Troubled Waters in Ecotopia: Environmental Racism in Portland, Oregon.” Radical History 
Review. Issue 74: Special Issue on Environmental Politics, Geography and the Left (Spring 1999), 65-95; Julie Sze, 





which groups attain political leverage to achieve their goals.12 My dissertation will also be 
guided by notions of environmental racism and social justice and will emphasize the actions of 
community members in their efforts to organize against the GDRRA. Yet this dissertation will 
look beyond the activism of the community to contextualize their concerns about pollution in 
broader postwar trends affecting the city, including the fracturing of the Democratic political 
coalition, metropolitan decentralization, and urban disinvestment. 
More recently, historians have brought their methods to explore environmental activism. 
Scott Hamilton Dewey’s work regarding air pollution in metropolitan New York and Los 
Angeles and, especially, David and Richard Stradling’s examination of anti-pollution organizing 
in Cleveland are excellent examples of such historical work on local anti-pollution activism. The 
Stradlings’ work particularly seeks to unite a literature of the urban crisis with environmental 
history, arguing that both the actual (i.e. pollution) and perceived (relating deterioration and 
disease in “pathologizing slums”) decline of Cleveland was directly related to its environmental 
degradation.13 This dissertation also seeks to unite an environmental history of environmentalism 
with the urban crisis, yet in a setting more directly associated with the urban crisis 
historiographicly and culturally, asserting my work’s importance in expanding that narrative to 
include a new environment-centered perspective.14  
 
12 Sze, Noxious New York; David Pellow, Garbage Wars: The Struggle for Environmental Justice in Chicago. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), Elizabeth Blum, Love Canal Revisited: Race, Class, and Gender in 
Environmental Activism (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008). 
 
13 Stradling, David and Richard Stradling, Where the River Burned: Carl Stokes and the Struggle to Save Cleveland 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 62. 
 
14 Other important work on environmental inequality include Barbara Allen, Uneasy Alchemy: Citizens and Experts 
in Louisiana’s Chemical Corridor Disputes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), Elizabeth Blum, Love Canal 
Revisited: Race, Class, and Gender in Environmental Activism (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008), 




Science and Technology 
Environmental historians have challenged the foundations of modernization, arguing that 
science and knowledge are also prone to the influence of cultural norms and expectations. Kate 
Brown argued that plutonium production facilities were linked through consumption, technology, 
and human bodies, as government controlled how people, knowledge, and radioactive discharge 
moved through space, while simultaneously providing the means to high levels of consumption 
and middle class status.15 Yet even as residents of plutonium towns achieved their new status, 
they did so only by placing unquestioning faith in American technological and scientific progress 
to keep their bodies, families, and communities safe from the dangers of working with 
radioactive isotopes. “As plutopia matured,” Brown explained, “residents gave up their civil and 
biological rights for consumer rights.”16 In my dissertation, city officials also failed to adequately 
question the impact incineration would have on residents’ bodies, instead relying on their 
convictions that the high-tech practice was as safe and efficient as industry scientists suggested.  
Environmental historians have also illustrated the links between human bodies and 
medical advances. Tracing the use of diethylstilbestrol (DES) and other endocrine disrupting 
chemicals in foods and medication during the postwar era, Nancy Langston suggested that 
scientific inquiry into the effects of DES on humans, especially women, were heavily influenced 
 
Devra Davis, When Smoke Ran Like Water: Tales of Environmental Deception and the Battle Against Pollution 
(New York: Basic Books, 2003), Laura Pulido, Environmentalism and Economic Justice: Two Chicano Struggles in 
the Southwest (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996), Ellen Griffith Spears, Baptized in PCBs: Race, 
Pollution, and Justice in an All-American City, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). 
 
15 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America. New York: 
Knopf, 2003. 
 
16 Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters 




by both economic needs and gender norms. Likewise, Gregg Mittman challenged scientific, 
standardized notions of disease, contending that definitions of allergies and hay fever were 
culturally formed by class and place, and that allergies, in turn, shaped economic development, 
attitudes towards land use, and the daily lives of Americans over the past 150 years. Mittman’s 
emphasis on environment in shaping cultural constructions of disease deepened historians’ 
understandings of the dialectic between culture and science. In this story, I am similarly 
interested in understanding the cultural dimensions of activists’ and scientists’ contentions 
regarding public health, risk, and illness.17  
Chapter 1 examines the growing garbage crisis across the nation. As American prosperity 
grew following World War II and the "purchaser as citizen" ideal, as defined by Lizabeth Cohen, 
emerged, Americans purchased more goods and created more waste than ever before. Landfill 
operators struggled to keep up with the constant flow of castoffs and trash and the lifespans of 
their facilities started to shrink exponentially. Some landfills closed completely. As available 
space decreased, prices to dispose of waste increased dramatically. Meanwhile, continuing 
suburban sprawl made siting new landfills increasingly challenging as available open land was 
claimed for new housing developments. The economic problems associated with the urban crisis 
made the garbage crisis particular difficult for cities. Municipal officials, in Detroit and 
elsewhere, searched for creative and cost-effective solutions to the dual crises they faced, 
including incineration technology. New incinerators, often called "resource recovery" plants 
offered cities a way to turn the problem of waste into a useful commodity that also created 
 
17Nancy Langston, Toxic Bodies: Hormone Disruptors and the Legacy of DES, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2011) and Gregg Mittman, Breathing Space:  How Allergies Shape Our Lives and Landscapes, (New Haven: Yale 




energy. I am less concerned with whether the garbage crisis was real or simply perceived, and 
more concerned with the how the threat of it moved cities to seek new solutions to deal with their 
garbage.  
Chapter 2 extends the arguments cities were making in favor of resource recovery as the 
energy crisis gripped America. The constriction of national energy resources provided cities with 
another compelling reason to investigate Research and development of resource recovery was 
also undergirded by the Environmental Protection Agency, which characterized the method as 
"the technology of choice" for municipal waste disposal. As part of its campaign towards energy 
independence, the federal government prioritized the development of resource recovery for its 
ability to turn cheap and plentiful waste into electricity using technology that was readily 
available and could easily be connected into existing power systems. Despite their relative 
insulation from the worst impacts of the energy crisis, Detroit officials were enticed by the 
opportunity to transition their energy production from the coal- and oil-fired Mistersky Power 
Plant, which had long been a source of contention between the city and the Wayne County Air 
Pollution Commission, to a high-tech resource recovery plant. Resource recovery then offered 
Detroit the opportunity to free itself from monthly coal and oil expenditures and create all of the 
energy it needed from a material it already had.  
Yet the path towards resource recovery would not be as simple as city officials may have 
hoped. In Chapter 3, I explore the growth of the national resource recovery industry and the 
difficulties city officials faced by the lack of their own technological expertise, which forced 
them to rely heavily on financial and environmental consultants from private industry as they 




Engineering, a powerful and well-funded firm that had no experience building a resource 
recovery plant, Detroit's fiscal woes weighed heavily on the project, even threatening to derail it 
completely. The state of Michigan's tax revolt, made law by the Headlee Amendment in 1976, 
and the city's own fiscal crisis in 1981 presented new and unprecedented challenges to the 
complex joint-financing agreement the city had – with great difficulty – negotiated over years 
with Combustion Engineering.  
Chapter 4 begins exploring this tenuous moment for the city. Having devoted a great deal 
of time and energy over the preceding eight years into developing their resource recovery 
project, Detroit officials now found themselves frustrated by a troubling fiscal situation. Yet 
rather than use the moment to reassess resource recovery's place in the city, the Young 
administration pushed the project forward with gusto as Detroit's fortunes improved, led 
forcefully by new City Finance Director Bella Marshall. By 1984, the city triumphantly 
announced its plan to move forward with their "environmentally-sound" resource recovery plant 
that would turn Detroit trash into useful energy in the heart of downtown. As the city prepared to 
issue in bonds to fund the project, however, issues in the permitting process threatened to hold up 
the project once more. The federal Environmental Protection Agency's enforcement delegation of 
the Clean Air Act to the state of Michigan's Department of Natural Resource meant that the state 
was responsible for reviewing and granting permits to new sources of emissions, including the 
new Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority incinerator. Yet the state's failure to 
accurately define key enforcement criteria, as well as a thousand-fold calculation error in 
determining the facility's cancer risk to nearby residents, led some in government, the media, and 




Chapter 5 examines two groups of environmental activists – the radical Evergreen 
Alliance and the more traditional Detroit Audubon Society – and their campaigns against the 
facility. Their different advocacy strategies ultimately made cooperation towards their shared 
goal challenging, and the groups were never able to unify against Detroit and Combustion 
Engineering. While the Evergreen Alliance continued to demonstrate their opposition to the 
GDRRA incinerator in the streets and in print, legal challenges by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, a citizen coalition led by the Detroit Audubon Society, and the Province of Ontario all 
were thwarted by a federal judicial system determined to roll back environmental protections 
under the deregulatory Reagan presidency. Ultimately, Detroit's resource recovery plant started 
burning the city's waste in December 1988. 
Though this story closes on a troubling note, it is not the end. In the Conclusion, I briefly 
consider some of the success activists and regulators experienced after the facility began 
operating. Air emissions test failures – which had been identified and warned against by state 
officials five years earlier – and controversy surrounding the toxic nature of the facility's ash 
gave the incinerator’s opponents new opportunities to characterize the facility as dangerous to 
human health and environmental safety. The incinerator's inability to operate in compliance with 
state and federal environmental regulations ultimately forced the City of Detroit to add expensive 
pollution control technologies in 1990. Yet the cost of those retrofits was unbearable for the 
financially troubled city, and Detroit was compelled to sell the facility in a complex leaseback 
agreement to Phillip Morris Company. Though the deal provided the city with the funds to 
finance the addition of new pollution controls, it also had long-term costs to Detroit's residents. 




bonds to construct it in 1984.18 In this way, the successes of anti-incinerator activists to install 
new pollution controls that would protect city residents had deep implications on the economic 
future of their city.  
This reveals the true tragedy of this story. While the incinerator certainly exacerbated the 
public health crisis Detroiters experience everyday - the Delray neighborhood, which lies 
downwind from the incinerator, has consistently been ranked as the most polluted zip code in 
America – the facility also took a massive economic toll on the city and its residents.19 Detroit's 
incinerator project forced the city into obligatory relationships with private contractors, 
environmental consultants, powerful banks, and credit rating firms, all of which shaped Detroit's 
fiscal future for decades to come. As Detroit continues to rebuild after its 2013 bankruptcy, there 
is value in interrogating the sources of its economic hardship. While there are many factors - 
federally-subsidized suburbanization, shrinking of its tax base, federal disinvestment in cities, 
reliance on the automotive industry - that contributed to Detroit's financial troubles in the late 
twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries, the role of private capital it equally important in this 
story. In "The Ruins of Detroit: Exploring Urban Crisis in the Motor City," historian Kevin 
Boyle suggests that historians have not adequately considered the role of corporate capital in the 
"unmaking" of Detroit. "[T]wentieth-century Detroit was, at its heart," Boyle contends, "a 
product of industrial capitalism."20 
 
18 Thomas Stephens, “The Detroit Trash Incinerator, 1973-2011: Waste and Environmental Racism in the Heart of 
the Great Lakes,” unpublished manuscript, shared with the author.  
 
19 Steve Neavling, “Struggling to breathe in 48217, Michigan’s most toxic ZIP code,” Metro Times, January 8, 2020. 
20 Kevin Boyle, “The Ruins of Detroit: Exploring the Urban Crisis in the Motor City,” Michigan Historical Review, 




While I agree with Boyle's assessment, this dissertation argues a broader view of capital's 
influence on Detroit's troubles. Detroit was squeezed by multiple economic stakeholders during 
the urban crisis, the least of which, perhaps, were the automotive companies on whom Boyle 
directs his critique. The corporatization and financialization of municipal government - influx of 
private corporations into public infrastructure and the increased power of credit ratings firms in 
determining a city's access to capital – are even more to blame for Detroit's unmaking. Although 
not fully-fledged, Detroit navigated these new fiscal and political shifts by adopting a proto-
neoliberal strategy that embraced public-private collaboration, encouraged private development 
through tax incentives, and conformed to prescription of "fiscally-responsible" as defined by 
credit rating agencies. Overall, the construction of the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery 
Authority incinerator was part of a larger trend in postwar Detroit towards fostering large-scale 
public and private development and modeled a “successful” project that still largely impacts how 
development is pursued in today’s Detroit.  
Some notes on terms used in this dissertation. The terms “resource recovery,” waste-to-
energy,” and “incinerator” are all used relatively equally to represent the same process and type 
of facility. The term I choose to employ generally reflects the context in which I am discussing 
the facility. “Resource recovery” was used by corporate backers and government officials and 
included a wide array of post-energy crisis technologies that found useful applications for 
materials previously considered waste products, including incineration. “Waste-to-energy” was 
used nearly exclusively by corporate backers and appears sporadically, usually in quotations. 
“Incinerator” was primarily employed by environmental activists who saw value and power in 




Finally, a note on the scope of this project. I end my story in 1988 with the beginning of 
the GDRRA’s operations. Yet this is not to say that anti-incinerator activism ended that year. 
The Evergreen Alliance, and later Zero Waste Detroit and the Sierra Club have continued to fight 
against the facility until it closed in 2019. Their perseverance and love for their city brought this 









“ONLY TWO THINGS ARE CERTAIN: DEATH AND GARBAGE:”  TRASH CRISIS AND 
URBAN CRISIS, 1960-1973 
Gripping a paper shopping bag and a pair of kitchen tongs, Mrs. Billie Pedigo walked from the 
Jefferson Avenue bus to the city-county building to talk with Public Works Commissioner 
Clarence Russell. She didn’t have a meeting scheduled with him, but she walked into his office 
anyway, bag in hand, on June 27, 1973. Without a word, she overturned the bag’s contents onto 
his office sofa. A rat, long-dead and covered in insects, plopped onto the sofa. Pedigo used the 
kitchen tongs to remove the tinfoil shroud she had fashioned for the creature and then turned to 
Commissioner Russell. Her trash, she contended, had not been picked up for an entire month, 
and this rat was clearly attracted by the piles of waste in her alley. “I don’t think there’s anybody 
in Detroit who hasn’t had his garbage picked up in a month,’ retorted Russell. But as the pungent 
stench of decomposing rat filled his office, Russell picked up the phone and told a subordinate to 
get “an answer on her garbage. And I don’t want to wait a half-a-day to get it either.” Pedigo, 
still gripping her kitchen tongs and now looking sheepishly down at the rat, admitted she could 
have written a letter about her concern to the Commissioner, but indicated she “didn’t want to 
delay matters.” Frustrated with this spectacle, Russell removed the rat from his sofa and dropped 
it in a bag to dispose of it himself as he escorted Pedigo back out to Jefferson Avenue.1  
 
1 Peter Benjaminson, “Sanitation Chief Smells a Rat – Right in Office,” Detroit Free Press, June 28, 1973 in MS: 
Roman S. Gribbs Collection, General Files – Detroit, City of; DPW, Newspaper Clippings 377:8, Detroit Public 


















While the retelling of this interaction may have caused some readers of the Detroit Free 
Press to chuckle the next morning, Pedigo’s act of personal protest revealed much about the 
frustration Detroiters felt about their trash and their city, a sentiment shared by residents in urban 
areas across the country and one which caused headaches for city officials from New York City 
to Los Angeles. Journalists, politicians, and everyday Americans were all fixated on the apparent 
proliferation of waste in streets and vacant lots, overflowing in landfills, and as new, hazardous 
industrial effluents. This public anxiety around waste suddenly made visible what had since 
World War II been mostly invisible. While previous generations of Americans were highly 
Figure 1. Mrs. Billie Pedigo (left) holds her paper bag containing a dead rat 




conscious of wastes either by necessity during the Depression or by duty amidst the fat, scrap 
metal, silk, and rubber salvage campaigns of World War II, the abundance and relief of the 
postwar period made thriftiness unnecessary and, for the most part, softened old anxieties about 
wastefulness.2 The reuse of old or broken materials common in the previous decades became 
associated with “poverty and backwardness.” Rather, those in the expanding middle class were 
more interested in the ease that came with new disposable products. Paper towels, aluminum foil, 
and disposable diapers all were emblematic pieces of a consumerist culture that prioritized 
convenience, cleanliness, and ease, especially for the women who took on most of the household 
labor. In 1951, the Women’s Home Companion emphasized the freedom that single-use products 
allowed and encouraged its readers to “chuck your dishwashing and laundry problems in the 
wastebasket!”3  
Yet the impact of this out of sight, out of mind mentality extended beyond household 
trash cans. With the universality of municipal trash collection and disposal, made even easier by 
uniform, city-issued garbage bins that could be picked up automatically by new compactor 
trucks, more Americans also became detached from where their refuse went after they threw it 
out. Many city officials likewise espoused an out of sight, out of mind approach to the 
management of their waste streams. The privatization and corporatization of the waste system 
meant that most municipalities were only concerned with the collection aspect of trash service. 
City trucks would then deposit waste at a city-owned transfer station, where it would sit until 
 
2 Susan Strasser, Waste and Want: A Social History of Trash, (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), 206-207; Heather 
Rogers, Gone Tomorrow: The Hidden Life of Garbage (New York: The New Press, 2005), 109; David Naguib 
Pellow, Garbage Wars: The Struggle for Environmental Justice in Chicago (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 41-
42. 
 




private haulers or, in some cases, city trucks would transport it to a landfill owned by a private 
contractor.4 There, the waste would be weighed and dumped, and cities would be billed per ton 
delivered. Yet the privatized nature of the modern waste system also distanced municipal 
officials from the actual disposal process. Divorced from the responsibility of disposal and 
assured that the private landfills they relied on would have enough capacity for twenty, fifty, 
even a hundred years, municipal sanitation officials found themselves alarmed and unprepared 
for the changes that would eventually occur as the national garbage crisis developed. 
This chapter will explore the causes of the garbage crisis as well as its impact on urban 
residents and municipal officials. Although it was called a “garbage” or “trash” crisis, it would 
more accurately be described as a “municipal solid waste” crisis in that the source of anxiety at 
the local level stemmed from the increasing volume of household waste.5 In this way, the trash 
crisis, as it was discussed by municipal officials and the public, did not take into account the 
postwar proliferation of new hazardous chemicals or industrial wastes that also found their way 
into landfills. While the baby boom and federally-supported suburbanization fostered the 
generation of more waste per individual per household, changing consumer trends and marketing 
strategies also exacerbated the growing problem of waste. As the volume of waste itself grew, 
many existent landfills ultimately filled overcapacity. Those that remained open charged 
exorbitant prices for cities and towns to dispose of their waste. Furthermore, continuing 
metropolitan sprawl and growing cultural awareness of ecology and the threat of pollution made 
 
4 Rogers, Gone Tomorrow, 12. 
 
5 “Garbage” is technically defined as being predominantly composed or organic wastes, especially from kitchens, 
while “trash” is defined as any unwanted castoffs and discarded items. In common use, the two terms are applied 
interchangeably for the same thing – municipal solid waste (MSW), which is the technical terms for both garbage 
and trash that is generated by residents, schools, businesses, and other places in a community – and I will generally 




siting new landfills physically and politically challenging.6 The financial insecurities of the urban 
crisis – caused in large part by federal disinvestment in cities – further aggravated the garbage 
crisis in urban places. In this way, the story of the national garbage crisis lies at the intersection 
of urban and suburban history, the history of capitalism and consumption, and cultural histories 
of environmentalism.  
Losing Space to Affluence: The Postwar Growth of Consumption and Sprawl 
The problems of urban trash were directly connected to two defining trends of the 
postwar period: a dramatic rise in disposable consumer goods and rampant decentralization 
across metropolitan regions. Participation in consumer markets had been a key part of 
Americans’ lives since the latter half of the nineteenth century. The rise of industrialized mass 
production and the growth of department stores that presented a “world of goods, constructed 
and shaped by the store into objects of desire” fostered a transition to a democratized “market-
oriented culture” with “the exchange and circulation of money and goods at the foundation of its 
aesthetic life and of its moral sensibility.”7 While the Great Depression and World War II saw 
the emergence of the “citizen consumer” who exercised power in the marketplace as a “patriotic 
obligation…with the general good at heart,” in the postwar period Americans began to consider 
consumption in the context of their own enjoyment rather as well as a duty to their country.8 Two 
 
6 Christopher Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature and the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth Century 
America. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 4-5, 7-8; also see Adam Rome, The Bulldozer and the 
Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 
7 Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2007), 131-132; William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture 
(New York: Random House, 1994), 3. 
 
8Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: 




ideas helped bolster and extend this transition from consumer citizen to a new postwar ideal of 
consumption. First, a wide range of economic interests from big business to the federal 
government vocally supported in magazines and public reports the notion that mass consumption 
and an ever-expanding economy were the means to creating an equitable financial playing field 
rather than the radical redistribution of wealth. Secondly, as the Cold War smoldered, American 
consumers were convinced that mass consumption fostered economic egalitarianism and created 
a classless society with more choice and a higher standard of living than the Soviet Union’s 
restrictive communism.9 In this way, the proliferation of consumer goods not only represented 
personal prosperity, but also national success and the triumph of the marketplace as a 
democratizing force for all in America and beyond.  
Delighted by their newfound affluence and easy access to cheap goods, Americans in the 
postwar era purchased more than any generation before them. Yet the proliferation of consumer 
goods also meant an increase in packaging, single-use products, and discarded castoffs that were 
considered obsolete. From 1940 to 1970, daily production of residential and commercial waste 
doubled from two pounds per day per person to four pounds.10 While the individual generation of 
waste leveled out at the four pound per day rate, it was compounded by the massive population 
boom following World War II. Increased economic prosperity in the United States and the return 
of thousands of GIs from their wartime service contributed to a prodigious baby boom, 
 
9 Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic, 114-116, 125-126. 
 
10 Martin Melosi, The Sanitary City: Urban Infrastructure in America from Colonial Times to the Present 




expanding the American population from 150 million people in 1950 to over 200 million two 
decades later.11  
Yet beyond population growth, the spread of people out from the urban center and into 
the suburbs also had a tremendous impact on the American landscape. Increased prosperity 
combined with federal assistance programs such as the GI Bill and the expansion of the Federal 
Housing Administration also expanded access to homeownership for thousands of Americans. 
This is not to say that home ownership and suburbanization were entirely new trends in the 
United States in the postwar period. But the scale of suburbanization – aided by decreasing 
construction costs and easy access to cheap building materials – accelerated after the War. While 
homeownership rates hovered between forty-six and forty-eight percent from 1900 to 1940, they 
increased an additional twenty percent from 1940 to 1960.12 The result was a sharp reduction in 
density at the urban core and unprecedented growth on the suburban and even rural peripheries.  
 As workers relocated from cities to the suburbs, so did businesses and industry. 
Commercial decentralization made new light industrial zones and business parks the largest land 
users in suburbia. As inner-city factories and offices aged without significant improvement or 
reinvestment, new suburban commercial and industrial areas – with high-tech amenities and 
plentiful parking – attracted companies away from the urban center. Likewise, the rise of the 
global economy and the relocation of manufacturing jobs from American Midwest and Northeast 
to the Sunbelt or out of the United States entirely – which took advantage of both cheaper labor 
 
11 U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990,” available at: 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2002/demo/POP-twps0056.pdf. 
 





and proximity to much-needed natural resources like magnesium and zinc – also contributed to a 
growing economic crisis in cities.13  
The scale and speed of decentralization prompted a new public anxiety about the future 
of cities that often framed the tremendous growth of the suburbs as the cause of urban decline 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Yet this dualistic perception was overly simplistic: in drawing such 
a direct connection many commentators failed to recognize the problems that had been 
developing in the cities for decades, such as decreasing federal outlays, growing deficit spending, 
and increasing reliance on short-term loans from local banks.14 Still, some of the critiques 
leveled at mass suburbanization were well-founded. A key one centered on decentralization’s 
impact on space, health, and the environment, including more air pollution from automobiles, 
soil erosion in recently cleared land, contaminated runoff from lawns and roads, and the “limits 
to growth” argument that centered on the finite nature of natural resources and open space.15  
These criticisms though rarely addressed sprawl’s impact on the shrinking amount of 
available and useable space for new landfills. As land was used to build new housing 
development, shopping centers, and industrial parks, the spread of development out from the 
metropolitan core made opening new landfills even more challenging and forced such 
disagreeable uses farther out towards the rural periphery. Housing developers and suburban 
 
13 Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor (New York City: The New Press, 
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15 Robert Bruegmann, Sprawl: A Compact History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 47; Adam Rome, 
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officials also understood that predominantly white, middle class Americans were moving away 
from cities to escape rubbish-filled streets and polluting industries, and any attempt to develop 
new waste disposal sites – landfills, as well as incinerators – nearby their new suburban enclaves 
would draw vocal opposition from homeowners ready to leverage their political and economic 
power.16 Combined with increased consumerism, suburbanization further exacerbated the 
growing waste problem to crisis level.  
Changes in Trash Composition and Municipal Disposal Strategies 
As cities increased in size and density during the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
public health officials and residents began to advocate for local government to handle refuse 
collection and disposal in order to protect public health. Municipal trash collection expanded 
during the Progressive Era and continued to become more prevalent through the 1930s, when all 
cities with populations over 100,000 provided for municipal waste collection.17 During this same 
time, cities were forced to adapt to new kinds of waste. In the nineteenth and the early twentieth 
centuries, municipal waste was generally sorted into three categories: ash, organic waste, and 
rubbish, which included rags, broken items, and other castoffs. This sorting, called source 
separation, was primarily a revenue generating measure for cities; ash was a useful binder in 
pavement and concrete blocks, while organic waste could be sold to hog farmers or “reduced,” a 
 
16 Martin Melosi, Effluent America: Cities, Industry, Energy, and the Environment (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 76. This opposition to locally unwanted land uses or LULUs often meant that such sites, 
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chemical process by which useful grease would be separated from the rest of the organic matter 
and sold as fertilizer.18  
Over time though, municipal wastes and disposal methods changed. Gas and electric heat 
replaced household stoves, making ash less common. Hog yards – which reached their peak in 
the 1939 – also fell out of use after multiple trichinosis outbreaks were linked to a parasitic 
nematode in garbage-fed pigs.19 The practice of source separation, then, fell out of use at the 
municipal level, while the rise of new disposable products, like paper cups, toilet paper, and 
facial tissues, was encouraged by developing cultural notions of hygiene and cleanliness in the 
1910s and 1920s. Cities then had to contend with a growing waste stream and, during the lean 
years of the Great Depression, turned increasingly to the cheapest form of disposal, either 
dumping waste in water or on open land. But such “open pit” dumps, though cheap, were a 
nuisance: the rotting heaps of trash and food waste smelled and attracted rats and other pests that 
created a public health threat.20  
A new disposal method – the “sanitary landfill” – provided a cheap and safer method for 
easily disposing of all materials, from organic waste to more durable materials, in one place. 
Unlike open dumps, sanitary landfills entombed waste under layers of dirt or ash in order to 
prevent (or at least conceal) its decomposition. While the process was first employed in 1932 as 
an emergency disposal method when San Francisco swine farmers refused contract terms with 
the city for their organic wastes, by 1936 it had become the city’s official method of disposal. 
 
18 Strasser, Waste and Want, 128, 134  
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That same year, New York City built their own sanitary landfill at Riker’s Island as a means to 
reclaim land and allow the city prison also located on the island to expand.21 The systematized 
and scientific approach to sanitary landfills was intriguing to municipal officials who sought a 
disposal method that could accommodate all sorts of waste and were also concerned about 
allaying public concern about the public health issues associated with open dumps.22 The 
apparent effectiveness of the sanitary landfill in both regards allowed cities to efficiently dispose 
of large amounts and kinds of waste and also gave urban residents permission to discard freely 
with little thought about their trash’s afterlife.  
Changes in the ways American lived and worked after World War II had major impacts 
on municipal waste systems. The advent of new durable plastics in the postwar years saw a rise 
in product packaging as well as cheap and plentiful toys, utensils, and other household goods that 
were meant to be disposable or – based on their cost – could easily be justified as disposable. 
The institutionalization of planned obsolesce also contributed to a growing portion of the 
household waste stream that would not decay or degrade in a landfill. The proliferation of paper 
also posed an enormous challenge for municipal sanitation officials. Paper use increased from 
7.3 million tons in 1946 to 10.2 million tons in 1966, 55 percent of which was used in packaging 
alone.23 While paper was an organic material that would eventually degrade, the volume of 
wastepaper was practically unmanageable for many landfill operators. Even more alarming, 
durable materials, like glass and aluminum, were being used for food and product packaging that 
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were touted as disposable or single-use. In 1969, municipalities across the nation reported 
collecting over 60 billion cans and 30 billion bottles, as well as 4 million tons of plastic and 30 
million tons of paper products and packaging. And all of it was, for the most part, heading 
straight to landfills. 
City officials and their private waste contractors were largely unable to foresee these 
changes in waste composition or adequately adapt once the scale of the problem became 
apparent. One solution to the problems posed by both the scale and type of waste was to separate 
out reusable materials, like paper and plastic, at the front end of collection much as cities had 
done for ashes and organic wastes before the rise of the sanitary landfill. But Americans seemed 
to be less interested in recycling and more interested in the convenience provided by a single 
municipal collection for all wastes. In 1969, only 17.8 percent of paper was recycled, compared 
to nearly 27.4 percent in 1950.24 Plus, front-end separation presented an additional challenge and 
expense at a time when the cost of handling municipal waste was growing. In 1968, communities 
with a population of around 400,000 were already spending an average of $2.5 million annually 
on garbage collection alone, plus another $900,000 on disposal.25 Yet the exponential growth of 
America’s waste footprint could not be ignored. Rather than face the technical and logistical 
challenge of removing useable wastes from the front end, cities across the country scrambled to 
find more landfill space to accommodate growing heaps of household trash. Municipal officials 
found, however, that many landfills were already overwhelmed by this new kind of waste stream 
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and were close to closing their gates. In the desperate search for places to stash the trash, the 
garbage crisis found its origin.  
“It Took the Nation By Surprise”: The Emerging Trash Crisis 
Crisis was undoubtedly the term of the 1970s. From the “urban crisis” and the “energy 
crisis” to the “housing crisis,” policymakers across the nation articulated their feelings of anxiety 
and uncertainty about shifts in the American economy and culture with the word.26 In his 1974 
budget letter to the City Council, Detroit Mayor Coleman Young observed that the city found 
itself at “a time when, nationally, we are faced with a series of crises: rising unemployment and 
inflation, environmental threats, energy shortages, and Watergate and the possible impeachment 
of the President.”27 Yet by using the term “crisis,” Young and other politicians obfuscated the 
decades-long development of these issues, many of which found their sources in both de facto 
and de jure federal, state, and local policies. “Crisis,” writes Martin Melosi, “denies the 
complexity of the problem and ignores its persistence over time, failing to question whether it is 
chronic, recurrent, or temporary.”28 This characterization was certainly true of another crisis of 
era: the garbage crisis. While perhaps not considered a defining issue of the era by historians 
today, the national problems around trash collection and disposal were certainly front-of-mind 
for many Americans at the time, on equal footing with other more familiar events of the 
convulsive late 1960s and early 1970s. An ad for U.S. News & World Report that implored  
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readers to protect themselves and their families from “The News Monster,” which left readers 
“feeling helpless, frightened, and frustrated” with reports about student riots, tensions in the 
Middle East, smog reports, and the “garbage crisis details.”29 The problems associated with the 
nation’s increasing mountains of trash were of great concern to people across the United States, 
both city officials who were on the front lines of dealing with the physical and financial impacts 
of the crisis and common Americans who were weary of the anxiety-inducing news monster. 
Like other crises of the decade, the garbage crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s was 
the intersection of multiple, long-developing trends, including increasing waste volume, front-
 
29 “How to protect yourself and your family from THE NEWS MONSTER,” New York Times, February 21, 1971. 
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end separation challenges, debates between public or private management, high costs – 
especially for labor – associated with collection, and disagreements over local versus regional 
disposal options.30 At a 1973 meeting of the National League of Cities and the U.S. Council of 
Mayors, attendees reported the “skyrocketing” volume of municipal waste and “sharp decline” in 
the available space for landfills.31 Landfills, it seemed, were filling up quicker than city officials 
had planned and local governments, confronted by growth models for waste generation over the 
next five or ten years, were forced to confront the dire reality that they simply would not be able 
to keep up with the trash without a drastic change. Public and private disposal sites across the 
country that had been designed to accommodate a city’s waste for the next ten years would be 
full in half that time, even less in some places.32 In Baltimore, city officials predicted that their 
landfill could only operate for another five years as long as waste volume did not increase and 
their two municipal incinerators – built in 1933 and 1955 – continued to operate at 90 percent 
capacity or more.33 The situation was similar in Houston where the municipal landfill operators 
had for five years warned the disposal site had a future anticipated life of “only a few months.” 
Yet the city continued to use it, trucking in fresh fill dirt from elsewhere in order to cover the 900 
tons of household waste delivered daily. Seeking to avoid the increasing license fees to dump at 
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the city’s over-full landfill, some private waste contractors had taken to buying small city lots – 
sometimes in the middle of neighborhoods – excavating the soil down forty feet or more and 
then using the remaining pit as a “merchant dump.” Regulated by no other laws than “the law of 
gravity” as waste piled up above the pit, these illegal dumps, according to an HEW report “serve 
a real economic purpose, in an interim period extending over many years in the past during 
which neither the city nor the county has been able to provide adequate disposal facilities for the 
community's wastes.”34 Though entrepreneurial, these were ultimately unsustainable solutions to 
the looming garbage crisis. Municipalities across America were coming to terms with the notion 
that they would need to locate and build new disposal sites in the not-too-distant future in order 
to accommodate the growing piles of garbage.  
But the effects of decentralization and sprawl made locating new waste disposal sites – 
landfills as well as incinerators – significantly more expensive and politically challenging. In two 
of the nation’s fastest growing counties – Baltimore and Anne Arundel, just beyond the city of 
Baltimore’s boundaries – vacant land was topping $10,000 an acre. Although both counties and 
the city of Baltimore were interested in building a regional state-of-the-art incinerator to the cost 
of land made it more economical for county officials to pay private contractors to ship their trash 
to landfills in neighboring rural areas through the Harbor Tunnel at a cost of $90,000 per year for 
tolls alone.35 In addition to an overall decrease in inexpensive open space not-too-distant from 
the urban core, the growing strength and influence of citizen groups added another hurdle to 
waste disposal. In Norwalk, Connecticut, city officials were considering an 80-acre parcel of 
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marshy shoreland – the last large open space within the city’s borders – for a new sanitary 
landfill. Yet local conservationists opposed the site, suggesting that its location along a major 
waterfowl migratory flyway merited its preservation as an open space.  
Likewise, in the Connecticut town of Wilton, HEW contractors reported that after a dump 
in a nearby town was closed by the state, town officials proactively purchased land within their 
town’s borders for a new sanitary landfill. Nearby residents, however, brought suit against the 
town and obtained a permanent injunction that prohibited the town and private haulers from 
using the land for waste disposal. With no apparent solution, all trash pickup abruptly stopped in 
the community of 12,000. The situation, according to HEW contractors represented, “in a real 
sense, the type of problem that the nation faces, depicted on a far smaller scale.” Even more than 
waste volumes and suburbanization then, citizen opposition was a major challenge for cities who 
sought to build new landfills, especially within their boundaries. “The neighboring residents of 
any proposed new landfill area,” the HEW contractors contended, “are the primary obstacles to 
the selection of land.”36 
The desperate nature of the garbage crisis, especially in dense urban areas, was best 
illustrated by a sobering chart kept by New York City Sanitation Commissioner Griswold L. 
Moeller: “The chart, which has a steadily rising top line to indicate the 4 per cent a year rise in 
total waste…projects the problem into the years ahead” while “another line, which is steadily 
increasing, shows the tonnage going to landfills. But that line ends abruptly at 1975 when the last 
of the landfill areas remaining in the city…is filled to capacity. The chart at that point is 
dominated by a great red swath that is labeled ‘Disposal Systems Gap, 15,000 tons per day.’” To 
 





meet this gap, the city considered many new creative disposal methods, all which sought to 
eliminate the volume of waste: a 6,000 ton per day incinerator, a pneumatic tube system located 
in subway tunnels and connected to a suburban shredder, and “an incinerator ship that would be 
loaded at dockside with the city’s garbage, then steam out 25 to 50 miles and burn the cargo of 
waste” before dumping the remaining ash overboard into the ocean. The absurdity and scale of 
these solutions reveal the extent to which city planners and engineers were made desperate by 
the garbage crisis. Any headway they made in its elimination one day was negated by the heaps 
and piles found the next morning in alleyways and on curbs across the country. As Moeller 
gravely observed, any “technological solution is far in the future and the solid waste crisis is 
already here.”37  
The perceived lack of advancing technology in waste disposal systems contributed to 
feelings of an imminent crisis. In most municipalities, trash was collected and disposed of in 
much the same way as it had been at the turn of the century, merely trading out horse-and-cart 
for motorized vehicles. While there had been some innovation in the form of the compactor truck 
and new hydraulic lifts, for the most part, men still walked behind a truck and hefted the heavy 
cans full of household waste onto their shoulder and into a truck to be taken to disposal sites. In 
Nation’s Business, columnists commented on “how narrow the nation’s present margin of 
control is over the mounting solid waste problem.” “[D]ue to lack of suitable planning, interest, 
and public understanding,” they argued, “this threat to the public health and welfare received 
only token attention until a few years ago.”38 Though this assessment was accurate, municipal 
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officials often had few available funds in their shrinking budgets to address solid waste 
problems, especially as suburbanization continued to draw taxpayers away from the urban core. 
There was also little incentive to pursuing regional planning or innovative practices as residents 
were less interested in such trends and more concerned with timely and efficient waste 
collection.  
Yet for all the discussion around the failure of technology to produce a viable solution to 
the garbage crisis, others pointed to American innovation after World War II as the very root of 
the problem. “The nation’s affluence and growing technology have produced an alarming 
byproduct – fast-multiplying mountains of society’s throwaways,” lamented Los Angeles Times 
reporter Bill Stockton. Characterizing the nationwide fight against the trash crisis as a “lagging 
battle,” Stockton saw in the mountains of garbage “a crisis that has its roots in the lifestyle of an 
affluent society that seemingly knows no bounds to technological growth, and consequentially, 
to rubbish.”39 Overall, the crisis was too large of a problem for localities to deal with on their 
own, especially since the potential solutions – including cheap open land or far-flung landfills – 
lay far beyond their own boundaries. Yet changing perspectives about solid waste disposal began 
to frame the issue as a national environmental problem, one that only state or even federal 
government had the resources to adequately address.   
Quantifying “Crisis:” Federal Investigations, Research, and Action 
Until the mid-1960s, waste collection and disposal had largely been considered the 
responsibility of local government. Yet the scale of the garbage crisis both in terms of volume 
and geographic impact across many cities and regions combined to develop “a refuse disposal 
 




problem that far outstrips the waste handling resources and facilities of virtually every 
community in the nation.”40 In special address on “natural beauty” in 1965, President Lyndon 
Johnson called on Congress to pursue “better solutions to the disposal of solid waste” and 
recommended new federal investments into research and development and the creation of new 
programs to assist state and local governments to coordinate regional waste plans.41 Later that 
year, Congress attributed the “ever-mounting increase” of waste in America to changes in the 
“manufacture, packaging, and marketing” of consumer goods combined with “the economic and 
population growth of the Nation, and the improvements in the standard of living.” Yet 
representatives also saw large-scale urban renewal, blight-removal programs, and an expansion 
of new construction and infrastructure projects as a major cause of the “rising tide in scrap, 
discarded and waste materials.” In this way, Congress recognized federally subsidized 
suburbanization and urban redevelopment programs as key contributors to the rising tide of 
waste. Lawmakers, however, did not see a role for the federal government in administering what 
they saw as a local service, contending that “collection and disposal of solid wastes should 
continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and local agencies.” Rather, the federal 
role would focus on providing “financial and technical assistance” and “leadership in the 
development, demonstration, and application” of new disposal technologies.42  
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The resulting Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 appropriated funds towards a new 
national research program for solid waste disposal methods, as well as grants to states and 
municipalities to develop waste plans or explore new disposal technologies and techniques. The 
Act was administered jointly through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the 
Department of the Interior, reflecting the dual impacts of the crisis on human health and open 
land. This multidirectional approach to solving the crisis, Congress believed, was essential to 
support the creation of new disposal methods as well as secure new landfill sites. But with 
municipalities spending $3 billion per year for both public and private haulers and disposal sites, 
Congress’s nearly $33-million appropriation did not sufficiently mirror the apprehension that 
cities and states felt as they pondered the future of their solid waste problems.43 “[T]he Federal 
Solid Waste program should be spending $500-million a year,” argued Commissioner Merril 
Eisenbud, head of New York City’s new Environment Protection Agency.44 
One major challenge the newly created national solid waste program faced, however, was 
a dearth of information about how municipalities and regional authorities actually dealt with 
their solid waste. To address this, the newly-created federal Bureau of Solid Waste contracted 
with industrial firm Combustion Engineering “to assess the existing state of solid waste 
technology” and “to draw some conclusions concerning the economics of solid waste 
management.”45 Combustion Engineering, or CE as it was often referred to, had a vested interest 
in addressing the questions of solid waste needs across the United States. A leader in traditional 
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coal- and oil- power steam boilers since the 1920s, CE diversified into nuclear power generating 
systems following World War II. From 1955 until the early 1960s, Combustion Engineering won 
federal government contracts to produce nuclear fuel for the United States Navy's fleet of 
nuclear-propelled submarines and develop the S1C prototype reactor where over 14,000 Naval 
operators trained. 46 In 1967, CE secured its first contract to construct a major nuclear power 
plant, the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station, on Michigan’s west coast. Yet as nuclear energy 
scaled down amidst public anxiety and the national trash crisis grew, officials at CE saw an 
opportunity to apply their expertise in building power plant-grade boilers to developing 
municipal solid waste incinerators that could burn waste to create steam and energy. In 
conducting a federally funded national survey of waste disposal needs, including available open 
space for landfills, age and performance of existing municipal incinerators, and the potential for 
regional waste disposal, Combustion Engineering had access to valuable information about the 
landscape of municipal waste practices and what market might exist for their new incinerator 
technology. 
Researchers at CE began their study by selecting six hundred cities and creating two 
groups: those with populations of 25,000 to 50,000 residents and another with populations of 
50,000 or more. In the first round of the national survey, CE collected data from all six hundred 
cities. While the first three questions of the survey focused on disposal method, disposal site 
distance from the city, and estimated lifespan of the disposal site, the final five survey points 
focused on municipal incinerators, including facility capacity, age, hours per week it was 
operated, percentage of total refuse incinerated, if cities planned on constructing new incinerators 
 




in the future, and, if so, what capacity. Yet the distribution of the survey questions did not reflect 
the actual disposal methods of the nation. Despite making up the majority of the survey only 9 
percent of municipal waste was incinerated, reinforcing the notion that Combustion 
Engineering’s more vested interest was in collecting data that would ultimately help them assess 
the market for new incineration technology. The results of CE’s survey revealed just how real the 
trash crisis was. Approximately 50 percent of cities relied on dumps or sanitary landfills that had 
estimated lifespans of six years or less. And the disposal gap – the amount of disposal capacity in 
landfills or incinerators versus how much trash was actually generated – only widened as the size 
of the city increased. According to 1975 projections, municipalities with 500,000 to one million 
residents would have disposal capacity for three-quarters of the household waste produced, while 
those with populations over one million could dispose of only 62 percent of their trash. 
Moreover, most of the municipalities surveyed admitted they had no plan in place to locate a 
new facility. “If present trends continue and further long-range planning is not expanded,” CE’s 
study continued, “there will be a lack of facilities to handle solid waste by 1975.”47  
Combustion Engineering, however, reported that most local governments were not 
planning for this gap. Less than 30 percent of cities surveyed for the report had convened local 
bodies to deal with the solid waste problem in 1969. “The only time we can get the [City] 
Council to do any planning is when the problem is so big that even a blind voter could see it, and 
then it is too late,” contended one waste commissioner. Considering the magnitude of the crisis, 
CE suggested that the “regionalization” of solid waste planning was the most promising solution. 
Yet they also acknowledged the “considerable political and emotional objections” municipal 
 




officials had to regional governance, including differences of political party across cities and the 
“fear” that regionalization would force each participating city to “surrender its authority to 
another political entity.” A potential solution, CE suggested, was an expanded role for private 
contractors in the waste disposal process. As non-political entities, contractors, they argued, 
benefitted from the “ability to cross municipal and political boundaries” which could ultimately 
help “hasten the regional approach to solid waste disposal.” Yet in recommending an expanded 
role for private industry in their report, Combustion Engineering sought to make space for itself 
as the federal Bureau of Solid Waste began to craft policy based on CE’s survey data. CE had a 
particular interest in the regionalization of solid waste disposal, as it allowed them to take 
advantage of economies of scale and build larger incinerators that could turn thousands of tons of 
trash per day into mere handfuls of ash.48 
The majority of Combustion Engineering’s report – nearly 200 pages – focused on the 
potential market for their new incinerator technology. Survey data compiled in 1969 found that 
there were approximately 250 incinerators in the United States, burning 75,000 tons per day. 
Larger cities – those with populations of 500,000 or more – burned more of their waste in 
incinerators than smaller cities and used their incinerators more heavily, allowing little down 
time at the plants except for repairs and maintenance. Yet these incinerators located in large 
cities also tended to be older – ranging from thirteen to seventeen years old – and CE reported 
that many of them would “have to be replaced within the next ten year period.” For CE, this was 
very useful information as they sought to define their market. Later in their report, engineers at 
CE laid out their vision for municipal incineration, one that they defined as a totally “integrated 
 




system” in which the contractor who built and operated the plant had total control of the disposal 
process from the moment the waste arrived at the facility to the removal of ash from the boiler.49  
Yet there were obstacles to implementing such systems, particularly in the realms of 
performance, regulation, and finance. CE, for example, called for performance standards 
“expressed in clear, quantitative engineering terms” and “government financial support” for 
developing national regulatory test programs. Furthermore, CE engineers argued that cities’ 
specifications for incinerators “should be expressed in terms of engineering performance and not 
in terms of ambiguous perfection (‘shall be odorless, smokeless, and perform to the satisfaction 
of city officials’)” when they developed contracts. Yet in suggesting such definitions, CE put 
cities at a disadvantage and necessitated local governments hire consultants who would be able 
to “translate” engineering language into something lay people could understand. Finally, called 
for federally backed research into air emissions, ash composition, system capacity, and steam 
power production in order to generate more data and create standards for the growing industry. 
“Statistically reliable tests,” CE’s report contended, “are expensive and are therefore often 
curtailed to the point that true system performance is not known.” This need was key: until 
Combustion Engineering and other incinerator companies had sound data about facility 
performance, they would be designing and eventually constructing plants with little knowledge 
about how they would actually operate once they started burning trash.50  
 In addition to gathering information, the federal government also funded statewide 
planning efforts and explored new disposal technologies and techniques under the Solid Waste 
 






Disposal Act. Between 1966 and 1970, the Bureau of Solid Waste distributed over $6.2 million 
to statewide agencies to develop solid waste plans assessed issues, coordinated solutions with 
local and regional stakeholders, and created regulatory frameworks for enforcing new solid 
waste rules.51 On the research and development side, the federal government also funded 
contractor-led demonstration projects like a municipal-scale composting plant, a household 
refuse grinder, and a hydraulic pipeline to transport shredded waste.52 Yet the private origins of 
many demonstration projects meant that much of the operational and cost information was 
considered proprietary, thus limiting the Bureau’s mission to collect useful and worthwhile data. 
In this way, Combustion Engineering’s call for an expanded role for private contractors in solid 
waste disposal had both advantages and disadvantages in fulfilling the goals of Bureau’s 
mandate. 
Waste incineration combined with steam heat recovery was a particularly promising 
disposal technology. By 1970, four plants in the United States practiced heat recovery, the most 
notable being the Southwest Incinerator in Chicago due to its complex steam delivery system 
connecting it to the massive Union Stockyards.53 Yet the use recovered steam heat was limited 
and required a substantial capital costs to construct delivery systems. Even worse, delivery was 
inefficient since steam quickly easily dissipated and cooled over long distances. In 1968, the city 
of St. Louis began to experiment with replacing some of the coal in their power plants with 
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household waste. By first removing the metals, then shredding it into pieces of uniform size, the 
city could efficiently burn the waste to produce steam, which could then be converted to 
electricity in the normal operations of the power plant. With little handling, the city could thus 
recover the usefulness of their waste. In cooperation with local utility Union Electric Company, 
city officials began testing this method in the company’s main plant in downtown St. Louis. Yet 
the scale was small – Union Electric only granted the city access to two test boilers able to burn 
300 tons of trash per day. What was needed was a refuse-exclusive plant that could handle more 
of the city’s waste. In 1970, federal officials granted St. Louis two-thirds of the capital costs to 
construct a “resource recovery” demonstration plant.54 National solid waste researchers saw in 
the St. Louis project a promising solution to the garbage crisis, both in its “simplicity” and 
totality: the necessary equipment was commercially available, the system could be tied into 
existing power plants for distribution, and the only limits on how much trash could be burned 
was the size of the boiler.  
New interest in the recovery of useful or marketable resources from waste demonstrated 
by projects like that in St. Louis represented a key turning point in federal solid waste policy. In 
his February 1970 Message on the Environment, President Richard Nixon echoed many of the 
same concerns about the garbage crisis as Congress had five years earlier: the power and scale of 
consumerism, the wastefulness of packaging, demographic change, new non-degradable 
materials in the waste stream, and the rise of a “discard and forget” culture. Yet the president 
also suggested that addressing the waste problem by way of collection and disposal alone could 
not stem the crisis: 
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One way to meet the problem of solid wastes is simply to surrender 
to it: to continue pouring more and more public money into 
collection and disposal of whatever happens to be privately 
produced and discarded…If we are ever truly to gain control of the 
problem, our goal must be broader: to reduce the volume of wastes 
and the difficulty of their disposal, and to encourage their 
constructive re-use instead.  
 
Nixon’s call for the federal government’s extension into new areas of waste disposal with a 
“greater emphasis on techniques for re-cycling materials” marked a key shift in national policy.55 
Building off the accomplishments of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, a new expanded law – the 
Resource Recovery Act – reflected this shift, including new sections focused on the study of 
techniques for recovering materials and energy from wastes and allocated special grant funds 
specifically to construct prototype “resource recovery systems.” The act also revealed the federal 
government’s new interest in the commodification of waste by encouraging market research, tax 
incentives, and government contracts that prioritized recycled or reused materials.56 The trash 
crisis, like other crises of the decade, had become a business opportunity, and entrepreneurs, 
investors, and hucksters all lined up hoping to take advantage.  
The Garbage Crisis as Economic Opportunity and Constraint 
The new federal interest in reusing and recycling materials prompted study into salvage 
markets for a number of different products, including glass, aluminum, paper, rubber, plastic, 
textiles, copper, and zinc. The argument for recycled materials was strong from both and 
environmental and an economic standpoint: recycled, or secondary, materials required less 
intrusion into the environment to extract or harvest and cost less to reprocess into a new product. 
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Yet in the United States, raw materials were still, for the most part, plentiful and were usually of 
superior quality to salvaged materials. Manufacturers then could often obtain a better-quality 
material for nearly the same price as a recycled product. Furthermore, mining and harvesting 
technologies were well-advanced and effective at exploiting concentrations of resources from 
forests, mountainsides, or fields. The same technological advances did not exist in the solid 
waste industry and most salvage operations relied on separating materials by hand. Yet this was 
both dangerous to the sorters and costly. According to EPA contractors at the Midwest Research 
Institute, hand sorting cost an average of $16 per hour, while profits from salvaged materials 
averaged only $4 to $9 per ton.57 Furthermore, most private waste companies – many of whom 
were growing rapidly during the garbage crisis – considered recycling “a nuisance” that 
interfered with their “principal mission” to collect and dispose of municipal waste.58 The waste 
industry, then, could not be relied on to develop new technologies or strategies to facilitate the 
federal government’s goal to expand the recovery of recyclable materials under its new solid 
waste rules.  
Without federal, state, or local laws mandating recycling though, efforts to reclaim 
salvageable materials relied in large part on private industry to create markets for such 
commodities. Corporations like Reynolds Metals Company, Alcoa, and Owens-Illinois all 
organized voluntary recycling centers where Americans could bring used glass bottles, aluminum 
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foil, and cans in exchange for cash.59 But these were limited in scope and – much like the Keep 
America Beautiful campaign launched by an alliance packaging, beverage, and cigarette 
corporations nearly two decades earlier – were primarily focused on generating positive press for 
companies many considered as contributing to the garbage crisis by producing single-use, 
disposable containers.60 Furthermore, these industry programs relied on consumers’ willingness 
to participate. This was easier when prices for recovered materials were high. When the market 
was oversaturated and prices fell, so too did consumer participation. Recycling then was caught 
in a cyclical market that undercut its own success.  
All in all, the challenges of early recycling efforts and the EPA’s research demonstrate 
the power of a growing coalition of government, corporate interests, and research contractors to 
shape policy and public action regarding waste and the environment. Although the Resource 
Recovery Act encouraged the reuse of salvaged materials, corporate interests – bolstered by their 
allies in nonprofit research firms – successfully lobbied federal regulators to put the onus of 
salvage and recycling under the Act on consumers rather than on industry. And while some 
Americans were motivated to continue recycling even after the high wave of enthusiasm 
surrounding the first Earth Day celebrations in April 1970, it also took effort to separate waste, 
identify disposal sites (if they existed locally), and deliver recyclable materials to corporate 
salvage operations.61 Under the guise of free markets and consumer preferences, research 
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contractors and private industry could thus pin low participation in recycling programs on 
disinterest and justify scaling back their efforts. Meanwhile, officials at the EPA relied on data 
gathered by contractors as they continued to guide federal policy in solid waste field and pass 
their recommendations on to local governments. The Resource Recovery Act thus failed to hold 
industry accountable for their sizeable contributions to the garbage crisis and did little to mitigate 
the impact of the crisis on cities across the country. 
Beyond recycling, federal interest in the constructive reuse of materials previously 
considered waste also fostered creative and entrepreneurial thinking about trash and experiments 
with new waste-based products abounded. In Elgin, Illinois, community members contracted 
with engineers to create a 100-foot long, 7-foot wide pedestrian bridge over the Fox River made 
with a blend of concrete and 25,000 plastic bottles. According to the engineers, the novel 
“plastic-crete” was just as strong as traditional concrete but ten percent lighter, saving 1,800 
pounds of concrete in the bridge project.62 In another instance, federal engineers from the 
Department of Transportation added 800 tons of sulphate sludge, lime, incinerator ash, and slag 
to cement to create what they termed “super sludge,” a powerfully strong yet flexible building 
material. To demonstrate the usefulness of the new material, the engineers paved a new 120-acre 
parking lot at Dulles International Airport entirely with super-sludge.63 In Chicago, Streets and 
Sanitation Commissioner James V. Fitzpatrick experimented with a Japanese process that dipped 
compacted trash bales into asphalt, concrete, or steel. Fitzpatrick attested to the building 
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implications for the new method, contending that “compaction is the breakthrough that is going 
to save cities.”64  
Yet most of these demonstrations failed to attract wide application. Much like recycling, 
many of these new waste-based products cost as much, if not more, to create than the products 
they sought to replace. In fact, much of the nation’s inability to cope adequately contend with the 
garbage crisis came down to questions of technology and cost. According to a National 
Academies of Science and Engineering study, the waste problem was “characterized by 
minimum attention, minimum funding and minimum application of technology” and was further 
exacerbated by “the continued reluctance of those concerned to come to grips with it and apply 
existing technology, systems and organizational know-how to its solution – and above all, to pay 
for these services.”65 EPA solid waste officials, likewise, pointed to an “apathetic” public and 
local government as the cause of “inaction at all levels” towards stemming the crisis. Disinterest, 
according to federal officials, was reflected in how much municipalities were willing to spend on 
new technologies. “Who wants to spend money on something that must be thrown away?” 
contended the EPA’s Director of Technical Operations at an environmental conference in 
Prague.  
Yet inaction, arguably, also stemmed from disagreements over who was now responsible 
for managing solid waste. While traditionally the purview of local government, the scale of the 
garbage crisis often meant that effective solutions were beyond the scope and power of localities 
alone. While federally supported regional- and state-level waste planning under the Solid Waste 
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Disposal Act created new roles in what had been a largely local issue for more than a century, 
the extent to which these new bodies would – or could – take action to mitigate the crisis was 
still unclear. State and regional planners did not always have the authority to take meaningful 
action nor were they adequately funded either by state legislators or by EPA assistance grants, 
which averaged less than $30,000 per state in 1966. Without support or expertise, local officials 
were left to cope with the crisis however they could, though they were often ill-equipped. EPA 
reports asserted that “the technology that is available and acceptable to do many jobs of solid 
waste management is not understood nor applied by those who plan, conduct, and operate solid 
waste management systems.”66 Without knowledge or expertise in engineering or solid waste 
technology, it was often easier for local officials to maintain the status quo until an alternative 
solution presented itself. 
One of the reasons a solution to the garbage crisis remained elusive was that there were 
still profits to be had within the existing waste collection and disposal markets. Across the 
country, the garbage crisis drove up the price of per pound “tipping fees” charged to 
municipalities by private landfill owners, making the disposal business quite lucrative. As 
landfills and open dumps closest to urban areas filled and closed, waste needed to be transported 
farther and farther out to the periphery, and even to other states entirely. The interstate – and 
eventually international – commerce in trash became an enormous market, and landfill owners 
across the nation applauded a United States Court of Appeals decision clearing the way against 
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legal challenges to such a trade.67 Private waste contractors, especially those on the suburban-
rural periphery, saw the decision as the complete solution to cities’ disposal issues. “There is no 
garbage crisis,” said Joseph Cassini, a New Jersey landfill operator. “We have plenty of land in 
New Jersey for New York refuse…for years to come.” Yet New Jersey’s Director of 
Environmental Quality suggested to the Appeals Court that Cassini was sorely mistaken and 
New Jersey landfills would be completely filled within the next three years. “Boloney,” retorted 
Cassini.68 Cassini’s assertion that New Jersey had enough land to accommodate New York 
City’s waste revealed the confidence private waste haulers felt that, as the crisis worsened, cities 
would increasingly turn to contractors to solve their seemingly insurmountable solid waste 
problems.  
While some saw the trash crisis as an opportunity for profits and entrepreneurship, others 
viewed it as an opportunity to gain leverage in the highly competitive political landscape of cities 
during the late sixties and early seventies. For those cities that did not rely on private contractors 
to collect household garbage, organized labor came to view their power over trash as an 
opportunity to achieve their goals in the context of urban power arrangements. 1968 saw two of 
the most influential of strike actions by sanitation workers in New York City and Memphis. 
Seeking a pay raise, public and private sanitation workers in New York City went on strike, 
refusing to pick up the city’s waste along its busy streets. “This city is going to be inundated in 
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the country, after Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Utah, Kentucky, Montana, Alabama, Oklahoma, New Mexico, 
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garbage,” threatened Alfred Katz, an executive of the Uniformed Sanitationmens Association, 
“People are going to drown in it.”69 When Mayor John Lindsay attempted to enroll hospital 
workers to pick up the refuse surrounding the city’s seventy-one medical centers as a public 
health measure, officials of the Hospitals Employees Union refused, contending, “We will not be 
used as strikebreakers. We’re not going to scab on anybody.”70 The situation grew so desperate 
after eight days that Governor Nelson Rockefeller threatened on national television to send in the 
National Guard in to remove the 70,000 tons of waste overflowing the city’s streets if Mayor 
John Lindsay, a fellow Republican, did not reach an agreement with the strikers. Although 
Lindsey eventually negotiated with the strikers, Rockefeller’s “pro-labor” sentiments during the 
incident were greeted with distrust and suspicion by conservative Republicans, who ultimately 
chose Richard Nixon as their presidential candidate later that year. “It may just be that Nelson is 
just not a lucky man,” one Republican colleague suggested. “Four years ago, it was divorce and 
re-marriage. This time it’s Lindsay and garbage.”71 
In Memphis, black sanitation workers also struck. Like their New York counterparts, they 
also saw the power of trash to incapacitate the city and assert their power over a racist labor 
system. Low wages and poor working conditions in the Memphis Public Works Department 
were a direct reflection of racial divisions in the workplace. On February 12 – Lincoln’s Birthday 
– over 1,300 black garbage men did not show up for work. Their struggle attracted news national 
coverage as well as the notice of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who came to Memphis to march 
 
69 “Trash Crisis Splits G.O.P. in New York,” Chicago Tribune, February 8, 1968.  
 
70 Martin Tolchin, “Hospitals Told to Remove Trash,” New York Times, February 6, 1968. 
 




with strikers and their allies. The strike was viewed by many as “the catalyst” the civil rights 
movement needed at the time – an issue that highlighted both the economic and social cost of 
racism in America.72 Two months later, the Memphis City Council agreed to recognize the 
sanitation workers union, a dues checkoff through the employees’ credit union, a 15-cent-an-
hourpay raise, a grievance procedure, and promotions based on merit and seniority. Yet the end 
of the strike was overshadowed by the immense grief of the black community after King’s 
assassination in Memphis days earlier. As the City Council’s deal was announced to a crowd of 
strikers and their allies, Local 1733 President T.O. Jones led the crowd in singing “We Shall 
Overcome” as tears streaked down his face. 73  
According to the Wall Street Journal, civil rights leaders “found a weapon” in garbage 
that they could use to draw attention to their unjust situation. “When garbage collection is 
withheld by strikers, the impact on the white community can be immediate and painful.” While 
the paper’s comment perhaps unfairly suggested that black sanitation workers sought to actively 
harm white Memphians rather than assert their authority within a racist economic and social 
system, the garbage strike was indeed an effective “weapon” in the fight for civil rights and 
inspired similar actions elsewhere. Less than a week after the Memphis strike began, over forty 
black sanitation workers in Jackson, Mississippi walked off their jobs too, protesting low wages 
and discrimination.74 These actions also reveal the class implications of waste, the divides 
between those who got to ignore it and those who disposed of it. Across the country, in northern 
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as well as southern cities, black men often found that the only jobs they could secure in city 
government were as garbage men, street sweepers, and on sanitation crews. 
 “Trashtown, U.S.A.”: Detroit and the Garbage Crisis 
Perhaps nowhere were the strains of the urban crisis more acutely felt than Detroit. 
Detroit’s factories, which had fueled American victory in World War II three decades earlier, 
were sputtering in the face of an economic recession as early as the 1950s. Detroit’s mass of light 
manufacturers were feeling the effects of the recession too, as the Big Three automotive 
producers – Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors – weren’t initiating any new work. Scores of 
other businesses had picked up and left the city completely, part of the national trend towards 
decentralization. Businesses were not alone in their removal to suburban peripheries: from the 
1950s onward, thousands of residents too had left the city of Detroit, attracted by the promise of 
federally-backed mortgages for larger suburban homes. This repositioning of businesses and 
residents across the metropolitan landscape was mirrored by the redistribution of financial 
resources across the area. As the suburbs flourished, Detroit’s population and tax base shrunk 
and its economic status grew increasingly troubled. 
Such financial issues made coping with the national trash crisis even more challenging 
for Detroit. Not only did it face the same volume and disposal issues as cities around the country, 
Detroit struggled to maintain basic city services, sometimes failing to even collect household 
trash in the first place. The issues of rubbish and blight often found themselves on citizens’ 
minds and on the mayor’s desk. In the 1960s and 1970s, thousands of letters came to the mayor’s 
office, detailing myriad complaints about the overflowing refuse in abandoned lots, along roads, 




about Detroit’s trash crisis – and similar crises around the country – were often conflated with 
perceptions of postwar decline in cities, especially in regard to shifting racial demographics. To 
residents and observers, the piles of trash were only one symptom of the much larger problem of 
urban decay, disinvestment, and change. 
Local newspapers also highlighted these issues of trash and rubbish, often articulating 
their concerns within the broader context of the city’s financial and social woes. In one of his 
weekly public interest columns, Detroit Free Press reporter Judd Arnet profiled problems across 
Detroit, including the “defilement of civilization:” trash.  
Portions of Grand River, which either fate or my own stupidity has 
consigned me to travel each day, have been unspeakable as of late. 
Long stretches of sidewalk are ankle-deep in a moveable feast of 
trash, which shifts with the winds. It is a depressing scene and one 
flees it with a feeling of queasiness, as though increased speed 
might carry him away from the ultimate carelessness of a 
collapsing society. 
 
To Arnet, such a scene was the ultimate evidence that the people in city government, bogged 
down by hopelessness, had simply given up on Detroit and its residents. He concluded, 
“Hopefully someone cares, at least a teensy-weensy bit.” But until he saw evidence to the 
contrary, Arnet suggested rechristening the city “Trashtown, U.S.A.”75  
Detroit’s local journalists and business elite weren’t the only ones troubled by piles of 
trash in the streets. Residents were acutely aware of the mounds of uncollected refuse. “Man, 
people are getting messier downtown every year,” said Sam Neal, who had swept Detroit’s 
streets for seventeen years, “and there ain’t as many of us white wings to pick up after them.” 
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Neal was right about one thing: the city’s “white wing” force – the white coverall-clad street 
sweepers who pushed wheeled barrels resembling winged birds – had shrunk from forty-two to 
just ten over fifteen years due to budget cuts and increased labor costs. “Detroit used to be the 
cleanest city in America,” Neal noted, “got trophies for it – but it isn’t that way anymore.” 
Someday I wouldn’t be surprised to find those trophies in the gutter,” he concluded, “Everything 
else is there.”76 
Neal wasn’t alone in his perception that residents simply didn’t care about the city 
anymore. The city’s Environmental Enforcement supervisor Robert Pontoo, also argued that 
Detroiters themselves and their changing values about their city as the reason why “certain parts 
of Detroit bear a resemblance to a garbage dump.” Pontoo was referring to a letter he received 
from a church committee complaining about piles of garbage behind an apartment building 
across the alley from the church. When he went to inspect the site, he found three of the units 
abandoned and one occupied by a mother of two who had been told to vacate the premises but 
couldn’t get in contact with her social worker. Meanwhile, garbage collection had been stopped 
at the building and the trash had started piling up. The letter, Pontoo suggested, revealed the true 
source of Detroit’s filthiness: residents felt little responsibility to each other or their city, and so 
did not feel compelled to keep their streets or alleys clean. “When are people going to start 
caring for each other?” Pontoo lamented. “The church had a complaint committee, but not one 
that would give help.”77 Yet Pontoo’s readiness to blame Detroiters for the city’s trash problem 
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reveals that even city officials were guilty of making the troubling correlation between garbage 
and the racially-changing nature of their city, ultimately suggesting that African American 
residents did not care about their city, their neighborhoods, or each other. Even more though, 
Pontoo’s story suggests the overwhelming sense of the economic and social problems growing in 
Detroit and the disadvantages its residents faced as a result.  
As early as 1968, city officials were aware of a looming garbage crisis. “How are Detroit 
and surrounding towns and counties going to handle the mushrooming mountain of waste 
produced by citizens?” asked the Detroit Free Press. One answer, the paper suggested, was to 
turn to the private sector to assume what had been a mostly public undertaking. According to 
Public Works Commissioner Robert P. Roselle, Detroit spent over $4 million per year to dispose 
of 855,000 tons of household trash. While 60 percent of it was burned in four archaic city-owned 
incinerators with no pollution controls, the other 40 percent was hauled by city trucks to private 
landfills outside of Detroit’s boundaries at a cost of $1 million. Roselle explained that the city 
hoped to replace all four of its incinerators, but estimated costs to do had ballooned to more than 
$60 million. Sensing opportunity, a number of private companies approached Roselle hoping to 
take over Detroit’s waste disposal, including Dearborn-based Thermal Conversion Corporation. 
Originally called Incineration Inc., Thermal sought a city zoning change to a parcel in the Delray 
neighborhood to construct a “massive” incinerator that could handle all of the city’s disposal 
needs in one facility. “Unproven,” was how Roselle characterized Thermal’s proposition. “It 
does not appear feasible for the City of Detroit to enter into agreement with any such 
organizations until such facilities are actually built and in operation,” he explained to the City 




make those commitments now…we’re looking and listening at this point.”78 City officials then 
were more comfortable maintaining the status quo, however tenuous, than entering into an 
agreement with a private corporation to build a yet-untested technology for city-wide waste 
disposal.  
The issues of cost that had deterred city officials under Mayor Jerome Cavanaugh were 
no better under the next administration. In fact, the city had less money to take care of the 
garbage problem while a growing environmental consciousness in 1970s America made the 
situation seem even worse. Following other cities and their newfound post-Earth Day ecological 
awareness, Mayor Roman Gribbs created the city’s first Environmental Quality Task Force in 
1971. The notes of their first meeting list fifteen concerns, including air quality, recycling, the 
quality of the Rouge River, and an urgent problem necessitating “early consideration” by the 
group “to plan, coordinate, and monitor [a] City solid waste disposal program.”79 The high 
priority of this issue on the mayor’s new task force illustrates the degree to which city officials 
saw it as a problem that needed immediate attention. But the route the city would take to solving 
that problem was uncertain: Detroit was already spending millions of dollars on haulers to 
remove 4,500 tons of municipal waste per day out to landfills in rural Wayne County, 80 but the 
city was also closing four of its outdated municipal incinerators, in part due to their detrimental 
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impact on air quality in Detroit’s neighborhoods.81 The city’s options were shrinking, and every 
day the officials put off a solution, 4,500 more tons of garbage were piled into trash cans in 
alleyways across the city. 
Detroiters, like residents across the country, proposed some unconventional solutions to 
the trash crisis. In 1971, Wayne State University Underground, a self-described “citizens 
committee proposing the underground disposal of solid waste,” wrote to Mayor Roman Gribbs 
suggesting that the city dispose of solid waste in the 1,500-acre vacant salt mines underneath 
Detroit, the decomposition of which would produce methane gas that could also be collected and 
burned as fuel by the city’s Public Lighting Department, eliminating the substantial air pollution 
produced by the “one bushel of coal per each man, woman, and child” the department burned to 
produce electricity for the city’s public buildings. In this way, the project was “economical as 
well as ecological,” the group contended.”82 Whether the city ever investigated the idea is 
unclear, but no disposal sites for municipal trash were ever constructed in the abandoned salt 
mines.83 Still, the suggestion reflects the sense of public anxiety surrounding Detroit’s dwindling 
affordable disposal options.  
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In 1973, a federal Environmental Protection Agency case study focused on Detroit’s solid 
waste management system confirmed many of the same garbage problems that had concerned 
city officials and the general public for years. EPA researchers first observed that low 
productivity levels and growing labor costs in the garbage collection process threatened to 
become “a major problem area” in the city’s future.84 Yet “perhaps more significant,” the report 
continued, “is the potential for crisis that exists in the disposal area,” an issue precipitated by the 
city’s closing of three of its four municipal incinerators in 1971 without any plan in place to 
replace them. As a result, the city had been forced to change their entire waste disposal system – 
60 percent of which had been handled by the city incinerators – to rely exclusively on private 
contractors. Under the new disposal system, the city was responsible for providing the manpower 
and infrastructure, like trucks, to collect household trash. Once collected by city workers, the 
garbage was then transported to one of five privately-operated transfer stations located across the 
city, each of which was contractually guaranteed a certain amount of waste – anywhere from 200 
to 2,0000 tons – per day. Private haulers would then pick up the waste, weigh it, and transport it 
to a landfill they owned and operated on the urban periphery. The city would then pay the 
contractor a “tipping fee” based on how many tons of waste they disposed of at their sites. In all, 
each contract the city had with private haulers cost between $200,000 to nearly $3 million a year 
for a total disposal cost of over $4 million in 1973.85 While this shift meant that expensive city 
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labor wasn’t being used to dispose of household trash, the city also was not saving money in 
transitioning to an entirely private disposal system.  
In their report, however, the EPA characterized the shift to private waste contractors as a 
positive one for city officials in that it eliminated “the problems associated with the acquisition 
and operation of landfill sites that most [other] cities have experienced.” Yet the shift to private 
contractors ultimately restricted the autonomy of city officials to shape Detroit’s solid waste 
policy for the future, especially as they often lacked good information about private owners’ 
landfills. While the city’s Department of Public Works, for instance, believed current disposal 
sites could be relied upon for a number of years to come, regional authorities who were better 
positioned to know the current state of disposal sites, indicated that the private landfills the city 
contracted with would be full in less than a year.86 In this way, Detroit’s reliance on private 
contractors to dispose of municipal waste exacerbated the growing garbage crisis by divesting 
them of their oversight authority and making it more difficult to adequately plan for the future.  
This crisis situation was emphasized by Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments 
or SEMCOG in their report to the state as required by Michigan’s 1973 Garbage and Refuse 
Disposal, which mandated every municipality over 10,000 residents submit a solid waste 
disposal plan in cooperation with regional authorities. Working with noted Massachusetts-based 
environmental consultants Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., SEMCOG initiated a survey of all residential, 
commercial, and industrial waste generation in the tri-county area. The results of the survey 
indicated many of the same realities regarding waste volume in Detroit as across the country: 
per-person, per-day rates of waste had risen to nearly fifteen pounds and were expected to 
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continue to increase annually. Sanitary landfills, the consultants contended, had not planned to 
accommodate such increases, and would quickly be phased out. The only long-term sustainable 
solution, according to their expertise, was the construction of a regional trash incinerator. Yet the 
regional model suggested by Metcalf & Eddy ultimately fell victim to the same obstacles 
Combustion Engineering had reported on in their 1969 survey of national solid waste practices, 
primarily that local officials felt that a regional authority was a “threat” to their own autonomy. 
The solution, according to EPA researchers, also echoed CE’s call for an expanded role for 
private contractors, who – as “non-political entities” – could move freely across city and county 
boundaries to provide disposal service.87  
The uncertainty surrounding the future of Detroit’s waste made the city a promising 
potential customer for disposal companies from across the country. Seeing the strain of 
municipalities to cope with the national trash crisis, entrepreneurial waste service providers 
ramped up their recruitment efforts, sending literature and representatives to convince city 
officials that their disposal alternatives provided the ultimate solution to landfill shortages and 
expense. In Detroit, such companies were particularly aggressive in their marketing efforts, 
trying to pull Detroit away from the expensive and time-consuming transfer station-to-private 
landfill process. In March 1973, the City Incinerator Company of Wisconsin and Grow-Rich 
Organic Fertilizers contacted Mayor Gribbs’s office asking for city officials to consider the 
technological advantages of their processes over existing landfill disposal.88 While Grow-Rich’s 
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primary focus was sewage sludge (another entirely separate, but equally troubling municipal 
waste during this time), City Incinerator appeared to offer a potential solution to Detroit’s 
municipal waste issues by decreasing the overall volume of waste at the back end rather than the 
front. Upon review by the Engineering Department however, the technology that City Incinerator 
was offering was not robust enough – neither in volume nor technologically – to meet Detroit’s 
needs. “The incinerator is very similar to our Brush Burning Plants in concept, design 
construction, reduction capabilities, air pollution control, and efficiency of operation,” argued 
Engineer A. Strauss, “It is our view that that for incineration of volumes of refuse of the 
magnitude the City encounters, this system has no advantages.”89 Yet the careful analysis and 
evaluation of the company’s proposal demonstrates that Detroit was seriously considering such 
proposals that sought to address the future of their waste. 
In fact, when Commissioner Russell had sought the Engineering Department’s input on 
the City Incinerator proposal, Detroit officials were already discussing another proposal that had 
come to the mayor’s office.  Black Clawson, an Ohio-based waste paper processing company, 
had offered to construct a 2,000-ton per day “refuse recycling plant” to burn Detroit’s waste, 
asking only that the city secure the land to locate the plant and pay a 6.45-cent tipping fee per ton 
of waste delivered. Less than two weeks after the initial proposal, the Mayor Gribbs gathered 
officials from across city departments to discuss securing Black Clawson the land required and 
determining the costs of other infrastructure that the city would need to build in order to support 
the plant. The group recommended a former industrial site at Ferry and Russell streets, located 
directly along both the Edsel Ford Expressway and the Grand Trunk Railroad line. Yet even 
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those at the meeting recognized the questionable nature of their discussion, suggesting that the 
Corporation Council be consulted to determine “the legality of the City entering into the 
agreement proposed by Black-Clawson.” While the thorny questions of mayoral authority, tax 
liability, and – most importantly for Detroit – project financing were worked out though, the city 
would continue moving forward with their plan to quickly accommodate the company’s 
proposal, asking the Counsel to also give them an opinion on “the possibility of using the ‘quick 
take’ method for land acquisition.”90  
The speed with which the city sought to move on Black Clawson’s plan is revealing. 
Most of the parties represented at that initial meeting – the Department of Public Works, Streets 
and Sanitation, City Engineering – were very aware of the troubled state of Detroit’s solid waste 
disposal procedures and planning (or lack thereof), and saw in the refuse recycling proposal a 
promising solution to the dual problems of shrinking disposal space and rising costs. The city’s 
strong motivation to move forward quickly with the project is even more apparent given their 
apparent ease with ignoring, for the time being, basic questions of fairness, standard operating 
procedure, and legality. Not only though was Detroit considering – even remotely – City 
Incinerator’s proposal while simultaneously engaging in serious internal discussions about Black 
Clawson for the same service, Commissioner Russell was also in discussion with Metro Waste 
Conversion Corporation of Texas, a pioneer in municipal composting. “Since the Black Clawson 
proposal…will only handle 2,000 tons of our waste,” Russell reasoned, “it would seem very wise 
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to listen to whatever Mr. Brown [of Metro Waste] wants to propose.”91 Russell then, if not city 
officials more broadly, understood that there was a growing market in waste disposal alternatives 
in the face of the national garbage crisis and was determined to investigate all of the options 
available to the city until he found the most favorable option for Detroit. 
Detroit officials, like many of their counterparts across the country, were also sharing 
information and discussing strategies for managing solid waste in the face of rising costs and 
dwindling resources. In a report to the Mayor’s Office on a national Solid Waste Seminar 
sponsored by the National League of Cities and the United States Conference of Mayors, Deputy 
Commissioner of Public Works Galen Grogan reflected on the information he thought most 
useful to the city, including comparisons with others cities in regards to collection productivity 
and a “Fair Day’s” wages. Grogan also noted that the “highlight” of the policy forum was an 
address by East St. Louis Mayor James W. Williams, who “described problems encountered by 
all core cities with efforts to maintain services and halt physical decay, in the face of a 
diminishing tax base, etc.” Grogan’s observations reveal the other issues associated with 
Detroit’s own solid waste problems, particularly that of costs and finances. Grogan, no doubt, 
saw something of Detroit’s situation in Mayor Williams’s remarks, and acknowledged the city’s 
limitations in adequately addressing the solid waste question in the face of the high capital costs. 
Concerns about costs, however, did not deter Grogan from noting the apparent success of St. 
Louis’s resource recovery demonstration. “We are observing this operation very closely,” 
admitted Grogan. Yet he and his city colleagues weren’t the only ones taking notice: “In view of 
the energy crisis,” Grogan suggested, “several cities are looking at the St. Louis process…as a 
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possibility in reducing fuel costs in power plants and also as a solution to the Solid Waste 
Disposal Problem.”92 Like the EPA, municipal officials across the country likewise saw the St. 
Louis Project as the potential “total” solution to their solid waste troubles.  
Grogan’s observation that the energy crisis had significantly changed the economic and 
political landscape around the garbage crisis was accurate: the sudden and acute pressures placed 
upon municipalities to find fuel and keep the lights on for their residents took some attention off 
of waste disposal. Yet concerns about fuel sources and costs also shifted the disposal 
conversation to be less about trash as a threat and more about it as a useful resource. 
 
92 Galen D. Grogan memo to Norman Miller, October 19, 1973 in MS: Roman S. Gribbs Collection, 1973 General 









“RESOURCE RECOVERY FACILITY A MUST:” GARBAGE CRISIS, ENERGY CRISIS, 
AND THE GROWTH OF RESOURCE RECOVERY, 1974-1976 
 On an unusually cold night in November, over 2,000 people milled around, talking 
excitedly in the ballroom of the Hilton Hotel Detroit. Ladies wearing colorful headscarves 
against the cold air and men in suit coats with campaign buttons on their lapels waited anxiously 
to see if Coleman A. Young would be elected the first black mayor of Detroit. When the word 
came that Young had narrowly beat his opponent, former Detroit Police Commissioner John F. 
Nichols, the ballroom’s exploded in jubilation, many well aware of the significance of the 
moment, exclaiming, “This is history. We saw history tonight.”1 
 The optimism expressed over Coleman Young’s successful election reflected the 
persistent anxieties and contentiousness that defined Detroit during the late 1960s and early 
1970s. The 1967 rebellion had deepened the divide between white and black Detroit, especially 
over the issue of the police force and crime prevention. This racial division featured prominently 
in the 1973 primary, a five-way contest between Young, former police chief John Nichols, City 
Council president Mel Ravitz, former judge Edward Bell, and Wayne State University law 
professor John Mogk. While Nichols claimed most of the white working-class vote, the 
progressive vote was essentially divided between Ravitz and Young. Long considered an ally of 
Detroit’s black community, Ravitz sought to inspire the traditional African American-white  
 







progressive coalition that he had relied upon as a Council member since the early 1960s. His 
reputation for building inclusive, community-centered coalitions in city politics even won Ravitz 
a key endorsement from the United Automotive Workers despite Young’s service as a UAW 
organizer before and after World War II. Yet politics in post-1967 Detroit were changed, and 
Ravitz’s goal to again unite white progressives and inner-city blacks was more challenging than 





he’d envisioned. Young won the primary with more than 10,000 votes over Ravitz, exposing the 
fracture of the traditional New Deal liberal coalition along hard racial lines. 
 The general election saw Young and John Nichols face off in a race that reflected the 
stratification of Detroit. According to Wayne State University professor and Young biographer 
Wilbur Rich, the race “pitted a liberal-labor leader with a reputation for radicalism against a law-
and-order candidate with thirty-one years’ affiliation with the Detroit Police Department [and] 
the last stand before the takeover by an onrushing black majority.”2 Young, then, faced the 
challenge of securing black voters while not putting off Detroit’s white population who may 
have perceived of his campaign as a black takeover of city politics. His strategy relied on 
advocating a sweeping reform agenda and a hard-on-crime stance, while simultaneously 
characterizing Nichols as a single-issue candidate with little political experience outside of the 
police force. In a statement to the New York Times, Young accused Nichols of orchestrating the 
heavy-handed police tactics that inordinately targeted young black men in Detroit’s 
neighborhoods and exacerbated racial tensions, referring to his challenger as “Black-Jack 
Nichols.”3 Ultimately, the high rate of new black voter registrations and the low overall turnout – 
only 56 percent – gave Young an advantage on Election Day. Defeating Nichols by less than 
17,000 votes, Young’s appeal to both the city’s white and black population was effective enough 
to make him the city’s first black mayor.4  
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Coleman Young’s election reflected the resentment Detroit’s African Americans felt 
toward law enforcement and their persistent economic marginalization, and his victory saw a 
surge of black pride and optimism for the future. “To have a black mayor,” wrote Detroit fifth 
grader Dan Gonzales to Young, “it’s just what the city needs.”5 Coleman Young represented to 
many Detroiters the gains in civil rights that African Americans had struggled towards for 
decades. The new mayor saw his election as a mandate from the people of Detroit to enact his 
vision for the city. Yet Young was inheriting a troubled city in a troubled nation. Detroit’s 
automotive industry was sputtering in the face of a national economic recession. Vehicle sales 
had fluctuated wildly since 1955, losing $4 million in three years and rebounding by 1960 only 
to fall again in the early in the decade. Detroit’s scores of light manufacturers felt the effects of 
the recession too, and many businesses that supported the automotive industry picked up and left 
the city completely by 1970, relocating out to the thriving suburbs of Warren, Troy, and 
Southfield.6  
Businesses were not alone in their removal to the suburbs. From the 1950s onward, 
thousands of residents left Detroit, attracted by the promise of federally-backed mortgages for 
larger suburban homes, often in racially segregated neighborhoods. Between 1950 and 1960, the 
city’s population fell more than over 10 percent, a trend that continued between 1960 and 1970. 
Yet at the same time, the tri-county metropolitan area, which included all of Wayne County as 
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well as suburban Macomb and Oakland Counties, grew by nearly two million people.7 This 
repositioning of businesses and residents across the metropolitan landscape contributed to a 
drastic reduction in tax revenue for Detroit. Deteriorating infrastructure and backlogged city 
services – fallen trees, uncollected trash, burnt out or broken streetlights – regularly drew the ire 
of the residents who remained.8 Many Detroiters – white and black alike – were still haunted by 
the animosities and anxieties produced by the 1967 uprising and by overly aggressive policing in 
the years that followed.  
Amidst the economic and social issues that plagued Detroit, the pressures of the region’s 
garbage crisis continued to mount. The financial implications of the national energy crisis only 
served to add new pressure on city officials to more earnestly explore alternative fuel sources. 
Detroit’s choice then to pursue resource recovery grew out of the intersection of three distinct yet 
interrelated crises – the garbage crisis, the energy crisis, and the urban crisis. While resource 
recovery had emerged as an attractive alternative to landfills in light of the financial and political 
pressures of the garbage crisis, the onset of the energy crisis made the process even more 
interesting to local planners as a cheap way to produce reliable energy with a plentiful domestic 
resource – trash. Detroit was no different – city officials’ investigations into resource recovery 
had started as a way to economically dispose of the city’s household waste as landfill costs 
increased. Yet with the change in administration in 1973, Detroit’s path forward with 
incineration was not certain. The onset of the national energy crisis, however, fundamentally 
changed the political and financial landscape of waste disposal. As cities and towns across 
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United States struggled with fuel shortages, resource recovery was heralded by federal energy 
and environmental experts as a complete and high-tech solution to two major municipal 
problems. By adopting resource recovery as their solid waste disposal strategy, cities could burn 
their plentiful and inexpensive trash to produce steam for electricity. Yet for a city like Detroit 
that was deeply impacted by the economic limitations of the urban crisis, the promise of federal 
grants and other resources to help mitigate their garbage crisis was an enticing opportunity. This 
chapter will examine how the energy crisis prompted federal support for the resource recovery 
industry and how Detroit and other cities – hoping to cash in on new federal research and 
development investments – increasingly adopted resource recovery as their waste disposal 
method of choice. 
Given the economic and political pressures created by the energy crisis, the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency designated resource recovery as its disposal method of choice 
in the 1970s, encouraging its development in cities across the country through grants and 
technical expertise to municipal officials.9 Yet these highly technical and expensive plants were 
often beyond the achievable for cities on their own, ultimately forcing them into contracts with 
private industry to build, finance, and operate such facilities. 
A “High Energy Society” Reckoning: The Energy Crisis Hits America 
In October 1973, leaders of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
placed an embargo on exports to the United States and threatened sustained cutbacks of overall 
oil production to 25 percent. Led by Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s actions were retaliation against 
President Richard Nixon’s support of Israel over Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War. By 
 




putting economic pressure on the United States, OPEC believed it could turn American foreign 
policy to favor the Arab states in the Middle East. By December, the per barrel cost of oil had 
quadrupled. Though the United States was the largest producer of oil in the world, it still 
imported 36 percent of its total needs in order to meet Americans’ enormous demands.10 The 
national energy crisis – this acute shortage of oil to fill American gas tanks, heat homes, and 
power industry – was a defining event of the 1970s and precipitated a new questioning of the 
heretofore unstoppable growth and success of the American economy.  
In his televised response to the crisis President Nixon detailed the new federal strategy, 
called “Project Independence,” which sought the energy autonomy of the United States by 1980. 
Both in the goal and the name of the plan, the president characterized dependence as a threat to 
American security. The severe impact of the oil embargo on industrial production demonstrated 
that reliance on imports left the economy and, therefore, national security vulnerable to foreign 
influence. President Nixon assured the nation, “There is no crisis of the American spirit” yet had 
he visited gas lines that stretched for blocks in cities and towns across the country or spoken to 
factory workers laid off due to manufacturing reductions, he would have found evidence that the 
American spirit, while perhaps not in crisis, was anxious, confused, frustrated, and even angry. 11 
The energy crisis also deepened the era’s growing skepticism that government was 
responsible for solving all national ills. The federal response to the crisis included the creation of 
the new federal Department of Energy as well as new price controls and oil rationing, all of 
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which expanded government intervention into the market. Yet, as Meg Jacobs suggests, the 
ultimate failure of these federal efforts to stabilize the crisis eventually contributed to the turn of 
American politics towards the right. Taking advantage of the crisis mentality, conservative 
insiders put forth a message that pointed to restrictive environmental and economic regulations 
as the reason for American energy dependence. These political restrictions limited the free 
market’s ability to locate, research, and tap into new domestic sources of energy. The solution to 
American vulnerability then was the unfettered ability to cultivate new energy sources.12  
New energy sources did not just mean turning to previously untapped domestic reserves 
of oil and natural gas. In 1974, the Senate allocated $10 billion over five years for research and 
development in energy, with the majority of funding directed towards nuclear power, the 
centerpiece of Nixon’s Project Independence. The national mood surrounding nuclear energy, 
however, was increasingly uneasy. Factions of the growing environmentalist movement saw 
nuclear energy as an unmitigated improvement over fossil fuels in terms of reducing air pollution 
and the environmental impact of extractive industries. Yet others expressed concerns about 
nuclear proliferation, a lack of national planning around radioactive waste disposal, and the 
potential for catastrophic accidents in plants.13 As utilities began to bring new nuclear plants 
from plans to reality, the partial meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979 quickly shifted the 
national mood surrounding nuclear energy from cautiously optimistic to outright fearful. Since 
 
12 Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, 7-9.  
 
13 J. Samuel Walker, Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective, (University of California Press, 




1970, over 120 plans for reactors were ultimately cancelled. Between 1979 and 2013, no new 
nuclear power plants were built in the United States.14 
Nuclear energy was also a tough sell in southeast Michigan. The near-meltdown at 
Detroit Edison’s Fermi #1 Nuclear Generation Facility in 1966 made citizens and politicians 
skeptical about the safety of nuclear power. Located in Monroe forty miles downriver from 
Detroit, Fermi was an experimental breeder reactor that would, in theory, produce more energy 
than it consumed. Early iterations of this type of reactor were considered riskier than 
conventional water-cooled reactors built in the 1940s and 1950s because their cooling 
mechanisms relied on the nonstop circulation super cool liquid sodium, a highly volatile 
substance that would explode if exposed to water or air. Both the unstable materials and the 
speed at which reactions took place meant that technicians had a smaller window of time to 
regain control over the system if anything went wrong. Thus, when radiation alarms went off 
throughout the reactor building in October 1966 followed by an announcement: “This is a Class 
1 Emergency,” Michiganders living near the plant panicked.15 
The incident led author John Fuller to describe nuclear power as “an unforgiving 
technology…[with] no room for error.” “Let’s face it,” he concluded, “we almost lost Detroit.”16 
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Fuller’s rejection of nuclear energy was echoed by many Michiganders, which left few options 
for large-scale electricity generation from alternative sources. The episode ultimately ended 
Detroit Edison’s plans to bring two more reactors online at the Fermi site in 1977 and 1982 and 
to build a new pair of reactors at Greenwood Energy Center north of Port Huron as part of a goal 
to generate one-third of their energy from nuclear sources by 1983.17 The public rejection of 
nuclear energy in the late 1960s had a significant impact on Michigan’s search for alternative 
sources of energy during the 1973 energy crisis.  
The majority of power plants in Michigan during the 1970s were coal-fired, and the state 
thus luckily avoided most of the crippling electricity shortages common in regions that relied 
more heavily on fuel oil. But the effect on the state’s economy was serious. Having built itself on 
the automotive industry, a drastic spike in oil prices transformed cars – once manifestations of 
postwar middle-class abundance – into economic burdens, drains on a family’s little income 
amidst persistent “stagflation.” Put off by the economic squeeze of the fuel crisis, leery 
consumers avoided car lots and drove vehicle sales downward. Between 1973 and 1974, Detroit 
automotive companies produced over two million fewer passenger cars for a total loss of nearly 
$5 million.18 
Although electric power generation in Michigan was primarily coal-based, many homes, 
buildings, and factories throughout the state did burn fuel oil for heat. In November 1973, 
Governor William Milliken addressed the legislature demanding their support for his emergency 
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energy conservation measures. “Few states have the potential of greater discomfort and 
disruption from the energy crisis as Michigan,” the governor explained. “We have long, cold 
winters and…ninety-five percent of the oil and gas consumed in Michigan comes from outside 
Michigan.” To address the potential crisis, the governor also declared a “Severe Energy 
Shortage” in the state, an emergency action that would give the Executive Branch new expanded 
authority to implement sweeping energy conservation measures, including suspending laws 
passed by the legislature for a period of forty-five days, mandatory outages of streetlights across 
the state, and restrictions on hours of operation for stores and businesses.  
In addition to addressing the ongoing crisis, Millikan also looked to assure the state’s 
future energy security by encouraging the development of new alternative technologies. 
Michigan’s “technological resources…colleges, universities, and private research centers” were 
among “the finest in the world,” the governor asserted, and their expertise ought to be put to the 
task of identifying long term solutions to the nation’s energy needs. Finally, Milliken outlined a 
“Statewide Ethic of Energy Thrift” that called for residents, government, and industry to “do 
their share in energy conservation:” walking instead of driving, turning off lights, dialing down 
the thermostat. In doing so, stakeholders across the state would “share our shortages equitably,” 
the governor explained.19 Yet Milliken’s message said very little about how the state would hold 
private industry accountable in shouldering their share of the conservation burden. While he 
admitted that the “obligation of government is to take actions which are effective” and citizens 
would be asked to make “sacrifices…in this time of energy shortage,” any long-term solution to 
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energy stability, the Governor explained, should not involve the “encroachment of government 
upon the private sector.”  
State legislators, meanwhile, worked to pass an emergency energy bill that protected 
Michigan residents from “heatless days and a lack of electric power” and address Governor 
Milliken’s calls for research into alternative energy and resource conservation.20 In 1974, four 
senators representing the Detroit metropolitan region – the area most impacted by both the 
garbage crisis and the energy crisis – introduced a bill “to establish a solid waste authority” in 
the state of Michigan. During the initial debate on the measure, Senator Gordon Rockwell of 
Genesee and Livingston Counties and a leading conservationist in the legislature, amended the 
bill’s title to establish a statewide “resource recovery commission,” suggesting the state’s interest 
in pursuing waste disposal and the recovery of useful resources together as a unified goal.  
By the time it had passed to the governor’s desk for his signature, the bill’s purpose grew 
clearer. The Resource Recovery Act of 1974 sought to “encourage the conservation of natural 
resources through the promotion or development of systems to collect, separate, reclaim, and 
recycle…materials of value from waste, for energy production uses, and to provide a coordinated 
statewide waste management and resource recovery program.”21 This definition reveals why 
resource recovery was so appealing to so many different stakeholders. The process was meant to 
recover value – whether through recycled materials or energy production – from waste. In this 
way, state government sought to extract worth from that which was worthless: trash. While the 
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businesses of waste management had long been profitable, resource recovery, as defined by the 
state legislature, reframed waste itself as a valuable and productive commodity. 
In Detroit, city officials believed they would have enough coal and natural gas to avoid 
the direct impact of the crisis. “In the area of primary energy resources and power production, 
Detroit and Wayne County are in one of the best positions in the country to weather the energy 
crisis without undue hardship,” a report to Mayor Coleman Young indicated. “Both major utility 
companies will be able to provide full service to existing residential customers and, with certain 
limitations, for commercial and industrial users.”22 In November 1974, Public Lighting 
Commission Superintendent Claude Bradford likewise reported the city had enough coal to “last 
until April 1,” including a commitment to supply 6,000 tons of coal to the Jefferies Housing 
Project to heat the complex through the winter. Detroit even had enough extra coal, according to 
Bradford, for the Public Lighting Department to keep the city’s Christmas tree lit the entire fifty-
day season despite requiring nearly 100 tons of coal per day.23 
Still, Young and his staff did anticipate productivity slowdowns at the major 
manufacturing plants, especially at the General Motors and Chrysler factories. A report to the 
Mayor’s Office on the crisis indicated that the “disruption caused by the decline in auto sales, 
and the shut-down period required to convert production lines to smaller car assembly may cause 
considerable hardship in Detroit” including “an unemployment rate four or five percentage 
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points higher than the national average,” up to 10 or 11 percent.24 While those future predictions 
were troubling, the impact of the crisis was already evident: car sales had dropped 13 percent and 
automakers laid off over 177,000 workers. Not only were the Big Three selling fewer cars in 
response to the energy crisis, the cars they were selling were mostly smaller and cheaper, 
prompting the New York Times to ask, “Can the auto makers earn enough from smaller, more 
efficient cars to stay in business?”25 
Young appointed executive staff member Dan Dozier to track policy and economic 
changes related to the oil shortage. The mayor also organized a new task force that included key 
stakeholders from the coal and gas industries, Detroit Edison, the United Automotive Workers, 
city government, Wayne State University, and local business.26 At their first meeting in 
December 1973, the Task Force reported that natural gas customers would most likely have 
access to fuel throughout the winter, but shifts in the coal supply from Detroit’s supplier, meant 
that 10,000 residents – including those in the Jefferies Housing Project – would be short of or 
without coal for up to fourteen days beginning in January 1974.27 These shortages, the Task 
Force found, also extended to the city’s hospitals and nursing homes, four of which were already 
reporting fuel oil shortages. The Task Force also gathered information about converting older 
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residential coal and oil furnaces to natural gas. But with costs ranging from $350 to $1200, 
conversion was not realistic for many of the city’s residents.  
Yet some Detroiters saw new possibilities. In The Detroiter Business News, Bank of the 
Commonwealth President and CEO A.A. Snyder conceded that “in the short-run, the Detroit area 
will feel the effects of the decline in big car sales,” but “in the long-run it will benefit from the 
changes the industry will undergo.” “Rather than tremble at the massive investment of men and 
money” that would inevitably come with huge shifts in the industry, explained Snyder, “we 
should delight in the challenge and opportunity it presents.”28 In taking such an optimistic tone, 
Snyder, of course, hoped that his bank and others in the Detroit area would be called upon to 
finance the plant conversions necessary to achieve such change. But Snyder was considering the 
crisis’s impact even beyond Detroit, suggesting that “the energy crisis affords us another 
opportunity [as] the nation will require every ounce of innovation we can muster if we are in fact 
to achieve self-sufficiency by 1980.”29 
“Less pessimistic than the pessimists and less optimistic than the optimists:” Detroit’s 
Public Lighting Department 
Detroit’s most pressing issue related to the energy crisis stemmed from the planned 
expansion of the Public Lighting Department, a body created at the turn of the century to provide 
the city’s electrical service at a lower cost than could be achieved in open bidding.30 For decades, 
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the Department produced energy for a cost of 5 percent less than Detroit Edison, encouraging 
Wayne State University, the Detroit Board of Education, and other state and federal clients 
downtown to contract with the Department for their power needs rather than Detroit Edison 
starting in the 1960s. These new contracts led to an enormous expansion of the Department, 
which had not seen any major upgrades to its operations or infrastructure since its creation in 
1905.  
In order to facilitate this expansion of service as well as address air pollution concerns 
from the newly created Wayne Country Air Pollution Board, the Public Lighting Department 
planned to transition their boilers at the city owned Mistersky Power Plant from coal to 
comparatively cleaner-burning oil in the 1960s. Yet what had seemed like a wise decision for the 
plant was, in light of the energy crisis, increasingly expensive and logistically difficult. “Because 
of a series of decisions by prior administrations, compounded by decisions within PLC and the 
recent events in the Middle East, costs have increased to a point where we are no longer 
competitive with Detroit Edison,” explained Budget Department Analyst Robert Banyai to 
Director Gerald Fischer in January 1974. The continued transition of the existing boilers to oil 
and the installation of new oil-fired boiler #7, Banyai said, would increase the Lighting 
Department’s kilowatt per hour costs from 1.8 cents in 1973 up to 3.6 cents in the next fiscal 
year, for a total increase of up to $8 million. To continue on the current path, according to 
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Banyai, would mean losing clients to Detroit Edison, resulting in “poor public relations” and “an 
expanded plant with…higher depreciation charges to spread over a decreased load.”31 
 Banyai offered four alternatives to the situation. The first called for city officials to 
exercise “political pressure” to secure natural gas – demand for which was growing quickly – as 
an alternative to fuel the boilers. Second, the Public Lighting Department could discontinue 
service to all non-city clients and put an indefinite hold on all plant expansion. The third and 
“least desirable alternative,” according to Banyai, was for Detroit to maintain the status quo and 
face an eventual financial crisis during Coleman Young’s first term as mayor. Finally, Banyai 
suggested the conversion of both the new and existing boilers to “utilize shredded refuse as fuel.” 
This final alternative resulted in the “greatest possible savings” since the cost of shredding and 
delivering the refuse to PLC at the Detroit’s Mistersky Power Plant would decrease the amount 
of required oil and was “below [the city’s] current cost of refuse disposal.”32 Rather than pay 
haulers to transport Detroit’s garbage to their private landfills, Banyai suggested that municipal 
waste was not waste at all but fuel, and therefore a solution to the city’s financial problems. 
Responding to Banyai’s concerns in a memo to City Controller Dennis O. Green, Public 
Lighting Department Superintendent Bradford found Banyai’s optimistic suggestion that Detroit 
convert its boilers at the Mistersky plant to burn refuse to be both too expensive and too 
uncertain. Bradford based his determination of the refuse-burning proposal on a Combustion 
Engineering report titled “Closing the Refuse Gap,” which the company had presented at the 
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meeting of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers the previous year. But Bradford did 
not disregard the use of refuse as fuel completely – at the end of his memo, he revealed that the 
Lighting Department and the Department of Public Works had been “approached by Combustion 
Engineering, Inc. with a proposal to sell steam to the PLC which has been generated by burning 
prepared city refuse.” According to Bradford, the proposal included CE’s promise to “finance 
and construct a refuse sorting and preparation facility and a steam generating facility at no cost to 
the city.” This allowed Detroit’s garbage to be disposed of for less and would generate steam for 
the Mistersky plant that was also less than current fuel costs. The benefits, Controller Green 
suggested, were “a solution to [the garbage problem] which the ecologists and conservationists 
can accept,” with “NO capital investment [by the city] other than minor steam piping.”33 
The debate about the uncertain future of the Public Lighting Department eventually 
attracted the attention of the Mayor’s Office. Young appointed Executive Assistant William 
Cilluffo to organize a task force “to evaluate the current policy of the PLC and develop policy as 
regards…the effect and relationship to PLC of the development of a refuse recycling facility.” 
The stated goals of the meeting show that the mayor was seriously considering a resource 
recovery plant in light of the Lighting Department’s fuel cost problems in light of the energy 
crisis. Cilluffo’s task, however, was frustrated by a lack of solid data, so that moving forward 
quickly with a plan of action was not realistic. “It is impossible to make an informed decision 
until and unless the facts are made clear as to what the objectives of PLC are; what its current 
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operating status is; where PLC is going in the future,” he explained.34 Cilluffo concerns about the 
discrepancies between different departments reveal the lack of clear and transparent 
communication within City government in the early days of the Young administration. While 
potentially a symptom of the “crisis” nature of PLC’s situation, such failures of communication 
ultimately prevented city officials from making fully informed decisions on key issues.  
When the task force reconvened a little over a month later in April 1974, they had come 
to a number of uneasy conclusions about the future of the Mistersky Power Plant. First, the 
national fuel oil supply was shrinking and would likely be unavailable for the rest of the year. 
This meant Detroit officials had to reconsider the planned conversion of boilers #5 and #6 from 
coal- to oil-fired. But to do so meant losing one-quarter of the funds the city had already spent on 
the total $30.5 million conversion, plus spending an additional $16.2 million to purchase a new 
coal powered boiler if they wanted to maintain service to all of their non-city clients. Moreover, 
the Lighting Department’s supplier, Burns & Roe, suggested that the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency would soon ban all coal storage in cities in order to reduce harmful coal dust 
pollution. The task force’s report also confirmed that refuse burning was not a viable alternative 
at Mistersky: the new oil-fired Unit #7 could not accommodate waste because it lacked an ash 
control mechanism. The same was true of Units #1-6, even though they were originally coal-
burning boilers. These older units had not been designed with adequate pollution controls for 
coal, much less for mixed municipal waste, and had already been identified by the Wayne 
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County Air Pollution Commission as the number one source of airborne particulate matter in the 
entire county.35 
Furthermore, even if the boilers were able to burn refuse, the storage volume of milled 
waste was four times that of coal and Mistersky was hemmed in on both sides along the densely 
industrialized bank of the Detroit River south of downtown. While the task force report asserted 
that the “conversion of Mistersky to direct firing of refuse is not recommended,” it also 
suggested that “refuse could be utilized by constructing and firing a boiler designed for refuse 
burning to generate steam for use in the existing turbine generator units 1 through 4.” The 
previous administration’s Department of Public Works, the report continued, had been preparing 
a Request for Proposals for just such a trash burning plant for over a year.36 Now the energy 
crisis gave city officials another compelling reason to move forward with such a project.  
Overall, the task force recommended halting work on the conversion of Mistersky’s #5 
and #6 boilers until a contract for fuel oil could be secured, while installation of the new #7 
boiler would continue in the hope that fuel oil would eventually become available by the time the 
unit was complete in 1976. In this way, the Public Lighting Department would be able to 
continue offering electrical service to its customers no matter which way fuel prices fell: “We are 
inclined to be less pessimistic than the pessimists and less optimistic than the optimists,” the task 
force explained in their report. “Hopefully, solid refuse may help relieve these high coal and fuel 
oil costs. Every effort should be made to use solid refuse in such a way as to benefit both the 
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Department of Public Works and PLC.”37 The persistent interest in waste as a potential fuel 
source despite the technological barriers present at Mistersky reveals the deep anxieties city 
officials felt about the price and availability of fuel in the coming years. 
Eyeing Garbage Greedily: The Impact of the Energy Crisis on Resource Recovery 
The tone and message of the garbage crisis – both in Detroit and across the nation – 
changed drastically with the onset of the energy crisis. With a scarcity of traditional fuel 
resources and new federal support for alternative energy development under President Nixon’s 
Project Independence, resource recovery – burning trash to create steam that could be converted 
to electricity with a standard turbine much in the same way as traditional carbon-based fuels – 
became a national priority. Unlike older incinerators, which often recaptured the heat produced 
by burning household waste, newer resource recovery systems focused on recovering saleable 
products, like recyclable materials and steam. Viewed through the lens of capitalism, trash was 
thus transformed from a public health threat to a valuable commodity that could produce cheap, 
reliable, domestic energy. Such resource recovery plants were one of many strategies cities 
considered to cope with their impending garbage crises. Yet high cost, lack of effective pollution 
controls, untested technology, and the ease of simply maintaining the status quo deterred many 
local governments from moving forward with resource recovery systems. In New York for 
example, city officials proposed a 6,000-ton per day trash incinerator to be built in the 
decommissioned Brooklyn Navy Yard, but after costs rose far beyond initial expectations – to 
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nearly $200 million – and community backlash grew virulent, city officials abandoned the 
project in 1971 after four years and nearly $8 million spent on planning.38  
Yet other cities were moving forward with their resource recovery facilities. In Hartford, 
Connecticut, plans were underway to construct a 2,000-ton per day plant that would come on line 
in 1975, while local officials in Dade County, Florida were in negotiations to build a facility that 
could eventually burn 6,000 tons per day. At least twenty-two cities – from Portland, Oregon to 
Nashville, Tennessee – had resource recovery systems currently operating or were in final 
negotiation or construction phases for their facilities in November 1975. That same year, the 
federal EPA estimated that approximately 14 million tons of waste would be processed through 
resource recovery plants annually over the next five years. Given the number of planned plants 
across the country and the EPA’s ambitious research and development program, the Agency 
predicted that resource recovery plants would dispose of over 100 million tons of waste annually 
by 1990.39  
While incineration had been a waste disposal option for municipalities since the late 
nineteenth century, resource recovery systems in the 1960s and 1970s were highly technical and 
complex, and the field was developing rapidly. In the first half of the twentieth century, most 
early incinerators were designed as “mass burn” facilities that did not pre-sort plastics or other 
recyclable materials out of municipal waste before burning. Newer resource recovery plants, 
however, were usually Refuse Derived Fuel – usually called RDF – systems, which used 
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mechanical cutters to shred incoming waste and conveyer belts to separate out non-combustible 
materials in order to produce an even-burning, easily combustible mixture suitable as fuel. At the 
facility, garbage trucks unloaded their waste into storage bunkers that could hold thousands of 
tons of trash. After magnets removed metals (which could be easily resold to scrappers), a front-
end loader compacted and moved the waste onto a conveyor belt where engineers sorted out 
noncombustibles like glass and rubber from the stream with a camera and mechanical crane. The 
waste then continued to move via the conveyor belt into the RDF system shredder and then into 
boilers to be burned. 
In the boiler, temperatures of up to 825 degrees Fahrenheit completely incinerated the 
waste, creating steam, gases, and ash. The steam then entered into either a city’s district heating 
system or a typical turbine-generator where it could be converted to electrical energy. The gas 
flowed through air pollution controls mechanisms, like baghouse filters, electrostatic 
precipitators, or acid gas scrubbers to remove particulate matter, mercury, carbon monoxide, and 
other hazardous emissions. Lighter “fly ash” was moistened and fell to the bottom of the boiler 
to combine with the heavier “bottom ash” before being collected and disposed of in a landfill or 
sold to construction companies who used it as filler for concrete. Ultimately, waste would be 
reduced down to a pile of ash approximately 20 percent less by volume compared to waste 
before the burn, reducing a city’s landfill requirements by up to 80 percent per year.40  
The need for cheap and reliable energy after the 1973 energy crisis revived many local 
discussions around resource recovery since facilities offered the triple advantages of cheap steam 
power, extra revenue from recovered recyclable materials, and a substantial reduction of waste 
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volume. The federal Environmental Protection Agency supported local governments that were 
interested in resource recovery with expert research and data from demonstration projects. The 
EPA-funded St. Louis-Union Electric project, for example, was able to sell recovered metals to 
local scrappers for over $20 per pound.41 Furthermore, the Agency reported that the potential 
heat energy of the country’s total refuse produced in 1974 was equivalent to the energy produced 
by burning 500,000 barrels of oil.42 In these reports and others, the EPA demonstrated that waste 
was a useful resource that could be realized through new resource recovery technology. But this 
new technology was also expensive and relatively unreliable. While some municipalities saw 
resource recovery as a potential solution to the duel problems of generating cheap, reliable 
energy and disposing of ever-increasing amounts of waste, the capital costs and high risk 
associated with such technologically-complex systems were often too great for cities to bear on 
their own. Luckily for local officials, the relatively new Environmental Protection Agency could 
offer both technical expertise and grant monies to support new projects.   
The energy crisis had a clear impact on the EPA and its efforts related to solid waste 
management. Since the onset of the garbage crisis in the 1960s, the federal government – first as 
the Bureau of Solid Waste under the Department for Health, Education, and Welfare and after 
1970 as the EPA – had encouraged regional waste management planning and the construction of 
new resource recovery plants in order to mitigate the continuing garbage crisis. Yet the onset of 
the energy crisis suddenly made the recovery of useful energy from burning solid waste an even 
more attractive process. The priorities of the EPA regarding solid waste shifted accordingly: 
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between 1970 and 1975 the Agency initiated five new resource recovery projects in Nashville, 
Baltimore, San Diego County, West Virginia, and Los Angeles. This was in addition to the 
flagship St. Louis-Union Electric demonstration project that added shredded waste to pulverized 
coal in order to decrease the overall cost of fossil fuels to the city. In order to provide the 
expertise necessary to expand their national resource recovery program, the EPA turned to the 
private sector to collaborate with the Agency on research that would ultimately shape federal 
policy. Such government subsidized support for resource recovery reflects the pro-business 
leanings of the early EPA, an alliance that left many environmentalists uneasy with the Agency 
and its role as a national oversight authority over private industry.43  
The energy crisis made the EPA’s priorities in developing resource recovery projects 
even more vital. “The current fuel crisis,” explained one Agency report, “has significantly 
increased the value of [solid waste energy products] and reduced the need to provide special 
incentives to enhance their marketability.” In this new economic landscape, EPA engineers were 
interested in developing an array of refuse-derived fuel products with different applications and 
each of the five new resource recovery projects sponsored by the EPA demonstrated a different 
process for recovering fuel from waste. Even more significant, fifteen major metropolitan 
regions were investigating resource recovery systems independent of direct Agency support, 
including Philadelphia, Chicago, Washington D.C., San Diego, and Detroit.44  
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 Yet many of the EPA reports developed between 1973 and 1976 relied on economic and 
resource assumptions that ultimately proved incorrect. For example, resource recovery forecasts 
out to 1990 were based on the EPA’s assumption that the energy crisis was more likely “to 
manifest itself as an inducement to resource recovery than to a basic change in demand patterns.” 
The rise of the environmentalist movement in the early 1970s combined with the close-to-home 
impact of the energy crisis did actually encourage change in the consumption patterns of some 
Americans. This aligns with Thomas Jundt’s work showing that many Americans who were 
concerned about corporate power over the environment and who did not see policy change as a 
viable solution used their power as consumers to challenge the status quo of American capitalism 
and politics and effect change. The strength of the environmental consumer movement 
throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, as well as successful public information campaigns, did 
much to shift the daily habits of many Americans, despite the EPA’s predictions to the 
contrary.45  
Resource recovery growth estimates were based on the assumption that traditional 
carbon-based fuel resources, especially natural gas and coal, would become scarcer and continue 
to increase in cost by up to 5 percent every year. As these finite fossil fuels became more 
expensive and energy costs overall increased, the EPA also predicted that resource recovery 
technology, especially the costs associated with processing and transporting waste, would 
become more economical. By 1990, the Agency estimated that “rising energy costs, coupled with 
increasing land costs (for disposal sites)” would make financing high-tech resource recovery 
plants more economical than continuing to rely on landfills in twenty-five to sixty-five 
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municipalities across the United States.46 Yet these assumptions regarding increasing costs for 
fossil fuels did not turn out to be true. Previously untapped domestic sources of coal and oil 
ultimately pushed prices of both resources back down to 1970-levels by 1990.47   
While EPA predictions about fuel prices might have pushed some municipalities to 
consider resource recovery for their waste disposal, there were very real problems facing existing 
plants. In St. Louis, the initial excitement that surrounded the city’s collaboration with Union 
Electric had diminished following three years of underperformance primarily due to maintenance 
issues. An EPA report on operations from November 1973 to March 1974 documented a number 
of problems with the facility, from built-in design flaws to operating inefficiencies that slowed or 
even stopped waste processing completely. Out of a potential 616 full capacity operating hours, 
the plant ran less than half, 264 hours. Nearly 40 percent of those lost hours were attributed to 
delayed trash pickup, sanitation worker strikes, and a fire that broke out in February 1974. 
Furthermore, the Agency reported that over 77 percent of the costs associated with the plant went 
towards maintenance. The pneumatic tubes that connected the refuse receiving area to the 
storage area, for example, had to be replaced multiple times due to excessive wear from 
incoming shards of glass, metal, and ceramics, while crews reported that refuse storage bin walls 
bulged out when it was filled, threatening to split the walls at the seams.48 While these issues 
were individually manageable, taken together they revealed deep problems for resource recovery 
in its early stages.  
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“To Make The City Clean:" Environmental Protection and Solid Waste Management in 
Detroit 
 
Like cities across the country, Detroit was considering a resource recovery plant as a 
solution to the dual crises of energy and garbage. After taking office in 1974, the Young 
administration picked up where Mayor Gribbs and his Department of Public Works had left off, 
even keeping Gribbs’s Superintendent of Solid Waste, Clarence Russell on staff. In a memo from 
new Public Works Commissioner James Watts to Young, Watts reviewed the actions of the 
previous Gribbs administration, including offering an enthusiastic description of a potential site 
at the intersection of Russell and Ferry Street, less than two miles northwest of downtown. The 
27-acre site would be large enough, Watts explained, to build the “recycling plant” as well as 
centralize the city service yard to one location. “Acquisition of this site,” Watts continued, “is an 
essential first step to beginning the urgent task of replacing the shamefully inadequate hovels 
now used as District Service facilities [and] permitting the return to the tax rolls of this valuable 
property and initiating action to construct a Recycling Plant.”49 
The site was in many ways ideal for a resource recovery plant. In addition to being 
nearby an existing Detroit Edison power plant, the site also was located at the intersection of the 
area’s two major expressways, the east-west Edsel Ford Expressway and the north-south 
Chrysler Expressway from which waste haulers could drive loads from the entire length of the 
city. Watts’s memo also described a facility that was far larger than anything considered by the 
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previous administration, one that could process up to 4,000 tons of waste per day. This was more 
than twice the capacity of any other existing resource recovery plant in the United States.50 
 James Watts was an unusual leader for such a project. A lawyer and former president of 
the Michigan NAACP, he had very little experience in waste management, building codes, or 
most other responsibilities expected of the city’s Public Works Department. What he did have 
was the trust of Coleman Young, with whom he had worked as a United Automobile Workers 
organizer for thirty years. “Mayor Young,” Watts wrote to DPW workers in 1974, “has told me 
to make Detroit ‘the cleanest big city in the nation’…I intend to do just that.”51 Young knew he 
could rely on his friend and colleague, who he often called “Jimmy” in official city 
communications, to forward his administrative vision.  
Despite being described by local media as abrasive and outspoken, Watts also understood 
the power of media to sway public opinion and lend legitimacy to the new administration. In a 
memo to mayoral assistant William Cilluffo, Watts complained that the lack of a permanent 
publicist in his department left him ill-equipped to distribute accurate and engaging stories on the 
city’s work in environmental protection to the general public. “To complicate matters, we are 
now moving into some new areas of concern in environmental protection which will require a 
full-scale information program.” Watts argued that effectively communicating the city’s interest 
in environmental concerns that would improve the quality of life for Detroiters could be a major 
boon to the city’s image when so many other things – the budget, racial tensions, labor unrest –  
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were going wrong. “[A] well-planned and implemented public information program…will  
enable us to tell the public what Mayor Young is doing to protect the environment and keep the 
City clean,” explained Watts. In a statement to Public Works employees following his 
appointment, Watts called his new role “the greatest personal challenge of my life.”52 That was 
probably true. And the greatest challenge of Watts’ new role would be to make the city’s 
Resource Recovery facility a reality. 
Yet James Watts had other, more urgent battles to fight in the months following his 
appointment. The first was the reclassification of his department from Public Works to the 
Environmental Protection and Maintenance Department under the new 1974 City Charter. While 
 
52 DPW Newsletter February 1974 in MS: Coleman A. Young Papers 36:7 Public Works #1 1974, Detroit Public 
Library, Burton Historical Collection. 
Figure 4. Mayor Coleman Young and James Watts (right). Department of Public Works Newsletter, 




this reconfigured unit performed many of the same tasks as its predecessor, the altered name 
revealed city officials’ growing awareness of the environment, pollution, and public health. This 
change mirrored broader shifts in American culture as environmentalism became more 
mainstream. The establishment of Earth Day, the creation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, national battles for the preservation of open space, and increasingly visible “green” 
consumer movements all contributed to the shaping of a new national consciousness related to 
the environment.53 This increased consciousness was also reflected in the very language of the 
new city charter: whereas the previous charter did not once mention the word “environment” 
under the twenty-two duties of the Public Works Department, the word appeared in all four 
sections defining the new department and its role in city administration.54  
The new Environmental Protection and Maintenance Department’s responsibilities 
included street maintenance, vehicle management, building maintenance, and solid waste 
management, including the continued work towards the construction of a new resource recovery 
plant. Although the enumerated duties were substantially the same as those under Public Works, 
the new charter language was more vague, which Watts seized as a reason to draw in new 
responsibilities previously managed by other departments, including managing the City Pound 
and the Engineering Department. Watts’s consolidation efforts did have some benefits to Detroit. 
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The Engineering Department, for example, had no Personnel Office or individual who negotiated 
with the labor unions represented in the Department, which Watts argued put their employees at 
a disadvantage. “I think,” explained Watts, “this is another reason why the City Engineering 
Department should be returned to the Environmental Protection and Maintenance Department 
where it rightfully belongs (smile).” Yet the expansion of his Department to encompass more 
staff and more responsibilities ultimately created more work for an already overtaxed James 
Watts.  
The most pressing problem Watts faced was a projected financial shortfall in 1975. The 
Budget Office’s analysis for the city’s approaching fiscal year anticipated a $100 million deficit. 
Analysts pointed to decreased property tax revenue as more residents continued to leave for the 
suburbs, as well as decreased income tax revenue as national “stagflation” caused layoffs in 
businesses across the city, especially in manufacturing plants.55 While similar situations played 
out in cities across the country, Detroit – with its reliance on a single industry – was particularly 
vulnerable to national economic slowdowns. Budget Director Walter Stecher’s notes outlining 
other municipalities’ responses to their own budget woes read as an ABCs of urban austerity in 
the 1970s: Atlanta cancelled all annual pay raises for city employees, Baltimore instituted a 
hiring freeze and cut over 2,500 positions within city government, while Cleveland laid off over 
1,000 employees and reduced garbage collection to once every two weeks. Yet Stecher seemed 
most compelled by New York City’s sweeping austerity measures, drawing a star next to his 
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notes on their strategy: nearly 25,000 city workers laid off, five fire stations closed, and police 
officers taking on unpaid overtime to avoid layoffs.56  
Detroit would replicate some of the same measures to meet their budget shortfall. 3,200 
city layoffs would account for $52 million of the anticipated gap. All city employees were asked 
to write to the Mayor, foregoing their annual pay raise. The Budget Office meanwhile asked each 
department to present two scenarios, one that reduced their operating budget 15 percent, another 
by 25 percent. In Watts’s department, the 25 percent reduction could only be achieved through 
the elimination of twenty different budget items, from all new city vehicle purchases (including 
500 new police cruisers and motorcycles) and all alley cleaning and street resurfacing to all 
backup garbage crews and all security watchmen for city buildings.57 While the Budget 
Department only reduced Watts’s budget by 15 percent by the end of the cuts, that reduction 
included over 600 employees.58 Understaffed and underfunded, Watt’s Environmental Protection 
and Maintenance Department thus struggled to keep up with the new responsibilities the Director 
had brought under his purview. 
It was this impending budget crisis that drew Watts towards resource recovery. During a 
budget review meeting in April 1974, Finance Director Dennis Green asked Watts what his plan 
was for solving the city’s “refuse disposal problems.” While it’s unclear if Watts had an adequate 
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answer for Green, in a memo to Young following this discussion, Watts suggested that the 
mayor’s “conversation with Mr. Henry Ford II, about Detroit’s disposal problems and their staff 
review in the total waste management problem in this area” prompted him to revisit the previous 
administration’s research into resource recovery.59 What he found was an extensive market 
analysis prepared in collaboration with accounting firm Price Waterhouse Company and 
communication with four resource recovery companies for preliminary plant designs. Yet this 
previous exploration into resource recovery was on a much smaller scale and was likely already 
obsolete. With expanding federal support for resource recovery research and development in 
response to the energy crisis, the field had changed and grown substantially since the Gribbs 
administration. Many new companies were actively recruiting city partners to collaborate with 
on what had the potential to be a lucrative opportunity.  
Resource Recovery, Private Industry, and the Power of Expertise 
 With the reinvigoration of resource recovery across the country after the energy crisis, 
private industry regularly reached out to municipalities offering their expertise in constructing, 
operating, and financing large-scale refuse plants. In September 1974, Waste Resources 
Corporation and Combustion Engineering together submitted a proposal to Detroit for a “City-
Wide Resource Recovery System.” The system would, according to the proposal, “minimize 
dependence on land for disposal” and “conserve natural resources,” concerns that were more 
reflective of the city’s garbage crisis of the 1960s and early 1970s. But the companies also 
acknowledged in their proposal the concerns brought on by the energy crisis and air pollution 
compliance at the city’s Mistersky Power Plant, stating the project’s objective was to “provide 
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long-term lower cost [energy] solution for the City of Detroit” and “replace non-complying 
power boilers with a new refuse boiler at no cost to Public Lighting.” The system that Waste 
Resources and CE proposed, however, was a three phase project completed over multiple years 
and across three different locations, each of which included major capital investment: $14.2 
million in Phase I, 24.8 million for Phase II, and $42.7 Million for Phase III for a grand total of 
nearly $82 million.60  
The Waste Resources-CE proposal described a resource recovery system that was 
“pollution free” and further explained that the company dedicated “relatively large resources” to 
keeping up with developments in “the broad field of environmental protection and control.” By 
centering their expertise in environmental protection and public health – both challenging issues 
in solid waste management – the companies made a persuasive argument to Detroit officials, 
who were struggling to bring their aging power plant into emissions compliance in the midst of a 
mounting budget crisis.61  
CE saw the value in offering a top-to-bottom array of services including a dedicated task 
force to oversee the initial feasibility study to creating a new management division that would 
handle the day-to-day operations of the incineration plant once it was complete. It was this 
complete integration of expert services that allowed CE to state they could finish projects more 
“efficiently and economically” than the public sector alone. Corporate funding, they argued, 
allowed for expertise in all aspects, including “architectural, mechanical, electrical, structural, 
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traffic and highway, and construction management.” In a growing and comparative field of 
private contractors, CE’s status as a “totally integrated company” was a compelling argument in 
favor of the company’s effectiveness and reliability for municipalities looking to implement 
large-scale projects despite limited resources – monetary or expertise-related – of their own.62 As 
more cities moved away from landfills and towards resource recovery, corporations – often with 
EPA support – sought to position themselves in the emerging public-private landscape of 
resource recovery. 
In the postwar period, Americans often looked to science and technology to make daily 
life easier and control the chaos of the natural world. 63 City officials, likewise, often put their 
faith in the scientific and technological expertise of private industry to address the inefficiencies 
of municipal services. This was particularly the case as the nation’s political landscape shifted 
away from governmental efforts to foster economic and political equity to a more individualistic 
and conservative politics in which government protected and supported the free market between 
the 1960s and 1970s.64 This ideological shift at the federal and state levels ultimately contributed 
to the evisceration municipal services across the nation during the late 1970s and 1980s, as cash-
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strapped cities, once the beneficiaries of grants, revenue sharing, and equity packages, turned to 
private development to solve urban problems.65  
In such a new and highly-technological field, city officials often did not have the 
knowledge to compare different proprietary systems, evaluate pollution controls, or fully 
consider the complex financing mechanisms available, forcing them to pay consultants for their 
expert opinions or, in some situations, rely on information from resource recovery developers 
themselves. On Long Island, Islip Supervisor Frank Jones explained, “[Consultants] have an 
inordinate amount of influence…In incineration you have no idea what state of the art is and you 
have to rely almost exclusively on them for judgments. I wouldn’t know water wall or mass burn 
or RDF from Joe DiMaggio.”66 This dependence on corporate expertise gave the private sector 
enormous influence over the public sphere and the direction of municipal waste management for 
decades to come. 
City officials in Detroit were in a similar situation. James Watts had no past experience 
with solid waste management, much less in resource recovery. While some individuals in his 
department had worked in the solid waste field for years, resource recovery was still relatively 
new and its complex, high-tech nature made it inaccessible except to the most advanced 
engineers. Thus, officials in the city’s Environmental Protection and Maintenance Department 
readily admitted that “Private industry…may be better able to do the research and development 
and marketing work necessary for the beneficial recovery of materials and energy from solid 
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waste.”67 In relying on private industry for public services, however, Detroit risked falling into 
the same situation as Islip and other towns and cities across the country: that public policy 
decisions would be heavily influenced by corporate actors who had a vested interest in 
promoting the business of resource recovery. 
Yet private industry in Detroit was also struggling with the economic impact of the 
energy crisis and a national recession, including potential stakeholders in the city’s resource 
recovery plans. In a meeting with a financial broker and analyst with ties to Detroit Edison, 
William Cilluffo learned that, if the broker’s information was accurate, the utility was on the 
“verge of bankruptcy.” Because of the energy crisis, the company had spent over $75 million 
more than they had brought in, and regulatory issues precluded them from raising the necessary 
capital in the stock market or through new bonds. “The only source of cash available to the 
company,” according to a report on the meeting from Finance Director Dennis Green, “is rate 
increases” nearing “approximately 100%.” Considering the alternatives to the city in the form of 
diminishing grid capacity and increased brownouts, Green recommended that Detroit officials 
take a stance of “no opposition” to rate increases during the next public rate hearing. In return for 
the favor, Green suggested that the city could prevail upon the expertise of Edison consultants 
during the future resource recovery negotiations.68 Such a partnership would provide Detroit 
with a key economic advantage as they pursued a resource recovery plant in that they had a 
guaranteed customer for the steam or electricity generated by the plant.   
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The Resource Recovery Task Force and the Request for Qualifications: The City’s Vision 
for Solid Waste Disposal 
In March 1975, EPMD sent a Request for Qualifications directly to twenty-three resource 
recovery companies and ten trade periodicals, seeking information from private industry “to 
design, construct, finance, and operate a Solid Waste Resource Recovery System” that would 
“solve the Solid Waste Disposal problem within the City’s boundaries.” This initial exploration 
called for proposals that included both a separation system that would remove glass and metals 
from the waste stream for resale and an energy conversion system. The city’s vision as presented 
in the RFQ further described a multi-phase system of three separate incinerators to be built over 
three years that could burn a total of 5,500 tons of waste per day when completed. This was a far 
larger project than had ever been previously considered by either the Gribbs or the Young 
administration and could accommodate 3,500 more tons per day than any resource recovery plant 
that had ever been built in the United States.69  
Given the unprecedented size and scale of the proposed facility, as well as Detroit’s own 
budget issues, the city’s Request for Qualifications centered on companies’ financial soundness 
and explained that interested firms would only advance to the formal proposal process if they 
could demonstrate “the financial plan to implement the system.” Detroit also sought detailed 
information about the potential marketability of recovered resources and firms’ design and 
operational experiences related to recycling, energy conversion, and solid waste processing. 
Notably, nowhere in any of the questions to the proposers did the city mention the potential 
environmental impact, positive or negative, of the system. This silence demonstrates that 
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Detroit’s primary concern in building a resource recovery plant was the economic benefits in the 
form of saleable commodities and reduced disposal costs over the long-term. Yet the city’s 
silence on environmental issues also suggests the persuasiveness of companies’ assertions – 
especially given Combustion Engineering’s proposal six months earlier – that resource recovery 
systems were environmentally sound and completely safe.70  
Over the next two months, the Resource Recovery Task Force received twenty-four 
proposals (although in the press James Watts would put that figure “between 50 and 60”71). On 
May 12, 1975, Coleman Young asked Watts to convene an evaluation committee to review the 
proposals and recommend which companies Detroit would continue to negotiate with towards a 
final contract. The committee, according to Young, would include two members each from the 
Environmental Protection and Maintenance Department, the Public Lighting Department, City 
Engineering, the Law Department, the Finance Department, and three representatives from 
Detroit Edison. The mayor also told Watts to establish a “Blue Ribbon Committee,” consisting of 
representatives from “outside government, like Ford, General Motors and U.A.W.” that would 
help evaluate the proposals after an initial weeding out process by the city. Young understood 
that such a large-scale, expensive project would need buy-in from Detroit’s key economic 
stakeholders in order to be perceived by press and public what Lynda Ann Ewan has called the 
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city’s “ruling class,” a cohort of corporate leaders and influential families who used their 
economic power to exert ideological dominance across Detroit and the metropolitan region.72 
At a meeting of municipal services directors later that week, Watts shared the mayor’s 
vision for moving forward and also articulated his own concerns regarding the potential facility 
site at the intersection of Russell and Ferry streets. While Detroit’s Request for Qualifications 
assumed that any proposed plant would be built to fit this site, the City Council had not 
appropriated money to purchase the land in the 1975 budget nor in the upcoming budget year. 
While Mayor Young had told Watts to work with the Budget Department “so we can start 
moving on it,” Environmental Protection and Maintenance Deputy Commissioner Bernard 
Panush explained that there was still uncertainty whether or not there was actually enough space 
available at the Russell-Ferry site to accommodate the massive facility they envisioned in the 
RFQ. Panush suggested that City Engineering, Corporation Counsel, and Public Lighting review 
the site over the next week to account for space, before the Task Force met to evaluate RFQs. “If 
we do not select a site,” he suggested, “what good are proposals?”73 This cart-before-the-horse 
approach underlines the troubling lack of mindful planning with which Watts and the Young 
administration pursued resource recovery, resulting in inefficiencies and competing goals 
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Evaluating Detroit’s RFQ: A Case for Economics over Environment 
After reviewing the twenty-four total proposals, the evaluation task force identified 
thirteen “qualified” bidders that had both the financial means and technical experience to build 
what would be the nation’s largest resource recovery facility. A review of the twenty-four 
bidders reveals much about resource recovery at this time. The majority of the companies were 
not involved in resource recovery as their primary industry. In fact, some of them were not 
involved in waste disposal of any sort. Monsanto was the infamous chemical company 
responsible for producing DDT and Agent Orange, Raytheon was an electronics and radio firm 
with deep ties to the United States military, and Black-Clawson was a paper producer based out 
of Franklin, Ohio. Others came to resource recovery by way of waste- or energy-related 
industries: Proler International had a background in metals recycling and Garrett Research was 
actually a division of Occidental Petroleum Corporation.74  
These various pathways to the resource recovery market reflected how the field 
developed throughout the 1960s and 1970s, first in response to the garbage crisis and then the 
energy crisis. As cities struggled to cope with the volume of their municipal waste in the 1960s, 
the recovery of recyclable materials and the reduction of waste’s volume was a key priority for 
the federal solid waste officials and private waste processors. Later during the energy crisis, 
national research into alternative fuels that could replace or supplement traditional fuel oil 
created opportunities for the private sector to explore processes like waste-to-energy incineration 
or pyrolysis, the creation of an oil-like fuel from burning waste, with the backing of federal 
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government contracts. Economic slowdowns during the 1970s also led other industrial producers 
to shift some of their business to resource recovery. This was especially true of nuclear power 
engineering firms, like Combustion Engineering, which had many of their lucrative government 
contracts cancelled throughout the decade as public fears about the safety of nuclear energy 
grew. Resource recovery seemed a promising field. In addition to millions of dollars in federal 
grants, city officials were actively searching for reliable and cost-efficient ways to dispose of 
their waste and – having little technological expertise in resource recovery themselves – were 
highly dependent on consultants or firms themselves for information about the different 
processes and systems.75 This reliance on outside expertise thus put important policy decisions 
that would impact urban residents in the hands of private industry, not elected officials. 
The Task Force’s evaluation of the RFQ responses, as presented to Mayor Young on 
August 4, reveals much about the city’s priorities in constructing such a system. Addressing the 
emphasis on the economic opportunities afforded by resource recovery and marketable materials 
presented by city officials in the Request for Qualifications, ten of the thirteen respondents 
proposed front end recovery systems that separated marketable materials, like metals and glass, 
out of the waste stream before the remaining refuse was burned to generate steam. This emphasis 
on economic benefits the system would bring to Detroit was present throughout the Task Force’s 
report to the mayor. The prime objective of a resource recovery system, Task Force members 
argued in the report, was “the economical disposition of municipal solid waste,” a goal officials 
hoped to achieve by identifying local markets for steam heat and the metals and glass removed 
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from the waste stream, as well as through the “cost savings” the city would realize in eliminating 
the reliance on landfills far off in rural Wayne County.76 
Yet Detroit officials sought solutions to many different economic problems in a resource 
recovery plant, not all of which were possible as various city departments pursued different 
goals. All of the Environmental Protection and Maintenance Department’s objectives, for 
example, addressed concerns that stemmed from the garbage crisis, while the Public Lighting 
Department was concerned with the uncertain future of the Mistersky Plant in light of the energy 
crisis. The planned conversion of the plant’s coal-fired boilers to oil in order to comply with the 
Clean Air Act had been held up by the energy crisis and, in the meantime, Mistersky continued 
to burn coal and knowingly violate federal emissions regulations. When it came to selecting a 
resource recovery company, Public Lighting’s objectives, then, focused on a contractor’s ability 
to burn enough waste to match the capacity of the city’s coal-fired boilers. In this way, the 
Detroit’s Public Lighting clients would see no changes to their service and the city could retire 
the polluting coal boilers permanently. In order to meet Public Lighting’s 204-megawatt 
capacity, any resource recovery system would need to burn up to 4600 tons per day in an 
“emergency maximum” situation or 2,880 tons per day in a “normal use” state. These needs 
could, for the most part, be easily met as James Watts reported the city collected between 2,200 
and 4,000 tons of household waste per day. If officials sought to sell their steam to Detroit 
Edison, however, city workers would need to collect and burn over 7,500 tons of waste per day 
to meet the utility’s maximum needs. While Young and Watts both considered selling their 
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steam to Detroit Edison as an ideal way to generate much-needed additional revenue, it seemed 
unlikely that the city could meet the required waste volumes, especially given Detroit’s 
consistently shrinking population.77  
The review of the thirteen qualified bidders led the Resource Recovery Task Force to 
recommend a three-phase approach in order to accommodate larger waste volumes over time, but 
with less initial cost and, therefore, less financial risk. Phase I would include a 3,000 ton per day 
“recycling installation” located at the Mistersky plant that would use “processed fuel” to provide 
steam only to the city’s Public Lighting Department and would utilize that plant’s existing turbo-
generators to create electricity. Phase II would see collaboration between the city and Detroit 
Edison to build a second 3,000 tons per day plant – preferably at Mistersky, but potentially at the 
much-larger Russell-Ferry site. Yet in order to even consider starting Phase II, Detroit would 
have to assure Detroit Edison that they could deliver double the amount of household waste they 
currently collected from city residents. Where that waste would come from – other nearby cities, 
industrial and commercial clients, or a growing city population – was unclear in the report. 
Detroit officials, then, were endorsing a resource recovery plan to Mayor Young without any 
strategy for acquiring the resources to enact that plan.  
This dilemma, however, underlined one of the challenges of resource recovery, namely 
that in framing trash as a sought-after resource it became a new thing entirely, one totally 
separated from its origin. In falling into such thinking, city officials and contractors embraced the 
production of more waste by residents even though increasing waste volumes lay at the heart of 
the earlier garbage crisis. The Task Force report reflects such waste-as-commodity thinking. Its 
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technical language obfuscated the burning process and divorced trash from its origin. Viewed 
through the lens of capitalism, waste became “fuel” and incineration became environmentally-
sound “resource recovery.” When it came to actually protecting the environment, however, 
Watts and other task force members discussed the regulations they needed to adhere to as 
obstacles to their vision rather than rules put in place to protect the health and well-being of 
residents. Task Force members, for example, anticipated that the Wayne County Air Pollution 
Control Board would oppose the siting of both the Phase I and Phase II systems at the Mistersky 
site, given that it was already in noncompliance with the Clean Air Act. Yet bringing the refuse-
fired boilers in line with pollution standards at Mistersky and building another separate facility at 
Russell-Ferry ultimately meant more cost to the city and was, therefore, not the ideal path 
moving forward.78  
“Cooperation Between City Government and Private Enterprise:” Detroit Edison, Private 
Utilities, and Public Works 
At the same Request for Qualifications report meeting with Mayor Young and the 
Resource Recovery Task Force, representatives from Detroit Edison made their case to be a 
collaborator on the project. While the Task Force concluded they could not provide enough 
waste to fulfill both the Public Lighting Department’s and Detroit Edison’s needs, 
representatives from the utility were convinced that access to cheap and reliable steam from a 
resource recovery plant was key to their economic survival. In the company’s pitch to city 
government, Systems Planner Norman Styczynski laid bare Detroit Edison’s financial struggles 
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from the energy crisis and the decline of their Detroit-area customer base following the city’s 
depopulation in the late 1960s and 1970s. “[T]he Central Heating System is in serious financial 
trouble,” he wrote, “and may eventually be forced to discontinue its operation [leaving] over 
1000 customers in the heart of Downtown…without a source of heat.” Styczynski continued, 
emphasizing the financial losses the city would sustain if Detroit Edison were forced to scale 
back their services: “The cost of installing their own [heating] systems may drive many…out of 
the City. There will also be the potential loss of tax revenue.” At a time when Detroit had lost 5 
percent of its jobs every year since 1972 and federal aid to cities had dried up, the threat of losing 
more tenants in the central business district was a powerful motivator. “The only alternative,” 
Styczynski argued, “is…steam generation by the use of solid waste.”79 
Styczynski also played to city officials’ hope to build the resource recovery plant quickly 
and on their terms. In an effort to promote transparency and accountability, Detroit’s city charter 
mandated a public and open bid process that gave all contractors an equal opportunity to apply 
for city projects. Yet the charter also required officials to select the lowest project bidder, even if 
that company did not meet all of the city’s other preferences in terms of previous experience, 
financing capabilities, plant size, and other requirements.80 Styczynski characterized this 
situation as a “Time Consuming Process” that left Detroit open to legal challenges from its 
citizens or environmental groups during the public comment period. On the other hand, if the 
city somehow could justify not engaging in an open bid process and pursuing a negotiated 
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contract with the contractor of their choice, they would be even more likely to face legal 
challenges. Instead, Styczynski proposed a “Joint Venture” between Detroit and Detroit Edison 
in which most of the contract negotiations, plant design, and regulatory matters would be 
handled by the utility in return for “guaranteed” steam purchase for the company’s heating grid. 
As a private utility rather than a municipal government, Detroit Edison was not held to the same 
level of transparency in their negotiations with contractors nor was it subject to the same level of 
scrutiny by citizens. Styczynski summed up his argument with an enticing scenario for city 
officials: “No Legal Challenge – Construction Starts Promptly.”81 
A second benefit that a partnership with Detroit Edison offered was political leverage in 
suburban communities and existing infrastructure in the surrounding region that could facilitate 
the collection of up to 10,000 tons of waste per day. Detroit could not interfere with the 
“wastesheds” of other towns and cities and the distrust – even outright animosity – some 
suburban communities felt for Detroit would not have made trash-sharing a likely option 
anyway. But as the electricity provider for all of southeastern Michigan from Port Austin at the 
tip of Michigan’s “Thumb region” to Luna Pier six miles north of the Ohio border, Detroit 
Edison had enormous sway over the communities in its eleven-county service area, as well as the 
extensive rail infrastructure that could make transporting waste across the region more efficient. 
By leaning on its corporate power in the suburbs to procure more refuse, Detroit Edison could 
provide a robust enough district heating system to facilitate some of Mayor Young’s major 
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development goals, including in New Center, at the city hospital campus, and along the 
Riverfront.82 
Moreover, pursing a resource recovery plant as a joint venture with Detroit Edison would 
create a “Model Refuse/Energy System for the Nation,” as well as “Exemplif[y] Cooperation 
Between City Government and Private Enterprise.” In closing his pitch to Mayor Young, 
Styczynski characterized a resource recovery plant tied into Detroit Edison’s district heating 
system as a flagship project that would attract new businesses downtown and encourage 
Detroit’s economic and cultural renaissance. “Trash City, U.S.A.” would no longer be an insult, 
but a new honorific.83 Yet if Styczynski’s pitch had made an impression on Watts or Young, 
neither man revealed their thoughts at that time. The Task Force’s final evaluation, however, 
envisioned Detroit Edison as a partner in the second phase of the facility, a 3,000 ton per day 
resource recovery plant built at the Russell-Ferry site just south of Detroit Edison’s St. Aubin 
Street Plant that would provide steam power for the utility’s district heating system.84  
 Styczynski’s optimistic vision for the Detroit of the future and its “Model Refuse /Energy 
System” faced significant obstacles, however. The end of the Task Force’s evaluation report 
highlighted three legal decisions the city needed to make in order to move forward with the 
process, two of which concerned the bid process. As Styczynski had anticipated, the Task Force 
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was unsure if they had the legal authority to negotiate a contract with a preferred contractor 
based on the responses they had received from the Request for Qualifications or if they would 
have to advertise the project for “open competitive bid.” James Watts had sought clarity on this 
question three months earlier from Kermit Bailer, director of the city’s Law Department while 
the Task Force was still collecting and evaluating the contractors’ responses. “In view of the size 
of the facility planned, cost involved, financial status and technical knowledge of contractor, do 
we have the authority to negotiate a contract with a firm which is best qualified, based on our 
evaluation,” inquired Watts, “or do we have to advertise for bid proposals?” At the very least, he 
asked, did the city have the right to disqualify some companies based on the information 
provided in their RFQ responses? Essentially, Watts sought the legal ambiguity to bypass the 
city charter’s requirement. Yet with the substantial differences in resource recovery technologies, 
as well as the city’s vital concerns regarding the bidder’s ability to successfully finance the 
construction and operation of the facility, accepting the lowest bidder could put the project – and 
Detroit’s waste disposal plan – in jeopardy for decades to come.85 
The Law Department’s response came nearly four months after Watts’s initial memo and 
two months after the Task Force presented their evaluation report to Mayor Young. Looking to 
previous Michigan court rulings on competitive bid provisions by city charters, Assistant 
Corporation Counsel Darryl Alexander determined that the law was not on their side. The courts 
had previously upheld competitive bidding provisions even when there was only one potential 
bidder who could meet a contract’s specifications. Yet Alexander also pointed to recent court 
proceedings in Baltimore surrounding their resource recovery system, which had not been 
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procured through a public bidding process, as a possible model for Detroit’s path forward. 
Ultimately, the Maryland Court of Appeals found the “peculiarly unique” facts of the case as 
cause to rule in favor of Baltimore’s negotiated contract with system designer Monsanto. Central 
to the case was the court’s acknowledgment that different companies’ resource recovery systems 
“differed materially” from each other and could not be adequately compared on equal terms.86 
Despite pointing to the success of the Baltimore case, Alexander still concluded that, 
given the past rulings in the Michigan courts to not publicly bid for their resource recovery 
system would almost certainly present legal challenges that would ultimately prevent the project 
from moving forward. “We cannot advise you that your method of procurement would not be 
subject to question and consequent litigation,” Alexander concluded. To Watts’s second question 
regarding the disqualification of some bidders based on their RFQ responses, Alexander found 
“no legal prohibitions,” but did suggest the city have public hearings as the project criteria was 
developed “to avoid the appearance of favoritism.” Even then, Alexander warned, Detroit could 
be open to a suit from residents.87 The Department’s assessment of the legal issues presented a 
major obstacle to Watts and his plan to move the project forward. Writing to Mayor Young, who 
had already given his approval to the Task Force to move forward with a negotiated contract in 
August, Watts relayed the Law Department’s negative response to that scenario. “Consequently,” 
Watts wrote tersely, “we cannot proceed with the preparation of the…Request for Proposals for a 
negotiated contract, and we cannot conclude our selection of the top companies and advise them 
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to start preparing proposals until we get a clear affirmative decision from the Law 
Department.”88 
Despite these troubling legal questions, Watts and his colleagues in the Environmental 
Protection and Maintenance Department continued negotiating with Detroit Edison on the 
utility’s role in the resource recovery project. While the Task Force’s reported that the city only 
collected enough waste to fulfill the needs of the Public Lighting Department, two months later 
Watts told the mayor he had guaranteed the company “a priority supply” of the steam produced 
by a resource recovery plant. He further pledged that the city would obtain “all the necessary 
refuse to meet the needs of both Detroit Edison and Public Lighting Department.” Having easily 
gained such concessions with their promise of collaboration and support for the project, Detroit 
Edison pressed city officials for additional advantages. As negotiations continued, Mayor Young 
sought to treat the city’s Public Lighting Department and Detroit Edison as equal customers that 
would both be charged the market price of steam and would be contractually obligated to 
purchase a minimum amount of steam at a set base cost every day. Yet company officials knew 
that – besides Public Lighting – they alone had the existing infrastructure to be Detroit’s only 
realistic customer for steam. As such, they asked that their steam price be based not on the 
market as city officials proposed but locked in at a set rate that would be “tied into total 
operation costs of the facility.”89 
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Detroit Edison also sought the same economic incentives the city would receive from the 
incinerator operator for the sale of marketable commodities, including steam, ferrous metals, and 
glass. “If we follow Edison’s proposal,” Watts wrote to Mayor Young, “Edison will be partner 
with the City without any risks, only benefits if any accrue.” And the utility sought quick action 
on these questions, asking for a meeting with the Mayor to discuss the resource recovery plant 
the next week and to formally announce their collaboration to the media days later.90 Detroit 
Edison’s demands reflect the power that private utility companies – largely due to their 
geographic monopolies on essential services – had wielded over local governments for more than 
a century. Collaborating with Detroit Edison on the resource recovery negotiations would bring a 
level of certainty, plus political and economic power, into a largely uncertain process. But their 
cooperation had a price. In pursuing additional economic advantages in the early stages of 
planning, Detroit Edison sought to leverage their position as the region’s sole electric supplier. 
This imbalance of power between the private utility and city government foreshadowed some of 
the persistent challenges Detroit would face in negotiating with private industry to build their 
resource recovery plant. Detroit’s economic troubles consistently constrained officials’ ability to 
negotiate from a position of strength, often leaving them vulnerable to the demands of capital. 
Beyond the legal obstacles and the continuing negotiations, issues also emerged 
regarding the city’s available financing strategies for the potential facility. Both Detroit Finance 
Director Dennis Green and Budget Director Walter Stecher questioned the overall economics of 
constructing a resource recovery plant. Green estimated the construction cost of a 5,400 ton per 
day plant that could accommodate waste for both the Public Lighting Department and Detroit 
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Edison to be between $100 and $150 million. Yet the limited viable financing options available 
to Detroit in the midst of its fiscal troubles made such a large-scale project an even greater risk. 
All public sector financing – municipal bonds and general obligation bonds – was, according to 
Green, “shaky or non-existent” and would only further “erode” the city’s credit rating.91  
But financing the facility through the private sector presented its own set of challenges. 
Dismissing the use of public-private Pollution Control Bonds due to Detroit’s poor credit rating, 
Green suggested a leveraged lease with the facility operator. Characterizing this option as 
“legally complex,” but potentially “least expensive,” Green warned that the required Internal 
Revenue Service rulings on the agreement would likely delay construction by six to nine months. 
Yet it appeared to be the only viable option: Green’s memo demonstrated just how limited the 
city’s financial choices were and how dependent Detroit would be on private industry to move 
forward with such a facility. Without the cooperation of a private contractor, Detroit could not 
finance, construct, or operate a resource recovery facility. With such facts in mind, Green argued 
to put the project on hold for the time being given that, “the information gathered to this point 
does not justify a commitment of $3-5 million for land [at the Russell-Ferry site]. It is 
recommended that no commitment be made [until]…the economics support proceeding with the 
project.”92 
 Budget Director Walter Stecher echoed Green’s concerns about the unfavorable 
economics of a resource recovery plant. In a memo to Green, Stecher explained that the city’s 
contract with their current waste hauler, Metro Waste, outlined a disposal rate of $5.90 per ton 
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gradually escalating to $6.50 per ton over the next five years. Based on the city’s previous study 
into incineration under the Gribbs administration three years earlier, Stecher estimated the 
disposal cost in a resource recovery plant would range from $7 per ton to a high of $15. In 
addition to disposal cost, Stecher questioned the city’s financial obligation to the facility operator 
should they not deliver enough trash to produce the required steam for Detroit Edison and the 
Public Lighting Department. “[T]here remains the problem of how this shortage will be made 
up,” he advised. “Will the City accept refuse from other cities? If we do, what price will Detroit 
charge…and are we willing to accept refuse at a loss?” There were indirect expenses too that 
were not accounted for, Stecher argued. “[W]hat will the cost in time loss of 260 or more 
[garbage trucks] attempting to dump within a 60 to 90 minute period?” In the end, Stecher 
concurred with Green that the Resource Recovery Task Force would need to consider the total 
costs of such a facility before publicly announcing their plan.93  
“Nothing to lose and everything to gain:” Defending Resource Recovery in Detroit 
James Watts, however, would not be deterred by his colleagues’ economic postulations. 
He maintained that building a resource recovery plant would assure the future of Detroit’s waste 
management for decades to come. In a five-page memo to Mayor Young, Watts made his case as 
to why he and his staff “so firmly believe that the Resource Recovery Facility will be of great 
benefit to the City right now, if it is implemented during your first term of office.” He also 
echoed many of the environmental issues that contributed to the renewed popularity of resource 
recovery in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including the energy crisis and the apparent decline 
of nearby landfill space. “Landfill is environmentally and legislatively becoming an antiquated 
 
93 Walter L. Stecher memo to Dennis O. Green, November 4, 1975 in MS: Coleman A. Young Papers 63:9 Resource 




method for refuse disposal,” Watts contended. “Although current costs for disposal range 
between $5.88 and $8.40 per ton, the City has no long range commitments or options regarding 
landfill availability. As witnessed by the New England situation ($13.00 per ton), prices 
skyrocketed as landfill sites become scare and/or heavily regulated.”94 To Watts, the writing was 
on the wall: Michigan and other Rust Belt states were running out of landfill space and it was 
only a matter of time before disposal price increases would bankrupt Detroit.  
In his argument to Coleman Young, Watts dismissed the concerns Green and Stecher 
raised in their memos, arguing that their conclusions were based on information “generated 
under an entirely different set of circumstances, i.e. no energy crunch and an apparent lack of 
interest in reclaiming raw materials by private industry.” Yet since that time, Watts contended, 
improvements in technology and federal support for resource recovery research and development 
had created a new economic landscape. He emphasized the marketable products that could be 
produced through the resource recovery process, including scrap metal and other reclaimed 
materials, all of which could be sold by Detroit to offset their disposal costs. “Even fly ash 
residue [from incinerated waste] can be utilized at the asphalt plant of the Street Maintenance 
Division of E.P.M.D.,” he claimed.95  
Watts also addressed Green and Stecher’s concerns about the city’s current waste 
collection and how Detroit would deliver enough waste to satisfy both the Public Lighting 
Department and Detroit Edison’s needs. He revealed that his office had been in “informal 
discussions” with the Oakland County Department of Public Works to dispose of the entire 
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county’s refuse in the new Detroit facility. “[O]fficials expressed a genuine interest,” he stated, 
though any formal agreements had “been stymied by the lack of a public announcement of the 
city’s intent to proceed.” Securing additional waste from outside Detroit would be critical to 
keeping Detroit Edison at the negotiating table, according to Watts. Otherwise, Detroit would 
“forfeit the benefit of large-scale economies” and the opportunity to establish “a centralized 
metropolitan refuse collection and disposal authority under the city’s auspices.” Watts, then, was 
captivated by the idea of positioning Detroit’s resource recovery facility as a center for municipal 
waste disposal across the region and charging suburban communities to dump their waste in the 
city as a way to generate additional revenue.96  
Watts continued to refute Green and Stecher’s conclusions, characterizing Green’s 
assessment of the city’s limited financing options as incomplete. Green’s memo, he suggested, 
did not take into consideration inter-governmental cooperation with the state Resource Recovery 
Commission and with the EPA. Nor did the Green account for the financing abilities of the 
selected contractors, all of whom – according to Watts – had “arranged for successful bonding 
issues that are not necessarily dependent on the sponsoring governmental agencies [sic] own 
bonding capacities.” While Green understood that state and federal policies did little to provide 
financial support for cities (he only had to look at his own budgets in recent years to have that 
fact confirmed), Watts believed that Detroit’s resource recovery facility would be a compelling 
investment opportunity for private contractors.97  
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In his summary, Watts emphasized the precariousness of the current moment for Detroit. 
The positive response to the city’s RFQ and the “repeated telephone inquiries and frequent 
requests for…presentations” convinced Watts that the moment was ideal to move forward with 
the facility: “The City has nothing to lose and everything to gain from soliciting proposals; the 
longer we delay, the greater the inclination will be for contractors to question the integrity and 
sincerity of the city’s intention to have its own Resource Recovery Facility.” To advertise for 
bids, Watts assured Mayor Young, would not incur any responsibility or liability. “It is to the 
advantage of the City to implement a Resource Recovery Facility at this time, before refuse 
disposal becomes an emergency problem,” he concluded. Watts’s arguments were apparently 
well-received by Young, who highlighted and underlined the Director’s assertions regarding the 
approaching crisis point of landfilling, the reasons for collaborating with Detroit Edison, the 
recovery of commodity materials, and Watts’s determination to proceed to bids with all possible 
haste. A note at the memo’s head reveals Young’s ultimate impression on the question of moving 
the project forward: “RESOURCE RECOVERY FACILITY A MUST!”98  
 “Burn garbage to save money:” The City Goes Public 
On February 4, 1976, Coleman Young announced to the media the city’s intention to 
build a resource recovery facility. City newspapers responded to the mayor’s announcement with 
little criticism, observing that incineration made both economic and environmental sense for 
Detroit. “The logic is simple,” noted David Ashenfelter in the Detroit News, “Oil and other 
conventional fuels are costly while garbage is free, and Detroiters produce 3,200 tons of it every 
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day.”99 The News also emphasized that the anticipated lower disposal costs to Detroit would be 
passed on as savings to Detroit taxpayers. Peter Benjaminson of the Detroit Free Press 
emphasized these economic advantages as well, also noting that the facility would “provide new 
jobs and taxes for Detroit…and end refuse burying, which hurts the environment.”100 But 
Benjaminson also was one of the few reporters to at least consider the potential environmental 
implications of the new facility, citing city officials’ promise the plant would not increase air 
pollution.  
A Free Press editorial called Young’s proposal a “relatively radical concept” and, 
echoing Benjaminson, suggested that the pollution concerns that had plagued a similar project in 
the 1960s were no longer an issue. “[T]he type of resource recovery plant being built today is a 
generally clean operation that causes few – if any – problems for its neighbors,” the editorial 
claimed. In fact, the only disruptions the plant would cause, according to the paper, were “noisy 
trucks,” not pollution. “Garbage,” the article continued, “is a valuable resource that can help 
alleviate energy problems. And Detroit is to be commended.”101   
Citizens raised more environmental concerns than newspapers.  The President of the 
Michigan Chapter of the League of Women Voters, Charlotte Copp, offered the organization’s 
congratulations to the city of Detroit for planning to “dispose of its refuse in an environmentally-
sound manner.” “The plan to recycle where possible and incinerate the remainder,” she went on, 
“is preferable to burying in landfills” which “blight the landscape…[and] squander our natural 
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resources.” Yet Copp also suggested that the real solution to increasing waste was not to burn it, 
but to combat “increasingly wasteful consumer habits” and the proliferation of “throwaway” 
goods and excess packaging. In this way, Copp was articulating a different vision of waste 
management than that of the city and private industry, one that centered capitalism as the 
problem rather than the solution to the growing stream of trash.102  
As Detroit continued on its path towards resource recovery, city officials entered a new 
phase of negotiations with private contractors, financial consultants, and environmental 
regulators. These stakeholders all had their own goals and each would try to assert their priorities 
on the city. Facing their own budget problems, Young and Watts believed the solution was to 
make deep cuts and streamline city operations. By getting back to basics Young and his 
administration could reinvent Detroit, touting their new dedication to efficiency to business 
leaders to invest in the “new” Detroit and its renaissance.103 In this vein, Young and Watts may 
have believed that working with private industry to address the city’s waste issues and energy 
needs was a sound, long-term solution given Detroit’s lack of resources, but in doing so they also 
further placed themselves and the city in the hands of the corporations, banks, and financial 
authorities that would squeeze Detroit for decades to come.104 This was the result of maintaining 
and perpetuating perceptions of “crisis” – urban, waste, energy, or otherwise: by contextualizing 
the city’s decision to build a resource recovery facility within a political and economic landscape 
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based on fear and anxiety, Watts characterized inaction – or the time for more deliberate 
consideration advocated by Green and Stecher – as impossible. Companies would lose interest 
and again abandon Detroit to solve its own problems, leading to yet more decay and decline. 
Young, who was and would continue to be through his four terms as mayor fixated on 









“DETROIT IS NOT DEAD; NOR CAN IT BE ALLOWED TO DIE:” RESOURCE 
RECOVERY, FISCAL CRISIS, AND REDEVELOPMENT, 1976-1984 
In the first days of March 1976, the lower peninsula of Michigan stood paralyzed as one 
of the worst ice storms in the state’s history roared from Grand Rapids to Detroit. A mix of snow 
and freezing rain fell across the state over four days before the temperature dropped below 
freezing, forming ice sheets three inches thick in some places. The governor issued a State of 
Emergency and mobilized the National Guard to help residents across Michigan get out from 
under the damage. The icy mix pelted cars, brought down trees and coated homes. By the time 
the storm ended, over 120,000 Detroit residents were without power. Days earlier, rumor had it, 
two Detroit Edison linemen saw what they described as a small child scramble up a utility pole 
and then hop from pole top to pole top. When they yelled to the child, it turned and glared at 
them with its red eyes before hopping away. This last purported sighting of the Nain Rouge, the 
traditional harbinger of disaster in Detroit since its first sighting in 1701, was taken as an ill 
omen by many in the city in the days leading up to the storm.1  
Days later, after the streets were once again passable, Mayor Coleman Young, 
Environmental Protection and Maintenance Director James Watts, and their Resource Recovery 
Task Force moved forward with their search for a partner in private industry, convening the ten 
prequalified companies selected from the previous year’s Request for Qualifications at the 
 




Pontchartrain Hotel. The location was fitting: the first hotel built downtown since the 1920s, “the 
Pontch” was a sleek, modern building perched along the riverfront that was popular with visitors 
attending conventions across the street in the new Cobo Hall. Yet while company executives 
discussed the city’s plans for their resource recovery plant in the glitzy Pontch, the devastating 
damage of the ice storm still lingered in the neighborhoods as residents struggled to remove 
fallen trees and chip away at the thick ice blanketing the streets and sidewalks.   
Beyond the unprecedented weather, Detroit also faced a troubling financial crisis. A 
month earlier, Mayor Young appeared on television to give his State of the City address. While 
the mayor’s tone was hopeful, the outlook was not good. In a letter to business leaders and 
citizen groups the next day, Young characterized Detroit’s financial status as “critical.” “The 
story is simple,” he explained, “Detroit, once a rich and growing city…cannot today support 
even its most basic services.” The culprit, Young argued, was the national recession, 
compounded by the state legislature’s punitive taxation regulations that unfairly singled out 
Detroit. In levying income taxes, state government required that Detroit residents pay four times 
more than non-residents who worked in the city but lived elsewhere. With such laws in place, 
Detroit could not engage in “responsible taxing…that can help us help ourselves,” as Young put 
it.2  
Budget Director Walter Stetcher echoed Mayor Young’s indictments in his five-year 
fiscal report, blaming state and federal policies for the “agonizing” layoffs and austerity 
measures the city was forced to enact the previous year. The revenue raising measures available 
to local governments, Stecher claimed, did not allow cities – “at least the older core cities,” he 
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specified, drawing a stark comparison between Detroit and the growth and success of Sunbelt 
cities like Atlanta and Phoenix – to adapt to “the changing socio-economic conditions” of the 
1970s.3 The solution, according to Stecher, was a sweeping series of new legislative proposals at 
the state and federal level, including increases to the municipal income tax, new state excise 
taxes on cigarettes, beer, and liquor, laws allowing off-track betting and casinos, expansion of 
federal job and fair housing programs, and a one-year moratorium on Detroit’s payments towards 
the national Social Security system. 
Stecher’s report also proposed the adoption of a new program called “Moving Detroit 
Forward,” a $2.5 million federal appropriation that would supplement $1.2 billion in pledged 
private funds for housing, transportation, employment, and public safety programs in Detroit. 
The program, according to Mayor Young, would “repay America’s debt to Detroit” for fueling 
industrial and economic growth since the turn of the century and especially during World War 
II.4 Even with the major austerity measures city officials instituted in 1975, Detroit still had a 
deficit of $44 million, the largest in the city’s history. “Detroit is not dead; nor can it be allowed 
to die,” argued Stecher.5 Yet without cooperation from the state and federal government, he and 
other city officials believed that Detroit’s future was in peril. “The State, and especially the 
Federal Government have determined how cities functioned in the past,” Stecher contended. 
“They must now face up to the critical decisions which have to be made to assure the future well 
being of our City.” 
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Despite the dire financial situation that Stecher and Young articulated, James Watts and 
members of his Resource Recovery Task Force were eager to open the official Request for 
Proposals and choose the contractor for the city’s resource recovery project. The final draft of the 
Request that emerged from the Pontch meeting echoed many of the earlier justifications for the 
city’s initial exploration into resource recovery: minimizing dependence on shrinking landfills, 
providing cheap energy in the form of steam, and earning revenue from recyclable materials. In 
the context of Detroit’s increasingly troubling fiscal situation, these economic justifications were 
even more appealing. By choosing resource recovery over traditional landfilling, Detroit officials 
believed they would save money in the long run by eliminating transportation costs and hefty 
tipping fees to landfill operators and by reducing their consumption of fuel oil and coal for their 
city-owned Mistersky Power Plant.  
The Request for Proposals also reinforced city officials’ earlier contention that only the 
private sector could design, build, and operate such a complex facility. Municipalities, especially 
older cities like Detroit, did not have the funds, staff capacity, or the technical expertise to take 
on such an endeavor. “Private industry, rather than local government,” the city’s Request for 
Proposals read, “may be better able to do the research and development and marketing work 
necessary for beneficial recovery of materials and energy from solid waste.”6 In framing their 
call for contractors in this way, city officials acknowledged they were relying on the experience 
and expertise of private industry to build a system that was beyond their capacity, both in terms 
of technology and cost. Across the country, many municipalities were coming to the same 
conclusion. As over-capacity landfills closed and cities continued to collect hundreds of tons of 
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trash daily, many officials turned to resource recovery as the only economically-viable disposal 
option available. 
The chapter will detail the complex decision-making process Detroit officials faced in 
choosing resource recovery as their waste disposal method and consider how the city’s unstable 
fiscal status in the midst of the urban crisis ultimately threatened to derail the project entirely. 
Local officials in Detroit and their counterparts across the country were confronted with choices 
about different private contractors and the various incineration systems each employed in their 
plants, pollution control technologies that were effective against some emissions but not others, 
and an array of complex financing mechanisms ranging from public bonds, levered lease 
agreements, and private debt equity arrangements. Yet many cities were not suited to make these 
many decisions themselves. Local governments often lacked the expertise to well-informed 
choices and were forced to seek help elsewhere. One option was the federal government. The 
national energy crisis and the search for cheap and plentiful alternatives fuels initiated a massive 
federal research program into resource recovery, led by the Environmental Protection Agency, 
which produced hundreds of reports, bibliographies, and implementation guides geared 
specifically to local officials who were interested in building resource recovery plants. More 
often though, cities – including Detroit – often relied on teams of expert environmental and 
financial consultants to guide them through decision-making. Yet, as this chapter will 
demonstrate, consultants sometimes made recommendations that ran counter to what city 
officials envisioned. Despite consultants’ best advice, Detroit officials ultimately chose a 
contractor with limited experience in the field but that offered a sense of financial security. This 




State of the Field: National Resource Recovery Expansion 
By 1976, resource recovery was a rapidly growing field. According to the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency, sixteen facilities were open and operating across the country, 
concentrated along the East Coast and the Midwest. Nine new resource recovery projects were 
under construction and twenty-nine, including Detroit’s, had moved into the advanced planning 
stages. An EPA survey indicated that nearly 70 percent of the forty-four projects that reported 
data relied on various types of bonds – general obligation, revenue, pollution, or industrial bonds 
– while five had been completely funded by government either at the local, regional, or state 
level.7 Yet resource recovery was a technologically-complex field that local government could 
not navigate on their own. As a result, 60 percent of projects also relied upon private contractors 
to build or operate the system. Cities, then, were taking on enormous amounts of public debt to 
fund partially private developments often based on unproven designs or technology. In Monroe 
County, New York, for example, local officials issued over $35 million in general obligation 
bonds to fund the construction of a Raytheon-designed, 2000-ton-per-day resource recovery 
plant in 1976, which was ultimately closed after years of failing to meet operating guarantees at a 
cost to the county of over $80 million. Similarly, an 1,800-ton-per-day “joint venture” project in 
Bridgeport, Connecticut between a regional waste authority, Occidental Research Corporation, 
and Combustion Equipment Associates, Inc. was financed with $52 million in industrial revenue 
bonds. While the regional authority had issued the bonds and taken on the debt to construct the 
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facility, both companies would share in the revenues of the project with the authority, despite 
having taken on little financial risk themselves.8  
 Another important reality for cities seeking to build resource recovery facilities was their 
reliance on external environmental and financial consultants. Given the complex and highly 
technical nature of the systems, finances, and legal arrangements, local officials often required 
outside expertise to adequately evaluate proposals and navigate laws and contracts. Detroit 
officials contracted with two well-respected companies, the MITRE Corporation of Bedford, 
Massachusetts and White, Weld, and Co. of Boston. MITRE was a not-for-profit research and 
development organization sponsored by the federal government. The group emerged out of the 
Cold War era development of the Department of Defense’s SAGE (Semi-Automated Ground 
Environment) Project, a continental air-defense system that integrated radar, communications, 
and computers to track and intercept incoming aircraft. While the actual development of the 
SAGE system occurred at the federally-backed Lincoln Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, many of the engineers who worked on SAGE left Lincoln and moved to MITRE 
when that corporation formed to take over the project’s operations from MIT in 1959.9 MITRE’s 
work in developing weather forecasting systems for the Air Force led to government contracts 
with new federal environmental organizations, including the National Air Pollution Control 
Administration, the Council on Environmental Quality, and, eventually, the EPA. Ultimately, 
MITRE’s research into air pollution led researchers at the organization to explore the 
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interrelationship between energy production, resource conservation, and environmental quality.10 
The research group served as a consultant on resource recovery projects across the country, as 
cities sought solutions to pressing problems at the interface of solid waste and energy production.  
 In their first analysis of contractors’ responses to Detroit’s Request for Proposals in 
November 1976, MITRE also assured officials that resource recovery was “economically 
competitive with existing disposal methods” in Detroit and had a “lower overall environmental 
impact than traditionally operated landfills.” This assertion was in line with MITRE’s previous 
conclusions for an EPA-funded report on the environmental impact of resource recovery on the 
nation. “Emissions of most air pollutants will be reduced,” the MITRE report contended, while 
the “quantities of all pollutants present [in landfills] will decrease. Less landfill capacity will be 
required…Energy savings will be realized.”  
To come to these conclusions, MITRE engineers created computer models that 
extrapolated the impact of various pollutants in the air, surface water, and groundwater in 1990 if 
all planned resource recovery plants were working optimally and at full capacity and compared 
their predictions to a scenario in which no new plants opened at all. In the former, total pollutants 
in groundwater decreased dramatically. This was based on MITRE’s assumptions that expanded 
resource recovery capacity would also mean decreased use of landfills, which were the primary 
cause of groundwater contamination. Yet MITRE’s models also predicted an increase in air and 
surface water pollutants with the expansion of resource recovery, especially particulate matter, 
formaldehyde, and hydrochloric acid in the air and chlorides and sulfates in surface water. Back 
on the positive side of the ledger, MITRE analysts highlighted other economic and 
 




environmental benefits, including the recovery and reuse of recyclable materials, energy 
generation without fossil fuels, and preservation of open space that might otherwise become new 
landfills. Considered together, these benefits, along with the improvements in water quality, 
outweighed the detrimental effects on air and surface water pollution, so that MITRE researchers 
characterized the national shift towards resource recovery as “primarily beneficial.”11 
 MITRE’s first evaluation regarding Detroit’s resource recovery plant compared the three 
companies who had responded to the city’s Request for Proposals: Combustion Engineering, 
United Oil Products, and Canadian Industries Limited. In a presentation to Mayor Young, the 
firm characterized both CE and UOP’s proposals as strong, while CIL’s was “lacking in 
responsiveness” and did not include the required financial show-of-faith “corporate 
commitment” of a proposal bond. Given the importance of a contractor’s financial capabilities to 
Detroit officials, MITRE’s representatives suggested that CIL be eliminated from consideration. 
The consultants also suggested Detroit officials request additional information from UOP and 
CE, including adjusting their proposed systems to meet the emissions standards set by the Wayne 
County Air Pollution Control Commission, developing detailed financing plans, and providing 
more concrete details regarding the terms and conditions of energy sales to either the city’s 
Public Lighting Department, Detroit Edison, or both.  
In addition to their evaluation of the three contractors, MITRE analysts also made some 
early observations about the “potential air pollution effects” from the proposed facility. While 
the report emphasized that the front-end separation of metals, glass, and other noncombustibles 
from the waste stream, as proposed by CE and CIL, would, in theory, result in less particulate 
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matter in the plant’s emissions, the “lack of experience” with large-scale resource recovery 
systems meant that “such a system in Detroit could involve significant start up and operational 
problems, including air pollution control, no matter how well-conceived the system design.” To 
this point, the report went on to question whether electrostatic precipitators – considered the 
best-available anti-pollution technology at the time and suggested by all three companies – 
would mitigate air pollution enough to meet the emissions standards put forth by the Wayne 
County Air Pollution Control Commission, even if they “were modified to the maximum 
efficiency available in current precipitator technology.” Only CE suggested in their proposal that 
they would explore new innovations in air pollution control in order to potentially meet the high 
standards of the Commission, while UOP instead argued that the air pollution requirements 
should be changed to meet the realistic capabilities of current technology.12 All of this suggests 
that while resource recovery was expanding quickly in cities across the country, the technology 
to support its large-scale adoption still did not exist. As long as cities were restricted in the size 
and scale of their facilities based on local and national environmental regulations, resource 
recovery would continue to be outpaced by landfills despite their growing cost.  
The air pollution question was just one aspect of the project that made consultants at 
MITRE apprehensive about the size and scale of the Detroit project. Despite assuring city 
officials that it was an “economically competitive” disposal choice, analysts still felt there were a 
number of financial uncertainties in pursuing the resource recovery, including increasing tipping 
fees, unforeseen capital improvements or reductions in revenue, the untested nature of such 
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complex technologies, changing environmental regulations, and changing composition or 
amount of waste generated. All of these, the consultants contended, could potentially jeopardize 
the project and, more importantly, its bottom line.13 MITRE’s concerns in its report to Mayor 
Young persuasively articulated the most powerful deterrents to cities pursuing resource recovery 
in the mid-1970s: high cost and unknowable risk.  
Given Detroit’s growing economic troubles and MITRE’s frank evaluation of the 
potential risks, one of the most pressing questions city officials now had to grapple with was how 
to finance the new resource recovery plant while still protecting the city from any enormous 
financial loss. While earlier in their private discussions about resource recovery, Young and 
Watts had both thought that any selected contractor would pay for the construction of the plant 
“at no cost to the city,” this was not realistic. Developers were simply not willing to take on the 
sizeable risk solely on their own, especially given the Detroit plant would be the largest ever 
constructed in the United States and, thus, had greater potential for operational issues and 
construction cost overages. To explore the available financing options, the city brought on as 
financial consultants White, Weld & Company, a well-established East Cost investment firm 
with extensive public and private experience. While most notable at the time for their role in 
bringing Walmart’s initial public offering forward, the bank had also recently played a key role 
in marketing $30 million in bonds for a resource recovery facility in Saugus, Massachusetts.14 
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In their analysis of the two selected finalists, UOP and Combustion Engineering, 
representatives from White, Weld & Co. examined the firms’ credit ratings, potential equity 
contribution to the project costs, their ability to use tax benefits, and other key financial data in 
order to evaluate which company was the most financially sound partner for Detroit. While the 
representatives came to the conclusion that both proposals were “attractive in their potential 
[financial] protection to Detroit,” they were unable to suggest one firm over the other, 
contending that unknowable future conditions like operating costs and market prices for steam 
would ultimately determine “the viability of the project.”15 
What White, Weld & Co representatives did provide guidance on, however, was how 
Detroit might finance their contribution to the facility in spite of their economic issues. The firm 
suggested that the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, which oversaw solid waste 
regulations in the state, could issue revenue bonds for the construction of the facility in place of 
the city. The MDNR’s credit rating was much better than Detroit’s and the bonds, therefore, 
would be far more marketable. Once the city selected their preferred contractor, according to a 
plan suggested by White, Weld & Co., the company “would provide equity, either direct or 
through a 3rd party (leverage lease) for up to 20-30% of the cost of the facility.” The contractor 
would also be required to guarantee the construction of the facility for an agreed upon amount 
and would have to assure that the facility would meet operating and environmental standards as 
required by local and state laws. In this way, the contractor would take on some of the potential 
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financial risk of the facility and Detroit would be slightly less exposed amidst their fiscal 
troubles.16 
A key part of this operational guarantee, as laid out by White, Weld & Co. 
representatives, was the contractor’s assurance that they would accept and process all of the 
waste the city brought them once the resource recovery plant was open. This “take or pay” 
contract held that the contractor would pay Detroit a penalty if it chose not to accept a load of 
waste, thus guaranteeing the city wouldn’t lose money if the facility rejected a load. Detroit 
would then pay a “tipping fee” for every ton of waste that was accepted into the facility and 
processed. These tipping fees, plus any additional revenues generated by the sale of recyclable 
materials or steam would  “be paid directly into a special fund which would be established by the 
Department of Natural Resources” that would provide for operating and maintenance costs to the 
contractor, property taxes to the city, or, in the best case scenario, revenues to both parties.17  
This complicated financing mechanism, however, relied on many assumptions that were 
not guaranteed, namely the cooperation of the state Department of Natural Resources. The 
Michigan Resource Recovery Act of 1974 gave the department sweeping authority over solid 
waste projects throughout Michigan, including the ability to enter into contractual agreements 
with private companies on behalf of municipalities for solid waste services.18 But state officials 
still had very little experience with resource recovery facilities, having instead focused their 
attention on modernizing landfills. The department had never previously issued revenue bonds 
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for a municipality to create a local solid waste project. Nor had it ever created and managed a 
special fund like the one White, Weld & Co. consultants envisioned. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the Detroit and the state was a strained one: for years city officials, 
including Mayor Young, had vocally criticized state government for its tax regulations that they 
claimed asked more of Detroiters than other Michigan residents and for not paying for its share 
of infrastructure maintenance in the Detroit area.19  
 In addition to the uncertainties posed by the plan’s reliance on state-level cooperation, 
White, Weld & Co. acknowledged that the success of their proposed funding mechanism 
depended heavily on the marketability of the MDNR’s resource recovery bonds. “In order to get 
an A rating on the Bonds - - which we believe is essential to the sales of the Bonds at an 
attractive rate,” their evaluation stated, “the investing public must be convinced of the security of 
the revenues. This means…that the investors are convinced that the technology is sound, The 
City is obliged to deliver and pay for services, and the product purchasers are obliged to pay for 
all materials and energy produced.”20 Yet none of these conditions were assured. Detroit’s 
troubling financial situation did little to inspire confidence in investors, nor were the customers 
for recovered metals and glass guaranteed.  
And as other cities across the country brought their resource recovery facilities on line, 
many faced mechanical failures that forced plants to temporarily shut down or required costly 
improvements. In Baltimore for example, city officials reported that “operating parameters” at 
their Monsanto-designed plant were “significantly different” from those experienced in tests of 
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the smaller prototype. “These differences,” according to an EPA report, “resulted in a lowered 
plant availability and an unacceptably high level of air emissions.” Such “scale-up anomalies” 
were not inexpensive for municipalities to correct. While the Baltimore plant was able to use $1 
million from the EPA and $4 million from Monsanto (based upon contractual guarantees about 
operating success), the city was left to fund the $4.6 million difference for new pollution control 
equipment. In addition to the challenges posed by untested technology, increasing public 
activism around environmental issues and more stringent laws in response to such outcry often 
meant that between the time plants were designed and when they finally started operating, they 
were already obsolete and out of compliance with local or federal regulations. This was the case 
in Braintree, Massachusetts, where city officials and the EPA clashed over new emissions 
standards in 1976. The resulting legal conflict meant that the community had to continue to 
landfill its waste while its new $2.5 million resource recovery facility stood idle. In Nashville, a 
combination of both untested technology and changing laws forced city officials to replace air 
pollution control equipment, boilers, and other system equipment at a total cost of over $8 
million.21 The scale of the Detroit project was unprecedented and was likely to have its own set 
of costly problems once it started operations. Every mechanical failure or new law that forced the 
plant to shut down meant lost revenues for the city and for its investors.  
 Three months later, in February 1977, MITRE presented their evaluation of the two final 
proposals for the city’s resource recovery facility to Coleman Young. At the start, MITRE 
reaffirmed their first report, stressing that resource recovery was “a solution economically 
competitive with the existing landfill method” and further emphasizing in this second report that 
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it was a “technically, environmentally, and economically sound alternative” for waste disposal. 
Having ended their November meeting emphasizing the financial uncertainty of resource 
recovery, MITRE consultants sought to reassure Detroit officials that – despite the many risks – 
the process was still a sound economic investment for Detroit’s future. In a diagram comparing 
the estimated costs of tipping fees in local landfills versus the two facilities proposed by 
Combustion Engineering and UOP, MITRE argued that resource recovery was economically 
advantageous in the long run. While landfill tipping fees, they predicted, would rise to nearly $12 
in ten years, fees to dump at a resource recovery plant located centrally within the city would 
actually decrease over time to $6.22  
Yet the consultants also had some disappointing information for Detroit officials. 
Additional analysis indicated that, based on the emissions regulations put forth by the Wayne 
County Air Pollution Control Commission, city officials could only build a facility capable of 
processing 3,000 tons per day, rather than the 5,700-ton maximum envisioned in their Request 
for Proposals. In their proposals, however, neither UOP nor CE guaranteed to meet the emissions 
guidelines laid out by the Wayne County Commission, instead choosing to design larger plants 
that would burn more waste for a higher profit margin. This choice suggests that the potential 
environmental and public health impact of the facility was less of a priority than the economic 
considerations. Although both companies would eventually change their designs to meet air 
quality guidelines following meetings with officials from the federal EPA, Michigan Department 
of Natural Resources, and Wayne County Air Pollution Control Commission, this size reduction 
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meant that Detroit officials could not pursue large waste processing contracts with nearby 
communities, thus eliminating an additional source of revenue to support the project, nor could 
they burn enough waste for both the Public Lighting Department and Detroit Edison.23 
Having provided these important updates, MITRE’s moved forward evaluating the two 
proposals based on six criteria: technical, environmental, system management, marketing, 
financial, and economic. The technical and environmental criteria were the most complex, 
encompassing six subparts each. On the technical side, MITRE analysts ranked the two 
companies on their proposed system’s demonstrated experience, the ability of the facility to 
consistently process large loads of waste (as well as backup plans should the system shut down 
for any amount of time), the system’s flexibility to accommodate future expansions, and its 
energy efficiency. In prioritizing these considerations, MITRE’s was primarily concerned with 
maximizing the proposed plant’s revenue stream for Detroit by assuring its dependability, 
availability, and adaptability to meet changing market demands.24  
Further down in the evaluation criteria, MITRE’s environmental considerations of 
proposed plant included the aesthetics of the site, the potential impacts on water and air quality, 
noise from plant operations and truck traffic, health considerations both in the plant and in the 
surrounding community, and the processing of hazardous wastes. While CE’s proposed system 
was considered to be more efficient, in that it required less waste and emitted less air pollution to 
generate the same amount of steam, MITRE analysts ranked UOP’s air pollution control system 
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higher because its data, collected from its Northwest Chicago Incinerator, was considered more 
reliable than CE’s estimated data based solely on computer models. Both companies received the 
same overall technical rating, though the points each accumulated differed between categories: 
while CE ranked higher in availability, adaptability, and energy efficiency (suggesting that their 
system design was superior on paper), UOP was ranked highest in actual experience with its 
proprietary Martin system. “UOP is preferred in process experience…with 35-plus Martin 
system plants in operation around the world,” MITRE’s report explained. On the other hand, 
CE’s proposed system, while theoretically superior, had “never been operated over an extended 
period of time on a commercial scale.” These considerations are revealing; the enormous value 
MITRE’s consultants placed on experience and demonstrated operating success confirms that 
resource recovery was still a developing and uncertain field in the mid-1970s and presented great 
potential risk to local governments who sought to build facilities.25 
Even more important than demonstrated experience, at least in Detroit’s particular 
circumstance, were the financial considerations of the two proposals. While CE’s proposed 
5,700-ton-per-day plant was more economically advantageous with higher revenues from the 
tipping fee, the ultimate elimination of such a large plant in light of air quality regulations meant 
that both CE’s and UOP’s smaller plants were comparable in their day-to-day operational costs. 
Combustion Engineering estimated a that they could build a plant at a lower overall cost 
compared to UOP, yet this advantage was misleading since CE had never built their own facility 
and their estimates were likely low. The range of total estimated costs, from a low of $96 million 
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(CE at the Mistersky site) to a high of $119 million (UOP at Russell-Ferry), the project was, as 
MITRE reported, “basically…a $100 million project.”26 In all, MITRE’s evaluation of the final 
proposals from UOP and CE did not find notable differences between the two economically or 
environmentally. Ultimately, the “extensive operational experience” of UOP and the 
demonstrated success of their proprietary Martin process at the Northwest Chicago Incinerator 
for over five years, suggested to MITRE that selecting UOP as the contractor might put the 
Detroit project less at risk for the costly mechanical or technical issues that had plagued other 
large-scale resource recovery projects across the country.27 
Energy Crisis and Tax Revolt: Troubles Early On 
Although city officials were now forced to make a difficult choice between the two 
contractors, the emergence of another energy crisis in the early months of 1977 at the very least 
reassured them that they were on the right path in continuing to pursue resource recovery. As in 
the 1973 crisis, Detroit’s primarily concern centered on rising energy costs in the context of 
constricting fuel markets. In a report to the Energy Task Force of the Urban Consortium, Detroit 
Planning Director Anthony DeVito listed five “Priority Needs” regarding the city’s energy 
future. The list reveals concerns about rising energy costs that especially plagued older cities 
with outdated infrastructure and aging homes. First, DeVito identified the need for an energy 
audit of city buildings and a long-range energy conservation plan that could save the city money 
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on operating costs. He also pointed to rising residential heating costs and “urban sprawl” as 
strains on Detroit’s energy needs.28  
Lastly, DeVito reported securing “New Energy Sources” as the city’s fifth priority. 
Specifically, DeVito was interested in methods for recovering energy or in reusing materials 
generated by other city operations. “For example,” he wrote, “the Detroit resource recovery 
system will utilize the fuel value of trash to generate steam for heating in the central portion of 
Detroit.” Could other wastes, like trees, brush, and demolition material be reclaimed and used as 
fuel in a similar way, DeVito suggested. DeVito’s report suggests not only that city officials still 
viewed the resource recovery plant as a future protection against national fluctuations in the 
energy market, but that the promise of resource recovery – to turn waste into a valuable, useable 
commodity – had permeated beyond Watts’s Environmental Protection and Maintenance 
Department and into other city departments that sought to apply the principles to their own 
operations.29   
With the economic pressures of a new energy crisis upon them, city officials sought to 
move forward with selecting a contractor for their resource recovery plant. Despite MITRE’s 
assessment in their February report that UOP would be the safe choice of contractor for the city’s 
unprecedented resource recovery plant, given their demonstrated experience in constructing and 
operating plants, the city chose to move forward in negotiations with Combustion Engineering. 
This was for several reasons, all of which came down to the economic advantages such a 
partnership lent to the city. First, although Combustion Engineering’s proposed facility was 
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unproven and, therefore, less certain, according to city officials it had “the advantage of 
providing excess capacity and the potential for expanded operation and greater flexibility, 
assuming it performed up to expectations.”30  
Second, the city’s financial consultants at White, Weld, and Co. advised the city that “the 
participation of CE made the Project somewhat stronger financially.” This was a key 
endorsement as city engineers Michael Brinker and Harold Yaffe later reflected that the “ability 
to finance the Project was a major consideration and concern throughout the planning process.” 
Compared with UOP, CE boasted a higher credit rating – an “A” with both Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s – as well as 20 percent growth in net income between 1974 and 1975. UOP, 
on the other hand, had experienced a 15 percent loss over the same time period after a major 
construction contract for a Canadian oil refinery fell through when the oil company went 
bankrupt.31 In the end, CE’s stronger financial record and the sense of stability that represented 
was too attractive to Detroit, which had its own growing economic issues. On June 8, 1977 
James Watts received a memorandum of understanding from Jack Carney, Combustion 
Engineering’s lawyer in charge of negotiating the Detroit project. Hours later, Watts relayed the 
document to Coleman Young. Pending one final review by the Law Department and Watt’s 
Environmental Protection and Maintenance Department, the city finally had a contractor for their 
resource recovery project. Yet construction, much less operation, was still far off: the two parties 
now had to negotiate the financing mechanism for what would be the world’s largest trash 
incinerator. 
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Four months after receiving CE’s memo of understanding, newly appointed City Finance 
Director Paul Thompson Jr. already had the necessary bond measure on his 12-month calendar. 
Thompson shared this update with Mayor Young, indicating the city’s plans to seek $80-90 
million in Resource Recovery bonds from the state of Michigan for the project. Yet the timing, 
whether due to bureaucratic necessity or the city’s financial uncertainties, was still up in the air: 
“Calendar calls for March ’78,” Thompson noted, “however realistic date – Fall, ‘78”32 As city 
officials began to plan, however, they encountered lingering doubts in as to Detroit’s financial 
future. The city’s last five-year financial forecast, issued in 1975, painted a troubling picture, 
with Budget Director Walter Stecher contending that Detroit would “die” without assistance. 
While the extreme tone of the report was intended to urge action by state and federal officials, it 
also had negatively influenced Detroit’s credibility in the bond market. Earlier that year, Finance 
Director Dennis O. Green raised concerns about these negative reports in a memo to Coleman 
Young, writing that the city “must cease the issuance of the five-year forecasts in its present 
from because it is having extremely damaging impact on the tax-exempt market for the City of 
Detroit.” Rather, Green suggested, the city should present an honest and objective view of its 
finances without the “inflammatory fear-instilling impact.”33 While cutbacks and austerity 
measures had helped the Young administration weather its first fiscal crisis in 1975, the city’s 
credit rating and, thus, the confidence of investors reflected the lingering uncertainties of the 
city’s financial future. 
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While investors might have harbored some misgivings about Detroit’s future under the 
Young administration, Detroit voters did not. Young’s 1977 reelection campaign pitted the 
mayor against City Councilman Ernest Brown in Detroit’s first exclusively black mayoral 
contest. Brown campaigned as a sober, even-keel statesman, criticizing Young’s “gutter values” 
and “high-roller” lifestyle. Young, on the other hand, characterized Brown as a “boy scout” and 
pointed to his administration’s many achievements during his first term, including ending 
discriminatory practices by police, instituting an ambitious affirmative action plan in city hiring, 
and steering Detroit through the difficult economic times of 1975. Young also was viewed by 
many in Detroit and beyond as a rising national political star on the national level, pointing to his 
role as chair of the United States Conference of Mayors, vice chair of the National Democratic 
Committee, and as a close friend and advisor of President Jimmy Carter. His status and 
demonstrated success secured key endorsements from Henry Ford II, Coretta Scott King, the 
local AFL-CIO, UAW and Teamsters, the Urban Alliance, and The Detroit News. At the end of 
the day, Young’s image won over many of the key power brokers in the city, as well as the 
voters. Detroiters reelected him with a plurality of 63%, winning all but one majority black 
district and four majority white districts.34  
Young’s victory came at a key point in the negotiations over resource recovery. While 
city officials had spent a significant amount of time and money developing requests to 
contractors, hiring consultants, evaluating proposals, and conducting research on resource 
recovery, Detroit still had not signed a legally binding contract, issued bonds, or started 
construction of the facility. Had Young lost, a new mayor would have had the power to halt the 
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process and reassess the project based on the city’s solid waste needs and potentially found that 
the economics simply no longer worked out. Between 1970 and 1980, Detroit would lose over 
20% of its population.35 Yet city officials under the Young administration still continued to 
pursue the construction of an incinerator that would dispose of the trash generated in 1970 versus 
1980. In this way, the economics of resource recovery – processing more waste and generating 
more tipping fees in order to be economically viable – were ultimately not in Detroit’s favor as 
they moved forward.  
Economics were not working in Detroit’s favor in other ways. Not three months after 
Young’s reelection, Detroit faced another budget shortfall. As the administration worked to set 
their 1978 priorities, the mayor was alarmed by the state of Jimmy Watt’s Environmental 
Protection and Maintenance Department. “I am deeply concerned about the huge budget deficit 
forecast for your department,” he wrote Watts. The main culprit, according to Young, was non-
emergency overtime by the city’s garbage collectors, a cost that Watts and Young had negotiated 
with union representatives from the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees to eliminate the previous year by hiring new full-time personnel. With a potential 
deficit on the horizon, Young warned Watts that each department, as in 1975, would be required 
to make difficult reductions in operations or to increase productivity during working hours. “I’m 
confident that you and your staff will find ways to ‘live within your means,’” Young suggested. 
“As in the past, I know I can depend on you.”36 Yet Watts was continuing to grapple with the 
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management of his department. His goal to consolidate city services by bringing more 
responsibilities under his purview was not only met with resistance by employees but was also 
undermined by Coleman Young. Unbeknownst to Watts, the mayor was recommending a “slow 
analytical approach to the myriad of changes” proposed to the Environmental Protection and 
Maintenance Department in his discussions with other staff.37 Yet in not being forthcoming with 
the department director, Young allowed Watts to waste valuable time and energy pursuing ends 
that were not in line with the mayor’s vision. 
In 1978, Michigan voters had successfully petitioned the state government to put a 
referendum on that year’s ballot to change the state’s constitution and impose new tax limitations 
on local governments. The Headlee Amendment, named proposal author and Taxpayers United 
leader Richard Headlee, would protect property owners from tax increases by forcing 
municipalities to roll back the tax rate when annual growth on an existing property was greater 
than the rate of inflation and by requiring voter approval for all new bond issues and tax 
increases at the local level. Headlee was one instance of the many tax revolts that took place 
across the country in the 1970s, as suburbanites sought to roll back the effects of inflation on 
their property taxes.38 “These two proposals…are a step in the right direction toward cutting and 
limiting our taxes, which are already too heavy a burden for the vast majority of us,” argued 
suburban Algonac resident Shirley A. Vanbuskirk. “Lower and more equitable taxes will only 
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come about if the taxpayer does it himself.”39 Yet in bringing every bond issue to the voters for 
approval, the amendment threatened Coleman Young’s vision for a development-driven 
renaissance in Detroit, including projects that were currently underway in the Downtown 
Development Authority and the Southeastern Michigan Transit Authority. “If it comes to having 
the people vote to approve these bonds then we’re in trouble,” Mayor Young told the Detroit 
Free Press in July.40 
What was unclear to James Watts and other officials working on the resource recovery 
project was how the Headlee Amendment would ultimately impact their ability to issue the 
necessary bonds. If Michigan voters passed the amendment in November, the central piece of the 
proposed financing package was in jeopardy and so, then, was the facility itself. Officials in 
Detroit’s Legal and Finance Departments started to shape a plan to navigate the potential 
limitations imposed by the amendment. In a meeting with Deputy Mayor Richard Simmons, 
Finance Director Paul Thompson suggested the city put a proposal on the ballot seeking 
continuous voter approval for “Budget Bonds” under five mils per year earmarked for “Capital 
Improvement Programs.”41 In this way, officials could market bonds for development projects 
without requiring voter approval, giving the city more flexibility and more autonomy in the 
future. Thompson, however, had some reservations with the proposal and sent it to the city’s 
outside counsel at influential local legal firm, Miller, Canfield, Paddock, and Stone. 
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Upon review, however, bond counsel Stratton Brown expressed “reservations” as to the 
legality of the proposed ballot question. In a response to Thompson, Brown suggested that the 
purposes and amounts of the bonds in question were presented in a “most vague manner” and 
suggested that Michigan courts would almost certainly challenge the issue on the grounds that all 
financial matters brought to electors must be presented in a “fair and informative manner.” 
Furthermore, the state constitution mandated all bond proposals that required voter approval to 
be a well-defined “specific bond issue” on the ballot. All in all, concluded Brown, the city’s 
Headlee workaround would likely not stand up to legal scrutiny in court. In fact, he warned that 
if Detroit residents voted the proposed question down it could be interpreted as a total “block 
against future budget and rehabilitation bonding,” thus creating a situation potentially more 
damaging than Headlee.42 With Brown’s assessment of the proposal, Thompson recommended 
against its placement on the ballot that November. With only two months until the vote, Detroit 
still had no plan to deal with the potential fiscal restrictions of the Headlee Amendment.43  
The day before city offices closed for the Thanksgiving holiday, James Watts received a 
troubling memo from his Environmental Protection and Maintenance Deputy Director, Charlie 
Williams. Williams had just assumed his new post in February of that year and had quickly 
become a key member of Watts’s resource recovery contract negotiation team with the city and 
Combustion Engineering. In his memo, Williams explained that the negotiations team had been 
addressing important “non-negotiable project matters” since April, including such basic 
questions as “How can the City accept force majeure liabilities? How does the City pay for the 
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service it receives?” or indeed, what exactly was “the service” itself. In his memo, Williams 
argued that the many contractual issues could be reduced down to three questions. The first was 
the question of risk and who was responsible should costs increase as a result of some unforeseen 
circumstance. Mayor Young and Combustion Engineering officials had agreed during a 
preliminary meeting in August that the city would assume risk in the case of a change in law that 
forced modifications to the facility’s design during the construction phase only and would later 
assume joint risk with the company during the operating phase. Combustion Engineering, they 
agreed, would thus assume all other risk during construction and share joint risk during 
operation. Yet Williams reported to Watts that the company now refused to accept any 
responsibility of risk during the operating phase, a shift that Williams believed “throws into 
consideration the creditability of Combustion Engineering’s representatives.”44 Given the scale 
of the project and the untested nature of resource recovery, the question of who would assume 
risk and when was substantial and had major implications for the financial arrangements of the 
project.45  
The second major question of the negotiations also involved risk centered on the city’s 
precarious financial standing. Williams explained that the project’s insurance underwriters 
expressed concerns about “the ability of the City to pay if risk is assumed and also in case of 
default by the City of Detroit on any contractual provisions.” In response, negotiators from 
Combustion Engineering suggested that Detroit could still assume force majeure liability without 
the risk being characterized as additional debt, given that the assumption of more debt was a 
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non-negotiable point according to city bond accountant Larry Solomon. Instead, Combustion 
Engineering representatives suggested the city could assume the risk as a “contingent liability” 
for one year, meaning it would not appear in any of the city’s financial statements as potential 
debt. Williams, however, was skeptical of the proposal, given the company’s renege on their 
August agreement with Mayor Young, and suggested to Watts that the proposal be “closely 
scrutinized” before the city agreed to anything.46 
The third issue was the Headlee Amendment, which had been narrowly approved by 
Michigan voters earlier that month. Although the law would go into effect on December 22 of 
that year, state legislators were still uncertain exactly how it would be implemented, and 
municipalities were tentative to proceed without direction from the state. “Everything is 
speculation,” observed state fiscal official Tom Wagamon.47 Without much-needed clarity from 
the state legislature, the “uncertainties of the Headlee Amendment leaves the entire question of 
bonding up in the air,” Williams explained. City officials thus had to grapple with the fact that 
their ability to issue bonds, which had been their only assured funding mechanism, was now no 
longer a reliable option.48  
 Changes were also coming to the city’s resource recovery team. In November 1978, 
Mayor Coleman Young brought in attorney Mel Greenberg of the up-and-coming national firm 
Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, and Quentel out of Miami, Florida to assist with 
negotiations. The three founding partners – Greenberg, Traurig, and Hoffman – brought together 
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their particular expertise – tax law, real estate, and corporate law, respectively – to establish a 
full-service firm that specialized in financing and zoning issues for private development projects. 
They were particularly notable in Florida for guiding several large resource recovery projects 
forward in Florida.  
A week after being contacted by Mayor Young, Greenberg was in Detroit having 
breakfast with the rest of the city’s resource recovery team, including Charlie Williams and 
resource recovery project lead Michael Brinker. Over coffee they discussed strategy in advance 
of an important afternoon meeting with Combustion Engineering officials, the city’s bond 
counsel at Miller, Canfield, and – after White, Weld was sold to Merrill Lynch earlier in 1978 – 
the project’s new financial consultant, top-tier bank First Boston. During the meeting, both 
Combustion Engineering and First Boston expressed doubts as to Detroit’s “ability to pay” and 
requested from the city “a documented statement on this question.” Yet with the Headlee 
Amendment’s impact on the city’s bonding capabilities still uncertain, city officials could not 
accurately account for their ability to issue $78 million in resource recovery bonds as planned. 
Until this question was resolved, the project was at a virtual standstill. In the meantime, 
accountant David Olmstead from Miller, Canfield was asked to research the “ability to pay” 
question and prepare a report for Combustion Engineering officials by January 1979. Yet Watts 
and Young also had Mel Greenberg and his firm prepare their own financial analysis and risk 
assessment by January 19. Whether Watts and Young were simply seeking a second opinion or if 
they were seeking to pit the two legal firms against each other is unclear.49 According to Young 
biographer and political scientist Wilbur Rich, however, the mayor often employed “inventive 
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and aggressive” tactics to assure financing for city development projects and relied on internal 
“maneuvering” rather than transparency in his decision-making process.50  
With the financial analyses in hand and some clarity reached regarding Detroit’s fiscal 
status, the project stakeholders sought to make substantial progress on negotiations. Between 
April and June 1979, city and Combustion Engineering officials resolved most of the issues 
concerning the project’s construction phase. Combustion Engineering agreed their resource 
recovery facility would meet “performance guarantees,” including the amount and quality of 
energy production and total volume of waste processed. The company also assured the city they 
would complete the facility by an agreed upon “Commercial Completion Date.” Failure to meet 
that date or the performance guarantees meant that it would be financially obligated to make up 
whatever revenues were lost during that period, as well as “all applicable debt service for the 
Facility.” Combustion Engineering also agreed to meet both the performance standards and the 
completion date regardless of any technical issues or unforeseen setbacks, which had been a 
major sticking point in the negotiations early on.51  
Some of the important points regarding the project’s revenues were also easily resolved. 
Combustion Engineering and the city agreed that the company would process at least 780,000 
tons of waste per year for a total contract term of fifteen years. During the first half of the 
contract term, Combustion Engineering would collect revenues on 90 percent of the “Guaranteed 
Processed Waste” or approximately 702,000 tons. For any waste delivered beyond that amount, 
Combustion Engineering would pay Detroit the revenues derived from energy and recycled 
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materials. During the second half of the fifteen-year contract, revenues would be divided 80 
percent to Combustion Engineering and 20 percent to the city. 
Yet discussions flagged when stakeholders considered the more complex aspects of the 
facility’s operating phase. Would the city have any financial obligations to Combustion 
Engineering if they failed at any time to meet the minimum guaranteed waste delivery? What 
happened if the waste delivered by the city didn’t meet the standards of engineers at the facility? 
How or where would it be disposed? What if operating and maintenance costs skyrocketed? And 
who would be financially responsible to cover those? Taken together, the answers to these many 
questions were vital and had the potential to cost the city thousands, if not millions, of dollars.  
 By July of 1979, negotiations on these operating issues were no further along. In fact, the 
central question was now the uncertainty of Combustion Engineering’s proposed system to 
deliver the agreed upon results. In a lengthy letter to the company’s vice president, John 
Cunningham, an exasperated James Watts characterized this as unacceptable. “The primary 
reasons for the City’s selection of CE were CE’s promise that it would guaranty to the City that 
its system would yield a higher energy recovery and a more uniform and efficient fuel to offset 
the higher operating costs and capital costs of the CE system,” Watts explained. “[I]t is 
imperative that the promised efficiency of the Facility as stated in the Original Proposal be 
guaranteed in terms of both these key representations made by CE as to the construction and 
operation periods.” Particularly galling was Combustion Engineering’s suggestion they build a 
“downsized” resource recovery facility, capable of processing 2,000 pounds per day – 1,000 
pounds less than guaranteed in their original proposal.52 But the economics of resource recovery 
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were based on scale: more waste was burned to create more energy which generated more 
revenue. So though building a smaller facility was more realistic for the capabilities of 
Combustion Engineering, it was not an appealing option to the city. In this way, Watts faced the 
exact problem that consultants at MITRE predicted in 1976: Combustion Engineering’s lack of 
demonstrated experience in resource recovery combined with the unprecedented scale of the 
envisioned facility made what was already a difficult and uncertain process even more so.  
 In his response to Watts’s letter, Combustion Engineering Vice President John 
Cunningham tersely explained “we do not agree with the contentions” the Director had made in 
calling the company’s downsized facility plan “unacceptable,” but suggested “it is more 
constructive to respond to the substance of your proposal.” First, Cunningham proposed changes 
to the financial aspects of the construction phase, mainly that Combustion Engineering have 
access to the facility’s capitalized interest during construction. Unlike traditional interest, which 
is charged annually on a loan balance, capitalized interest is added at the end of a project and is 
considered as part of the project’s total cost. In the first year of the facility’s operation, the 
capitalized interest would thus increase the overall cost of the resource recovery plant on the 
city’s balance sheet. But because Detroit was taking on the debt to construct the facility, not 
Combustion Engineering, Watts and other city officials saw that capitalized interest as 
exclusively city money. 53 
Cunningham also suggested a number of changes to James Watts’s proposed financial 
terms during the operating phase. In the case that “unforeseen circumstances” caused “operating 
and maintenance expenses to exceed its committed operating and maintenance costs,” 
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Cunningham sought a new clause that would require city officials to renegotiate the financial 
terms of the contact, including revenue sharing. Furthermore, Cunningham suggested 
establishing a joint escrow account between the city and Combustion Engineering for use 
towards capital improvements or other expenditures. This was an arrangement that city officials 
had earlier considered as an equitable way to share expenses related to the facility. Yet 
Cunningham further suggested that because “the City of Detroit realizing by far the greatest 
percentage of the benefits during the Operating Phase of the project, any amounts remaining in 
such escrow account(s)…would flow to CE” at the end of the fifteen-year contract.54 Both of 
these new suggestions were met with vehement opposition from Detroit officials. The proposed 
renegotiation of financial terms in the middle of the project contract was “Not even considered 
by City,” wrote project manager Michael Brinker and Cunningham’s suggestion that the funds in 
the shared escrow account remaining at the end of the contract belonged to Combustion 
Engineering was even more infuriating. Since Detroit was providing the capital for the facility 
through their resource recovery bonds, “THIS IS THE CITY’S MONEY,” Brinker argued.55 
City officials, however, would realistically need to make some concessions if they hoped 
to move forward with resource recovery. At a follow up meeting on August 30, Watts, Brinker, 
and other city officials from the Legal and Finance Departments met with John Cunningham of 
Combustion Engineering and representatives from First Boston, the Greenberg firm, MITRE, 
and Detroit Edison to discuss final terms. Detroit officials were confident heading into the 
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meeting that Watts’s July letter had “put CE on notice,” as Brinker described it, so that “[a]ll 
parties, including the investment banker, appeared anxious to proceed to the task of drafting and 
negotiating contracts.” While that might have been the case, there were still some points that 
were not settled by the meeting’s end, including the circumstances for renegotiation, the 
disposition of the escrow account at the end of the contract term, and the tipping fee formula that 
determined how much the city would pay Combustion Engineering per load of waste. While 
these were key questions, Brinker observed that the tone of the meeting overall was positive. 
“These differences are not irreconcilable,” he said, also noting that the “investment banker…was 
(for the first time) very enthusiastic” about the feasibility of the project. Still, Brinker explained 
that his observations “should not be read over-optimistically,” suggesting that the city’s 
negotiating team was still cautious about these steps forward and aware that the situation could 
change quickly.56  
Such long and complex negotiations were not uncommon in the resource recovery field. 
The Northeast Massachusetts Resource Recovery Project, which took ten years from site 
selection to ground breaking, drew upon the expertise of the same environmental consultants and 
financial consultants as the Detroit project, and so serves as a useful comparison in that regard. 
In a conference paper outlining the Massachusetts project, the two stakeholders pointed to many 
of the same obstacles Detroit and Combustion Engineering faced in the development of their 
contract: fluctuations in the bond markets, shifts in the marketability of products or energy, 
passage of new state property tax laws, and questions over risk and revenue sharing. While the 
size (1500 tons per day) and the many collaborators on the contract (the facility serves twenty-
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two different communities) distinguish the Massachusetts project from Detroit’s, the authors’ 
description of the contract and finance negotiations as “tortuous” echoes the Detroit case.57  
Starts and Stops: Environmental Impact Statement and Fiscal Crisis 
 As policymakers created new laws to protect the environment, governments from the 
national to the local level also created new oversight bodies to enforce these regulations. In 
Michigan, the Environmental Review Board included representatives from each major state 
department and made recommendations to the governor regarding a proposed project’s impacts 
on human health and environmental quality. As negotiations between Detroit and Combustion 
Engineering wound down in 1979, the city and its consultants at MITRE began preparing the 
required environmental impact statement for submission to the state board. This report provided 
comprehensive plans of the proposed facility and analyzed the impact resource recovery would 
have on local air and water quality, traffic, and neighborhoods in the surrounding area.  
 The majority of the statement detailed how the facility would operate from the time 
trucks delivered the waste until the ash was removed from the boiler. MITRE described a 
complex system with three primary operations: the receiving, preparing, and processing of 
municipal waste into refuse-derived fuel – what they called RDF – the production of energy from 
burning RDF, and pollution control. The facility would operate five days a week in two 8-hour 
shifts with a third shift reserved for system maintenance. During operating shifts, city garbage 
trucks would queue up behind a set of scales to be weighed. Weights would be collected to  
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determine a total tipping fee, or the surcharge Detroit paid to Combustion Engineering to use the 
facility. The trucks would then proceed to one of fifteen bays to release waste into the storage 
area. This massive space, which made up nearly half of the entire facility, could hold up to 3,000 
tons of waste and could accommodate nearly 600 trucks per day. From there, crawler tractors 
would move throughout the storage area, spreading and compacting the loads of waste as they 
were delivered and creating more space for new loads to come in.58 
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Figure 5. Diagram of Resource Recovery Facility Process from the Environmental 




From the storage area, loaders would feed the waste on to one of three identical 
conveyers past an inspection station, where a worker would remove large objects unsuitable for 
burning, like large pieces of glass and metals. After this first separation, a primary shredder 
reduced incoming waste down to a size of six inches or less. Further down the conveyor, a 
magnetic separator would then remove smaller pieces of noncombustible metal and a system of 
two mesh screens would sift out fine particles of sand, dirt, and glass and then rocks, larger glass 
pieces, and “other heavy objects” at a rate of up to 100 tons per hour. These removed waste 
materials were transported to landfills or, in the case of ferrous metals, sold to scrap dealers. The 
multiple points of separation were key to producing a light, uniform, and easily combustible fuel 
from the highly heterogeneous mix of materials that made their way into Detroiters’ trash cans. 
A uniform and easy-burning waste mixture ultimately produced a consistent, higher quality flow 
of steam that could be sold to Detroit Edison. Finally, the sorted waste passed into a secondary 
shredder that would tear the material into pieces four inches across or less and push them through 
a grate into a second storage area. This resulting material created through these multiple 
separations and shreddings was considered RDF suitable for burning.59 
After the waste was processed into RDF, it was fed into one of the facility’s three boilers 
via conveyer belts and pneumatic tubes to promote even distribution throughout the combustion 
chamber. Once the boiler was fired, an air system would create turbulence throughout the 
combustion chamber, allowing each four-inch piece to burn more completely and for longer 
while it was suspended in the chamber. Along the bottom of the boiler, a moving grate captured 
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any non-combustible residue and unburned RDF for a final burn before the resultant ash would 
drop through into the handling system. This combustion process created steam in the boiler that 
either fed into a turbine to generate electricity or passed through a steam line to be sold to Detroit 
Edison for its Central Heating System in the downtown core. Excluding the 63,000 gallons of 
fuel oil required to reignite the boilers after maintenance six to eight times a year, the resource 
recovery facility was a closed-loop system that required no fossil fuels to operate.60 
In addition to ash and steam, the combustion of the RDF also produced exhaust gasses 
and wastewater. Each of the three boilers were outfitted with electrostatic precipitators or ESPs 
that captured particulate matter by adding a charged electron to tiny, solid particles as they 
passed through the precipitator. These charged particles would be pulled towards electrodes 
emitting a strong electric field in the boiler stack, thus preventing them from being emitted into 
the air as pollution.61 These ESPs were designated as the “Best Available Control Technology” 
(more commonly referred to as BACT), yet they were also new and still relatively unreliable in 
their effectiveness. Although ESPs could remove up to 99% of large particles from stack 
emissions, they were far less effective in capturing “fine” particles, or those under three 
micrometers. These particles were ultimately the most dangerous to human health since they 
could easily pass through the natural air filters in human nasal passages and damage lung 
tissue.62 At an incinerator as large as that proposed by Detroit, consultants at MITRE believed 
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ESPs were vital to reducing air pollution to meet the air quality and emissions standards set out 
by the Wayne County Air Pollution Control Authority, the state DNR, and the federal EPA.63  
The environmental impact statement’s thorough description of the resource recovery 
plant’s operations is important for two reasons. First, the statement describes the complex nature 
of the RDF system. The many shredders and grates that made up the system were engineers’ 
response to the heterogeneous nature of American waste. European “mass burn” incinerators did 
not separate or process wastes before burning. Rather, European operators used cranes to select 
certain types of materials – wet food waste, dry newsprint – from enormous storage areas and 
added it to the incinerator’s furnace to keep the fire burning consistently. This strategy was only 
successful in Europe, however, because of corporate commitments to using less packaging and 
consistent consumer practices of source separation and recycling. This resulted in a smaller and 
more uniform waste stream that made mass burn facilities more appropriate in Europe than in the 
United States.64  
American garbage, on the other hand, included materials – particularly plastics – that 
cause more corrosion at the high temperature necessary to burn waste. The intensive shredding 
and separation process needed to create RDF was resource recovery engineers’ response to 
American waste. Yet the complex system of shredders and grates was easily gummed up during 
processing, often resulting in mechanical breakdowns or explosions, as in Akron, Ohio, where a 
plant explosion killed three workers in 1984. By 1987, over half of the sixty RDF-based plants in 
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operation across the United States would experience one-week or longer breakdown-related 
shutdowns and ten would close permanently. Such unscheduled shutdowns often put cities and 
towns in difficult situations, as some resource recovery companies did not have contingency 
plans for backup landfill space included in their contracts.65 Although Detroit’s RDF system 
would produce more even and reliable steam for Detroit Edison, ultimately resulting in a more 
satisfied customer for the facility’s product, that same system also had a far greater potential of 
expensive mechanical failures and shutdowns.  
Secondly, while Combustion Engineering planned to install electrostatic precipitators in 
the plant to reduce emissions, federal EPA reports from as early as 1978 suggest that other forms 
of emission control devices were actually more effective than ESPs in reducing fine particulate 
matter. In tests by the Particulate Technology Branch of the EPA’s Office of Research and 
Development, fabric filter baghouses, for example, were 99 percent effective in removing 
dangerous chemicals and even moisture from gas streams. They did so by passing emission 
gasses through a series of super-fine, flexible fabric bags where particulate matter became 
trapped. In relying on relatively simple technology, baghouses were the least expensive form of 
pollution control to operate. Yet they were unpopular with industry because they were difficult to 
accommodate into plant designs, sometimes standing as tall as 80 feet, and cost millions of 
dollars to purchase and install into plants.66 Thus in selecting ESPs over baghouses to control 
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particulate emissions, Combustion Engineering chose a technology that was still relatively 
unproven and had distinct disadvantages. 
Overall, the environmental impact statement concentrated on the benefits of the project, 
which echoed many of the same justifications the city had used to justify its turn to resource 
recovery as early as 1970: it presented a long-term solution to solid waste disposal, reduced 
reliance on landfills, stabilized waste costs, and recovered energy and recyclable materials to 
generate revenue. The report, for the first time, also emphasized new job opportunities the 
project would create for Detroiters, including 240 temporary jobs over the three-year 
construction period and 82 permanent positions during the operating phase. Furthermore, 
harkening to both the energy crisis and the growing environmentalist concern about emissions, 
the report found that the shift to resource recovery would reduce fossil fuel use in Detroit by 
nearly 1 million barrels of fuel oil and over 350,000 tons of coal.67  
Yet the report also articulated what MITRE characterized as “unavoidable” negative 
impacts on air and water quality in the city. Although the incinerator would be fitted with the 
“Best Available Control Technology” in the form of ESPs and would conform to all air quality 
laws, MITRE did state that the facility would contribute to air pollution in downtown Detroit. 
Even small increases were problematic, especially since the Detroit was already in violation of 
Wayne County air quality regulations. Most troublesome was the proposed facility’s location 
within one mile of twenty schools, nine playgrounds or parks, three hospitals, and the Wayne 
County Youth Home. In this way, the most vulnerable populations – young children, the ill,  
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those experiencing poverty – would bear the heaviest burden of the “unavoidable negative 
impacts” from the incinerator.68 Yet the environmental impact statement also stated that the “net 
benefits” of the project would “outweigh the disadvantages,” suggesting that the jobs and 
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Figure 6. Map illustrating schools, parks, and other landmarks within one mile of Detroit’s 
planned resource recovery facility (notated as “Site”) from the Environmental Impact 






economic benefits presented in MITRE’s analysis of the project were more important to the city 
and its future than the potential health impacts on downtown residents.69 
The environmental impact statement also, as required by state law, considered 
alternatives to the proposed project, including continued landfilling, a smaller scale resource 
recovery facility, and a robust municipal composting program. MITRE, however, contended all 
of these strategies had economic disadvantages that made them unappealing to the city. On June 
10, 1981, James Watts sent the final impact statement to Mayor Young for his approval, 
explaining that the document had not yet been brought to the state Environmental Review Board, 
but that “DPW…stands prepared to most expeditiously pursue regulatory approval of the 
project.”70 While Watts was invigorated by this new and important milestone in the project’s 
development, his Mayor Young had more pressing issues on his mind.  
In April 1981, Coleman Young received troubling news. A “blue ribbon” committee of 
city corporations, labor unions, nonprofits, and banks reported that, based on Detroit’s fiscal 
standing, the city would be bankrupt by June 30. The only way to avoid bankruptcy would be 
through sweeping change, including new wage freezes and other concessions from city 
employees and a controversial income tax rate increase for both residents and nonresidents.71 Yet 
in a state that had just passed a tax revolt measure like the Headlee Amendment, a tax increase 
would be a significant obstacle, and it needed the approval of both houses of the state legislature 
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as well as Detroit voters. Yet, in a rare instance of “metropolitan agreement,” a Detroit News poll 
found that 51 percent of voters in the tri-county metro area supported the proposed 1 percent 
income tax increase for both Detroit residents and nonresidents.72  
With both the polling data and intense lobbying from the Detroit Economic Growth 
Corporation’s corporate partners, the plan passed the state legislature with the mayor’s assurance 
that he would also get city unions to agree to $77 million worth of wage concessions, 
successfully market $125 million in emergency funding bonds, and get his fiscal plan approved 
by the State Administration Board by August 15. Less than a month later, Detroit voters 
approved the tax rate hike by 69 percent in a special election and Young, after tough 
negotiations, secured two years of wage freezes from nearly all of the city worker unions in 
return for guaranteeing no layoffs. Yet the bond sale proved difficult: Young sought to sell $25 
million each in bonds to the state pension fund, the city’s police-fire pension fund, and the 
general employee pension fund, plus $50 million to a consortium of seven local banks. Yet the 
17 percent interest rate demanded by the state fund made that sale unrealistic, and legal experts 
suggested that sales to the two city pension funds might threaten their tax-exempt status.  
With the state sale out of the question, Young proposed that both city pension systems 
buy $31.2 million in bonds and sent two aides to seek clarity with the federal Internal Revenue 
Service concerning the tax-exempt question. Ultimately, the IRS agreed to the sale if half of the 
total bond package – over $62 million – was bought by private investors. The consortium of 
banks, however, baked at this suggestion, stating they would only purchase $56.5 million. While 
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the city’s general retirement pension fund approved their half of the remaining bond sale with 
mild dissent, the police and firefighters pension fund sued to block their half of the sale. Despite 
the uncertainty the fund’s litigation presented, the state fiscal board unanimously approved the 
mayor’s plan on August 15, ultimately keeping Detroit from bankruptcy. 
Though the Young administration again stabilized the city’s finances for the time being, 
the conditions that precipitated the crisis still had a deleterious impact. Detroit’s “economic 
misfortunes” had created a situation in which city government had “virtually no flexibility to 
raise additional revenues and virtually no flexibility to further reduce expenses.” With the city’s 
ability to make principal payments on its bonds increasingly speculative, credit rating firms 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s both downgraded Detroit’s bond rating to “junk status” in 
August 1980. “The rating change,” wrote Cathy Macsherry of S&P, was “reflective of rapidly 
gathering clouds of yet another potential fiscal crisis.”73 While city government successfully 
navigated the fiscal crisis foreshadowed by Macsherry, the damage in the bond market had 
already been done. Investors’ uncertainty in Detroit manifested in the form of high interest rates 
on their proposed Resource Recovery Bonds. The bond’s unmarketability effectively put the 
entire project on hold for over a year, and the city even, according to Environmental Protection 
and Maintenance official Mike Brinker, considered “deferring resource recovery for several 
years, and pursuing landfill options” as their primary waste disposal strategy.74 
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 “AN ENVIRONMENTAL FEAT OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE:” RESOURCE RECOVERY, 
REVITALIZATION, AND REGULATION, 1984-1986 
Exactly one month after a state fiscal review board approved Mayor Coleman Young’s 
plan to combat Detroit’s most recent fiscal crisis, the mayor stood before reporters to announce 
that the city of Detroit would contract with Combustion Engineering, Inc. to build a 3,000-ton 
per day trash incinerator in the heart of the city at Russell and Ferry Street. Young contended 
during the announcement that the project was a smart financial move for Detroit. The city was 
currently relying on privately-operated landfills in the suburbs at a cost of $13 to $15 million 
every year. By incinerating the city’s household trash down to handfuls of wispy ash, Detroit 
would reduce their landfill needs – and the cost to use those landfills – by at least 80 percent. 
Given the city’s fiscal crisis months earlier, Young framed the resource recovery project as a 
wise long-term investment for Detroit’s future – in spite of the facility’s estimated $300 million 
price tag.1 A week later, the Detroit Free Press ran a front page, above-the-fold article about 
Mayor Young’s plan to build the nation’s largest trash incinerator. Although reporter Judy 
Diebolt highlighted the cost-savings and energy-production benefits of the proposed facility, she 
also focused on the many challenges the resource recovery field faced in 1981, including the 
plastic-heavy nature of American trash, mechanical and operating troubles, contractual 
 





disagreements with contractors, and a “tight market for municipal bonds.”2 Despite Mayor 
Young’s enthusiastic announcement about the city’s partnership with Combustion Engineering, 
this last point would ultimately trouble Detroit’s plan to move forward with resource recovery 
following the 1981 fiscal crisis.  
Recognition of the interconnected nature of the city’s revitalization and the successful 
creation of a resource recovery facility marked an important shift in the way city officials talked 
about the project following the crucible of the fiscal crisis. Detroit officials sought to position 
resource recovery as essential to Detroit’s future both in assuring a reliable waste disposal 
method well into the twenty-first century and in insulating the city from the power and pressure 
of the surrounding suburban communities by eliminating its reliance on landfills. This chapter 
will explore the optimism and promise resource recovery presented to Detroit and other cities 
across the country. Yet as Detroit and other local governments learned, the shift towards new 
high-tech incinerators was not always an easy one. In a national landscape of increased 
awareness and public scrutiny of pollution and public health, municipalities that chose to pursue 
resource recovery often faced resistance from both environmental regulators and activists.   
This chapter will also examine the failure of state and federal environmental regulatory 
frameworks to protect the environment and human health. Although city officials had shared 
their intentions to build a resource recovery facility with local media since they began exploring 
the project in the early 1970s, real public awareness of the Detroit incinerator did not coalesce 
until the mid-1980s. This came following revelation of issues with the state of Michigan’s 
evaluation of Combustion Engineering’s permit for the facility that ultimately called into 
 




question the legality of the entire project. These issues centered on the requirements of the 
federal Clean Air Act that applied to the resource recovery facility and ultimately highlighted the 
subjective nature of permitting and risk assessment in environmental regulatory procedures. 
Public debates about risk, scientific objectivity, and regulation ultimately inspired a wide range 
of activists to prevent the facility from operating beginning in 1986. 
Though resource recovery was put on hold in the Young administration following the 
successful resolution of the fiscal crisis, James Watts and his Public Works Department still had 
to make plans for handling Detroit’s waste. Yet given the enormous investment of time and 
energy into the resource recovery project, Watts and his team had few backup plans for the 
future of Detroit’s waste. As a result, the department had to consider any and all potential 
arrangements. In a 1982 memo to Mayor Coleman Young, Watts detailed Public Work’s interest 
in working with the Water & Sewage Department to turn part of the city’s House of Corrections, 
or DEHOCO, into a landfill site. Located thirty miles west of Detroit in the city of Plymouth, the 
prison had been a significant draw on the city’s finances and officials had long looked for ways 
to make the expansive property productive, including the creation of a farm on the 45-acre site. 
By turning part of it into a landfill for both household waste and the Water Department’s sewage 
sludge, the city would avoid the enormous expenditures of the resource recovery project, while 
also eliminating tipping fees to non-city owned landfills. “If DEHOCO is determined to be a 
technically feasible landfill site and is sanctioned as politically acceptable,” Watts wrote, the 
arrangement would be of “mutual benefit” to both city departments.3  
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Either because of potential litigation that would inevitably stem from forcing inmates to 
share space with the city’s waste, the infrastructure investment needed to make such a project 
realistic, or some other reason, the DEHOCO plan was never discussed in an official capacity 
again. The suggestion does, however, reveal the desperate nature of Detroit’s long-term waste 
plans without the resource recovery plant and offers some explanation as to why, despite its 
tenuous financial status following previous year’s fiscal crisis, Detroit continued to pursue a 
resource recovery deal that was not guaranteed to work out in their favor economically. Still, 
Detroit officials persisted, and even began to frame resource recovery within their larger plans 
for the city’s revitalization. 
But they weren’t alone in their optimism. In 1982, Mike Brinker and researchers from the 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory published a report for the U.S. Conference of Mayors on the 
economic benefits of resource recovery for Detroit. The report suggested that selling steam 
produced by the incinerator to Detroit Edison for use in their Central Heating System would be 
cheaper than continuing to burn expensive natural gas to power the system. The utility could then 
pass along those savings to their customers in the downtown core. As Detroit sought to attract 
businesses and residents back to the area, “a viable, cost-effective district heating system would 
be a major asset,” the authors reasoned.4 In his memo to Mayor Young about the report, James 
Watts characterized the document as a “promotional tool” that presented Detroit as a model for 
other cities searching for ways to reduce costs and incentivize redevelopment their own central 
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business districts amidst the urban crisis.5 In this way, resource recovery in Detroit was linked 
with the recovery of the city itself.  
Besides considering alternatives for the city’s waste, Watts was again feeling the pressure 
to do more with less in his department. The fiscal crisis had precipitated another round of 
austerity measures and layoffs, and the Department of Public Works was deeply impacted. In 
October 1981, Watts met with staff from the Budget and Productivity Departments to establish 
an essential “manpower base” for the department. Although Watts and his deputy director, 
Conley Abrams, both argued for 900 employees to maintain the department’s activities, they 
ultimately decided during discussions with Mayor Young that 727 employees in the winter and 
839 in the summer would allow Public Works to keep up with anticipated workloads during both 
seasons. Yet the Budget office only financed 697 full time employees. “If we follow Budget’s 
line of reasoning,” Watts explained, “we will have a minimum work force in which we will be 
hard pressed just to pickup garbage and never mind demands concerning vacant lots, alley 
cleanings, special pickups, and some semblance of a clean city, which taxpayers are entitled to.”6  
The skeleton workforce was already hampering the daily life of Detroiters. Two massive 
snowstorms in February 1982 paralyzed the city because the Department of Public Works only 
had the manpower and equipment to plow 200 of the city’s 2,800 miles of paved roads. In an 
interview with the Detroit Free Press after the second storm pelted the city, Watts explained that 
the situation wasn’t likely to improve “because it is very, very expensive and the city doesn’t 
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have the money.” Reduced manpower and limited equipment – much of which was in poor 
condition, Watts noted – made service improvements simply impossible. In fact, the Director 
admitted he was forced to reallocate the city’s garbage trucks to plow the snow, leaving him 
three to four days behind on trash pickup too. “Now the mayor likes me,” Watts went on, “if he 
could give me the equipment, he’d do it. If they don’t put equipment in the budget, it ain’t 
because they’re mean people. They ain’t got no money.”7  
Despite such unworkable conditions, though, the Department of Public Works was met 
with further cuts the next year. Needing to eliminate over $3.5 million from his budget in 1983, 
Watts was obliged to make more difficult reductions, including 93 budgeted vacant positions and 
164 layoffs of current employees. Yet in a department that was already stretched thin, the 
Director argued that fifty-nine of the ninety-three vacant positions were “absolutely essential to 
operate this department.”8 As Detroit continued to cope with economic hardship in the early 
1980s, James Watts and his department, which provided some of the city’s most essential 
services, were unfailingly the first victims of funding cuts.  
The frustrating demands on his department to maintain productivity amidst continued 
reductions in funding and manpower had worn on James Watts, and in January 1984 he took a 
leave of absence from the city after undergoing heart surgery. Yet rather than hand the newly-
resuscitated resource recovery project off to Al Johnson or Mike Brinker, both of whom had 
worked alongside Watts in the Department of Public Works for many years, Coleman Young 
chose his new Finance Director, Bella Marshall, to take the lead. Marshall was a rising star in  
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Detroit politics. With a law degree from the University of Michigan, Marshall became staff 
counsel for the Detroit office of the Michigan Housing Development Authority in 1975, and rose 
to become that agency’s youngest-ever director only three years later. In 1982, Marshall’s 
ascendency drew the attention of Coleman Young, who was searching for a new Finance 
Director after the departure of Paul Thompson. Marshall liked to recount that during her 
interview for the position with Young at an Italian restaurant, “either I talked him to death or he 
was dieting, but he did not finish his food. So he offered me his leftovers, and I took them 
Figure 7. Bella Marshall in a Detroit Free Press feature story about women 




home.”9 While seemingly an inconsequential comment, this reflection actually reveals a great 
deal about Young and Marshall, their similar personalities and styles – rarely did someone out-
talk Coleman Young – as well as the resultant regard and trust Young felt for Marshall. Young 
appointed Marshall as the first female Finance Director at age theirty-two. Known for her rapid-
fire communication and sharp sense of style, Marshall became a strong force in Coleman 
Young’s administration and fiercely supportive of the mayor and his vision for Detroit. 
Marshall, perhaps, was a strategic choice to spearhead the resource recovery project 
because of her ability to collect and control information, a valuable skill in Young’s mind with a 
project that could be considered controversial. Her first memo in regard to the project set a new 
and telling tone against the previous years of Watts’ more casual management. “All 
communications…and particularly those involving policy, will be either handled initially by 
myself or referred to me,” Marshall wrote to Brinker and Johnson. “[A]ll public inquiries…will 
be referred to me. All written communications to any of the parties working on the project will 
now be reviewed by me,” she went on. “In this manner we may centralize and preserve the 
momentum of the project.”10   
Marshall assumed leadership of the resource recovery project permanently in March 1984 
when James Watts died of a heart attack, mere months after being honored at a testimonial 
dinner organized and attended by 650 labor, civil rights, and community activists.11 “Detroit has 
lost a vital, unique citizen with the death of Jimmy Watts,” said Mayor Young. “He was 
 
9 Patricia Edmonds, “The Women Behind the Mayor,” Detroit Free Press, November 23, 1986. 
 
10 Bella Marshall memo to Alvin Johnson and Michael Brinker, January 11, 1984 in MS: Coleman A. Young Papers 
205.21 Finance Dept 1 1984, Detroit Public Library, Burton Historical Collection. 
 




maligned in a lot of circles,” explained Public Works Deputy Director Al Johnson, “but he 
initiated things that saved this city millions of dollars.”12 While Marshall assumed leadership 
over most aspects of the resource recovery project following Watts’s passing, Mike Brinker also 
assumed an essential role in providing technical expertise as well as deep familiarity with nearly 
a decade’s worth of financial and legal negotiations with Combustion Engineering. Brinker 
joined the Public Works Department a year after graduating from John Carroll University with a 
degree in Business Administration in 1971. With his business and accounting expertise, Brinker 
was asked to join the Resource Recovery Task Force when it was first formed in 1974 and 
eventually worked his way up through the department as a policy analyst and accountant. By the 
time of Watts’s passing, he had become part of the core Public Works team working on the 
resource recovery project. Between the two of them, Brinker and Marshall represented a 
formidable team that believed resource recovery was in the best interest of the city and was 
dedicated to making sure this project would be seen through to completion.   
The transition of leadership on resource recovery from James Watts to Bella Marshall 
wasn’t the only change to the resource recovery team. In May 1982, the city replaced the MITRE 
Corporation with Roy F. Weston, Incorporated as the environmental and technical advisor on the 
project. The Pennsylvania-based company was founded in 1957 as wastewater treatment 
specialists and eventually expanded into a full-range firm for environmental engineering. While 
Weston was probably best known in the environmental consulting field for being one of the 
federal Environmental Protection Agency’s first contractors for the Superfund program to clean 
up contaminated sites of hazardous wastes, the company’s background in resource recovery 
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began in the early 1970s. In 1974, Weston was selected as an Agency contractor to research 
incineration of both sewage sludge – a common municipal waste issue the firm had extensive 
experience with – and municipal solid waste to produce steam. The firm also was responsible for 
key contributions to the state of New York’s 1970 solid waste plan as well as a two-volume 
report for the state of Illinois on resource recovery potential throughout the state, and in 1976 
they were listed in the EPA’s survey of the expanding industry as an “engineering consulting 
firm with experience in resource recovery.” While Weston certainly had useful experience in the 
resource recovery field, it was unclear why Detroit officials chose to terminate their eight-year 
relationship with MITRE in 1984.13  
Creating the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority 
 One of the key final issues Bella Marshall would face before breaking ground on the 
resource recovery facility was the creation of the authority that would manage the plant. There 
were two purposes for creating an authority. First, by creating a new an autonomous public 
corporation that was legally separate from the City of Detroit but managed by city appointees, 
the city more effectively market the bonds needed to begin construction since the new authority’s 
would not be limited by Detroit’s troubled credit rating. Second, the resource recovery team 
could potentially attract more municipalities to join Detroit in the project—to bring their garbage 
into the city—and generate more tipping fees. Since those fees ultimately went towards the 
operations and maintenance of the facility, it was in Detroit’s interest to contract more 
municipalities to dispose of their waste at the resource recovery facility. The state Joint Garbage 
and Rubbish Disposal Act of 1947 mandated that the incorporation of an authority for the 
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purposes of waste collection and disposal required “any 2 or more” municipalities to 
participate.14 There were, however, few cities interested in such a partnership with Detroit.15 
Whether it was trepidation over the city’s precarious financial standing after the spectacle of the 
1981 fiscal crisis, the uncertainty about resource recovery and its new technologies, or simply the 
daunting nature of a project that large and expensive, no city voluntarily stepped forward to join 
Detroit to create the authority.   
Yet there were two natural partners to join the authority: the cities of Hamtramck and 
Highland Park. Having withstood annexation pressures during the early twentieth century, both 
municipalities were almost totally surrounded by Detroit on all sides, except for a small sliver of 
border the two cities shared with each other. The recruitment of Hamtramck and Highland Park 
to join Detroit in a resource recovery facility was intended nearly from the beginning of the 
project. In the original Request for Proposals that was distributed to resource recovery companies 
in 1976, Detroit officials justified their intention to build a larger incinerator by suggesting that 
they would invite “the cities of Highland Park and Hamtramck which are within the City Limits 
to utilize the resource recovery facilities. The City feels confident that an attractive disposal rate 
will result in signed long-term contracts with these sources to supply the additional refuse 
needed.”16 Detroit officials, however, had not approached either community to join the new 
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16 “Request for Proposals for design, financing, construction, and operation of a Resource Recovery System to 
service the City of Detroit,” City of Detroit Environmental Protection & Maintenance Department, page II-3 in MS: 
Coleman A. Young Papers 97:5 Environmental Protection & Maintenance Dept. Resource Recovery System, RFP 




waste authority before or during negotiations with Combustion Engineering from 1976 until 
1984, thus preventing either city from affecting negotiations and, instead, pressuring them to join 
in a venture of which they had no say in shaping.  
On April 25, 1984, the Detroit Free Pres reported that Mayor Young would seek to 
partner with Highland Park to create the resource recovery authority. Although Mayor Robert 
Blackwell indicated he supported the plan, there were little details regarding his city’s financial 
stake in the authority. Would they receive any of the expected revenues? Would their credit 
rating come into play when the proposed authority issued bonds? Yet on May 22, the Detroit 
News reported that Highland Park’s City Council had unanimously approved the city’s 
participation in the new Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority. Characterizing the project 
as “Mayor Coleman A. Young’s answer to the growing refuse problem in the area,” the News 
reported that the facility would cost between $300 and $400 million to build and encouraged 
other municipalities to enter into the authority.17  
 On July 10, 1984, Mayor Young sat at a press conference on the 11th floor of City Hall 
with CE’s Industrial Group Vice President John B. Kelly, Highland Park Mayor Robert 
Blackwell, Detroit Edison Chairman and CEO Walter McCarthy Jr., and Smith Barney Vice 
President Robert Randol to announce that they would break ground on the long-awaited resource 
recovery plant at a projected cost of $420 million. All five men reaffirmed many of the same 
benefits that had been discussed for over a decade: a long-term solid waste solution, reliable 
energy, and sale of recovered materials.  
 




In some key ways, however, the focus of the conversation around resource recovery had 
changed over the past ten years of research and negotiations. While the benefits of the plant were 
still being discussed with regards to energy production and long-term waste planning, all five 
stakeholders also emphasized the environmental soundness of the project. “This innovative, 
environmentally sound plan will take care of Detroit’s solid waste needs well into the 21st 
century,” explained Mayor Young. “Our substantial suburban landfill requirements will be used 
constructively within Detroit.” McCarthy likewise called the project “economically competitive 
and environmentally clean,” while John Kelly characterized the project as “continuing 
[Combustion Engineering’s] commitment to provide environmentally sound and reliable energy 
systems” around the world. Randol, who was also the head of Smith Barney’s resource recovery 
finance operations, commented that the Detroit facility was the fifth project his firm had 
arranged financing for that year. “We believe these projects make an important contribution to 
the communities they serve by helping to solve both environmental and energy concerns,” 
Randol observed.18  
These comments reveal how society had shifted since 1974. As the fears that Americans 
felt changed, so had Detroit’s priorities. The energy crisis and the trash crisis had given way to 
the urban fiscal crisis and the environmental justice movement. Yet by reframing resource 
recovery as a mean to achieving economic revitalization and social stability in the city, Young 
and his administration could ultimately justify such an expensive capital project to the City 
Council and to Detroiters. “The project is state-of-the-art…providing a wide range of social 
benefits and meeting urban, environmental, energy, and social needs” Young contended in a 
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presentation to the City Council. “The resource recovery project will be another addition to 
Detroit’s renaissance program [and] will assist in the retention of downtown businesses and 
support the City’s general commitment to revitalization.”19 “We’re taking a step that every city 
in America will have to take – they’ll be watching us very closely.”20   
In front page coverage on the press conference, local papers echoed the benefits Detroit 
would derive from the proposed plant. The Detroit Free Press emphasized the new jobs – 750 
construction jobs and 84 permanent positions – the facility would create, the money the city 
would save by burning its waste rather than relying on landfills, and the freedom the city would 
gain by reducing their reliance on suburban landfills by “90 percent.” Yet the paper also pointed 
to the obstacles that remained for city officials: public hearings, construction permits from 
multiple local and state agencies, and an environmental impact review by the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency. “I would certainly say it’s conceivable that it could be 
affected,” said EPA Air Management Chief Joseph Paisie. “That’s a pretty good-sized 
incinerator.” Mayor Young, however, was confident that Detroit’s incinerator would not be 
impacted by the EPA’s sanctions because it was designed to burn waste at a high enough 
temperature to release no harmful emissions whatsoever. “If anything,” he told reporters, “this 
plant will greatly improve the atmosphere. This is an environmental feat of great significance.” 
All in all, the project had a path forward, but it would not be an easy one.21 
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Yet not everyone was convinced by Mayor Young’s contentions. In a memo to all City 
Council members, Council President Erma Henderson enumerated three pages worth of 
unanswered questions about the facility focused particularly on the project’s long-term financial 
impacts on the city. Pointing to Combustion Engineering’s contract to operate the system in 
return for a “excalatable [sic] fee per ton,” Henderson raised doubts. “More information about 
this fee is needed. Is it reasonable? How do we know it is reasonable?...How do we know this 
system is cost effective?” “Since tax money will be used for this project,” she pressed, “how will 
taxpayers benefit?” Most importantly: “When, if ever, does Detroit ever get a payback?” While 
Young, Marshall, and other city officials praised the resource recovery plant as a long-term 
solution to Detroit’s waste disposal needs and part of the city’s “renaissance,” Henderson sought 
assurances that the project made financial sense for Detroit and, more importantly, its residents.22 
There was also public doubt rising in regards to the Young administration. Elected to his 
third term as mayor, enthusiasm around Young and his vision for the city was waning. While the 
city’s economic and political elites pointed to Young’s accomplishments over the past decade, 
some Detroiters were less interested in Young’s new developments and more concerned with 
where the city’s money was being allocated. Right before the 1981 fiscal crisis, neighborhood 
activists began to question how city revenues were being collected and directed. “Detroiters… 
have reason to be wary of developers and of the federal assistance programs that the Mayor has 
welcomed,” explained Abdeen Jabara, a prominent spokesperson in Detroit’s growing Middle 
Eastern community. “We still have whole neighborhoods that are devastated, and instead of 
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doing something about them, we’re building flashy towers to draw suburbanites downtown at 
night on the same freeways that took them and their tax money out in the first place.”23  
Even within city government, Young had his critics. Councilman Ken Cockrel was often 
vocal about Young’s uneven distribution of city resources “The fact is,” explained Cockrel, “that 
services in the city are declining while tax abatements are granted to every tycoon developer who 
submits a proposal for downtown construction. The neighborhoods get virtually nothing from 
City Hall.”24 Two months before the resource recovery press conference, news came out that 
Young planned to sell Joe Louis Arena, Cobo Hall, and Tiger Stadium – all city-owned 
properties – to private developers Tom Monaghan, Mike Ilitch, and Al Taubman so that, 
according to Detroit News columnist Pete Waldmeir. “his rich pals can lease them back and get 
federal tax breaks.” Yet all three men were not reinvesting these tax breaks into Detroit. Instead, 
Taubman’s Michigan Panthers football team played in Pontiac and Monaghan was building the 
headquarters of his company, Dominos Pizza, in Ann Arbor. In this way, Young’s local brand of 
“voodoo economics,” Waldmeir explained, did not bring money back into the Detroit economy 
to support neighborhood services or redevelopment.25  
While activists talked about “flashy towers” and “tycoon developers” that were drawing 
on the city’s limited funds, none before 1986 pointed to the mayor’s planned trash incinerator as 
a significant draw on city resources. While CE was not directly receiving tax abatements like 
Ilitch and Taubman, the project increased Detroit’s debt burden, impacted their credit rating, and 
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put the city in a less advantageous position to be able to allocate their finances equitably. While 
the effects of such a deal might not have been evident to residents at the time, their impacts ran 
deep and continued to reverberate for decades afterwards.  
In addition to community activists who questioned how deals were made in City Hall, 
cultural notions of pollution and the environment had changed since the project began in the 
early 1970s. With acute national anxiety around a looming garbage crisis having somewhat 
quieted and public attention turned towards disasters like the Love Canal disaster and reports of 
“killer smog” in Los Angeles, environmental concerns about shrinking landfills had been 
replaced by ideas more focused on public health and environmental protection. Over time, public 
debates surrounding pollution, industry, and the environment would take center stage as the city 
was forced to navigate community concerns to construct its long-anticipated and hard-fought 
incinerator. 
Regulation and Risk Assessment 
Since announcing their plans to build the nation’s largest trash incinerator in July 1984, 
Detroit officials and their environmental consultants at Roy F. Weston, Inc. had been working 
through the extensive permitting process. Because they burned waste to create energy, resource 
recovery facilities were regulated similar to coal- or oil-fired power plants and the key law that 
governed the permitting process for the industry was the 1970 Clean Air Act. The Act defined a 
series of National Ambient Air Quality Standards and identified six “criteria pollutants” – lead, 
nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, ozone, and particulate matter – that could 
exist at “primary” or “secondary” levels. Primary level pollutants were those identified to be a 




including damage to property, transportation hazards, or personal comfort. Each of the six 
pollutants could be considered both primary and secondary criteria pollutants and could have 
different concentration standards for the two levels. For example, sulfur dioxide was a primary 
pollutant at 75 parts per billion (ppb) by volume in a given air sample taken over one hour, but 
was a secondary criteria pollutant if found at .5 parts per million (ppm) by volume over a 3 hour 
period. Lead, however, was considered both a primary and secondary pollutant at the same 
concentration: .15 micrograms per cubic meter of air. A city could be judged not in compliance 
(non-attainment, as it was called) for any or all of these pollutants, and that status ultimately 
made it more difficult for cities to build new factories, power plants, or other developments with 
a potential to negatively impact an area’s air quality.26 
Any new source of emissions, including incinerators, had to obtain a Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration or PSD permit. By federal law, PSD permits required installation of the 
“Best Available Control Technology” based on an analysis of existent air quality and a predictive 
model of air quality after the new facility was operational. But in fact, the definition of “Best 
Available Control Technology” was variable and imprecise from the beginning because it was 
determined on a case-by-case basis that took into account the unique energy, environmental, and 
economic impact of each project.  Yet the determination of the Best Available Control 
Technology was, in some ways, the most important part of the PSD permit since the 
development of new, more effective pollution controls were what allowed new facilities that 
contributed to air pollution to be built at all. In this way, the PSD permitting process, according 
to the EPA, was designed to balance protection of human health and well-being with the 
 





demands of economic growth. In evaluating PSD permits, the goal, then, was to prevent the air 
quality in a given area from “significantly deteriorating” as a result of a new emissions source. 
By determining the PSD “increment,” or the amount of air pollution an area was allowed to 
increase, of the proposed facility, the maximum allowable concentration "ceiling" set by the 
federal national air quality standards could be maintained.27  
The EPA had passed along most of the responsibility for enforcing the Clean Air Act to 
the states, which were required to meet federal air quality standards at a minimum. In September 
1979, the Agency delegated authority to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources in order 
to “reduce duplicate PSD permit reviews by our respective Agencies and to provide prospective 
applicants with only one agency to deal with in obtaining a construction permit.”28 While this 
delegation of authority might have made it easier for developers to obtain the necessary permits, 
it also decreased the level of federal oversight on PSD permits and placed responsibility for 
enforcement of federal law in the hands of the state. In this way, the debates that swirled around 
the incinerator and its permit from 1984 to 1990 raised questions about the shortcomings and 
limits of environmental regulation by government to protect its most vulnerable citizens in the 
face of corporate development.  
Detroit began its permitting process when Combustion Engineering delivered a “Permit 
to Install” to Wayne County after Weston completed the revised Environmental Impact 
Statement in June 1983. Wayne County had its own robust air quality commission, the Wayne 
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County Air Pollution Control Division, which had its own permitting process in addition to that 
of the state Department of Natural Resources and the federal EPA. Although this was a joint 
project with the City of Detroit, as the contactor, Combustion Engineering was considered the 
applicant and was responsible for making sure the facility made it through the permitting 
process. Less than two months later, company officials submitted the “Permit to Install” with the 
Michigan Air Quality Division.29 
According to state Air Quality staff reports, in 1984 Detroit was in compliance with both 
primary and secondary levels for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and lead under federal 
standards, but non-attainment for primary and secondary levels of total suspended particulates, 
carbon monoxide, and ozone. In their analysis of Combustion Engineering’s designs for the 
facility, state officials identified two new sources of pollutants from the facility. The first was 
during the shredding and processing of waste before it was fired. As the waste went through the 
shredder, it generated large amounts of fine particulate matter that, if not properly exhausted, 
could pose a major health risk to workers inside the plant. Particulate matter was also an 
extremely dangerous pollutant in ambient air outside of the plant, since it was fine enough to 
enter into lungs and harm the organ’s soft tissue. To mitigate the impact of particulate matter 
both inside and out, Combustion Engineering installed a baghouse – literally an extremely fine 
mesh fabric bag – on both exhaust lines from the processing area that would capture most of the 
particulate matter as it was emitted. The finest particulates that did pass through the baghouse 
would be released almost 100 feet in the air, allowing the wind to disperse them.  Another source 
of particulate emissions came from the boiler as waste was spread and stoked during combustion, 
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ultimately becoming super-light “fly ash.”30 To capture the ash as it moved up the exhaust stack, 
Combustion Engineering employed electrostatic precipitators or ESPs that created a strong 
magnetic field inside of the stack. Despite research conducted by the EPA in the 1970s suggested 
that fabric baghouses were actually more effective with regards to fine particulate matter – and 
their use of baghouse filters to control particulate matter elsewhere in the plant – both 
Combustion Engineering and Detroit’s environmental consultants at Weston characterized ESPs 
as the Best Available Control Technology for the facility’s exhaust emissions.31  
The six criteria pollutants created tradeoffs between human health, environmental 
protection, and cost. In the case of sulfur dioxide, for example, staff noted that the high sulfur 
content of municipal waste based on national studies would result in an airborne increase in that 
pollutant as the waste was burned. To this end, state regulators suggested the addition of a lime 
dry gas scrubber to decrease emissions. Yet the cost to install, operate, and maintain multiple 
scrubbers would increase the tipping fee charged to the City of Detroit every time one of their 
trucks unloaded at the facility by more than 40 percent. “Such an increase,” a report suggested, 
“would render the project non-competitive and therefore non-profitable, or economically feasible 
at this time.”32 As a result, the Department did not require Combustion Engineering to install 
these pollution control devices, though the company did leave room in the facility for them to be 
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installed after operation commenced in case the facility was found not to be in compliance with 
emissions standards. Such problems reveal the limitations of resource recovery as a viable 
method for waste management and suggests Detroit’s decision that burning its waste was more 
environmentally sound than landfilling it was also questionable. 
In order to attain even more emissions allowances under the Clean Air Act, Combustion 
Engineering applied for a permit as a “Major Offset Source.” In order to be considered an offset 
source, Combustion Engineering had to demonstrate that other particulate-emitting facilities in 
Wayne County would cease operations before the incinerator would begin to burn Detroit’s 
waste. According to Combustion Engineering, the shutdown of six coal-fired boilers at German 
chemical company BASF’s recently closed production facility fifteen miles south in Wyandotte, 
Michigan accounted for over 600 tons of available emissions offsets per year. Combustion 
Engineering only requested 432 tons of the available offsets for the Detroit resource recovery 
facility, suggesting that the operation of their waste-fired incinerator would actually improve air 
quality, a conclusion state Air Quality Review staff echoed in its staff notes characterizing the 
“net air quality benefit” that would result.33 Yet this reveals the inherent limitation of federal and 
state environmental regulations, which were – and still are – less focused on improving air 
quality than they were on preventing deterioration of conditions. In this way, environmental 
regulation was intended to balance protection of public health with continuing economic growth. 
To qualify as an offset source, the state Air Pollution Control Commission also required 
that the resource recovery facility meet the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate demonstrated at an 
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existing facility or specified in a state air quality plan. In the case of the Detroit facility, the 
demonstrated emissions rate identified as “achievable” was that of the Baltimore City 
Incinerator. Yet this facility was a poor model for the Detroit project. Not only was it far smaller 
– five times less than that proposed for the Detroit plant – this fact was due in large part to its 
own troubled history with emissions violations. Built and partially financed by chemical giant 
Monsanto for the city to own and operate, the $20 million plant opened in 1975. Yet mechanical 
problems, temperature control issues, and failed emissions tests, plagued the facility and led to a 
temporary shut down and $9 million in city-funded modifications in 1978 and 1979. Even after 
Baltimore retrofitted the plant with ESPs to address excessive particulate emissions, the 
incinerator still failed regulatory tests. The only solution, according to city officials, was to scale 
back the incinerator’s daily capacity from 1000 tons per day to 600. By burning less waste, the 
facility generated fewer emissions.34 In identifying the Baltimore facility as the emissions rate 
model for the 3,000 ton-per-day Detroit facility, state analysts created a regulatory framework 
that was unrealistic from the beginning and, therefore, likely to become a problem once the plant 
started burning. 
Overall, state Air Quality Division staff notes on the Detroit plant permit reveal the limits 
of resource recovery regulation. Resource recovery’s development in the 1970s – often funded 
by EPA grants – focused on small-scale demonstration or prototype projects that were intended 
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to be replicated and scaled up as the technology progressed. These projects provided, in most 
cases, the base of data that future megaprojects, like that in Detroit, were based upon. Yet in 
relying on data from smaller facilities to predict how larger, more complex plants would operate, 
regulators made many incorrect assumptions about emission concentrations and contents. 
Regulators, as a result, often applied unrealistic rules to resource recovery projects across the 
country, so that resource recovery plants across the country often failed emissions tests during 
shakedown. As a result, many plants – including those in Baltimore, Rochester, New York, and 
Bridgeport, Connecticut – were forced to burn far fewer tons per day than they were designed, 
ultimately resulting in lower revenues than anticipated and negatively impacting local 
governments’ bottom line.35  
These same debates about regulation, emissions, and cost were happening in other states 
across the country as well. According to a Newsday investigation into a cluster of thirteen 
incinerators near Long Island, New York, plant developers predicted emissions that were vastly 
different from each other, despite their similar size. Calculations showed that the Islip 
incinerator, for example, would emit seventeen times more arsenic than the proposed New 
Hempstead plant and thirteen times more hydrogen chloride than an incinerator in Babylon, 
while a resource recovery facility proposed in Huntington would emit 2,800 times the cobalt the 
Brooklyn incinerator.36 Vastly different extrapolative models combined with the lack of regular, 
mandatory emissions testing at either the state or federal levels meant that there wasn’t good data 
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to accurately estimate what plants were emitting and how much of it. Yet in basing emissions 
predictions off of bad data or models, incinerator developers were often forced to add additional 
pollution controls after the plants failed emissions tests. And those costs were often made up by 
raising the tipping fees. At a 400-ton-per-day plant in Duchess County, New York, officials 
reported that when they explored the costs of adding new pollution controls to their facility, they 
saw their tipping fees grow from $5 per ton to over $15 per ton, all to add ESPs, baghouses, and 
acid gas scrubbers.37 In raising tipping fees to accommodate plant retrofits, however, resource 
recovery often lost their affordability compared to landfills, much to the frustration of municipal 
officials who had taken on significant public debt to construct these facilities.    
While state and federal regulatory agencies often pointed to innovations in pollution 
control technology as what enabled new facilities to operate below Clean Air Act guidelines, 
they still contributed to air pollution. For example, the proposed Detroit facility would emit over 
100 tons of particulates per year, over 2500 tons of hydrogen chloride, plus chromium, furans, 
and dioxins. At their anticipated concentration, state regulators characterized these pollutants as 
“environmentally acceptable,” and suggested that the generation of dangerous, cancer-causing 
furans and dioxins could be mitigated through the maintenance of “good combustion conditions” 
and other best practices at the facility. Yet, the staff notes also did not ignore the enormous risk 
these chemicals posed to human health: “Staff assumed that all of the chlorinated dibenzodioxins 
[dioxins] and chlorinated dibenzofurans [furans] that could be emitted are…the most toxic dioxin 
isomer.” Yet following a risk analysis, state officials considered the health risk to the public to be 
 




“one in one million,” and, therefore, “acceptable.”38 In this way, environmental regulations were 
not focused on preventing pollution, but at mitigating its impact and balancing it with continued 
economic development.  
Despite the measurable impacts the Detroit incinerator would have on air quality in city, 
state analysts characterized the proposed facility as “the most environmentally prudent and 
feasible alternative” for waste disposal in Detroit, and suggested that the Michigan Air Pollution 
Control Commission – the body responsible for granting permits – approve the facility’s permit 
to install.39 On September 17, the state sent staff analysis on the permit and its determination of 
compliance with the Clean Air Act, a notice of public comment period, and other 
communications between the state and Combustion Engineering to Joseph Paisie, Chief of the 
Technical Analysis Section in the Air Quality Management Division for EPA Region V. This 
was part of the Clean Air Act enforcement agreement that delegated permit review from the 
federal EPA to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources: the state was required to send 
copies of relevant application documents related to a permit and the EPA could then 
communicate its comments or concerns based upon those documents to the state before the close 
of the public comment period.  
According to EPA Technical Analysis Section staff member, Ronald van Mersbergen, it 
was common for Paisie to review each permit himself or to assign permits to other staff or 
engineers for a special review if there appeared to be any discrepancies with the state’s 
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assessment.40 In the case of the Detroit permit, the state never received any comments from 
Region V staff during the project’s public comment period or special testimony during the 
Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission public hearing about the permit in October 1984. 
As a result, the state granted a final permit to Combustion Engineering and the City of Detroit on 
November 9, 1984. Having secured their permit, the city officials began the process of breaking 
ground on the new facility and issued $500 million in short-term bonds on December 27 to 
finance construction.41 It was essential that Detroit secure this financing by the end of the year 
because the newly passed Deficit Reduction Act eliminated the tax exempt status of industrial 
revenue bonds issued towards certain types of public-private projects, including casinos, sewage 
treatment plants, and solid waste disposal projects. The rapid proliferation of state- and local-
issued private activity bonds from $6.2 billion in 1976 to $62.4 billion in 1983 was extremely 
alarming to Congress, not because they were concerned about the growing power of private 
development in the public sphere, but because the tax-exempt status translated into a revenue 
loss to the federal government and the expanding volume of private activity bonds inflated tax-
exempt interest rates on bonds and made borrowing by state and local governments for 
traditional public purposes, like roads and schools, more expensive.42  
Rather than potentially lose the tax-exempt benefits that had been central to financial 
negotiations with Combustion Engineering and jeopardize those hard-negotiated terms, Detroit 
finance officials and city council fast-tracked the project’s financing deal in the last days of 
 
40 Preliminary Statement, GDRRA v. Adamkus, 86-CV-72910-DT (ED Mich 1986) in MS: Coleman Young 233:28 




42 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit 




1984. They were not alone. City officials across the country rushed to issue bonds for resource 
recovery project in the final days of 1984. “A lot of municipalities planning on issuing resource 
recovery bonds do not want to get into a situation where they will be held back next year” by the 
restrictions imposed by the Deficit Reduction Act, explained a senior vice president at Standard 
and Poor’s municipal finance department. The Act would place a cap on the amount of industrial 
development bonds that could be issued in each state to a maximum of $150 per capita or 
approximately $1.4 billion in Michigan, for example. Yet with resource recovery projects costing 
upwards of $400 million to build, such caps would make financing extremely competitive. 
Furthermore, many of the complex financial agreements between private companies and cities 
were based on assurances that the companies would reap the tax exemption benefits that came 
with public financing. Yet under the new Act, only resource recovery plants owned by local 
governments could qualify for tax exempt financing in the bond market. As a result, cities issued 
more than $2.5 billion in resource recovery bonds over the last two months of 1984, five times 
the amount marketed in the previous five years combined.43  
Eventually, Detroit’s variable-rate short-term bonds would need to be converted to fixed-
rate resource recovery bonds to protect Detroit from unfavorable interest rate fluctuations in the 
bond market. Yet that would not be an easy task as banks were still leery of Detroit as a reliable 
investment. Though the city had survived the 1981 fiscal crisis, they had since faced two more 
deficits in three years. When Detroit officials went looking for a buyer for their short-term 
escrow notes in January 1985, no bank was interested backing the city. This was no surprise 
given “half of the revenue for the Project was based upon the credit of a City that had recently 
 





faced bankruptcy and was still paying off past debts,” explained Bella Marshall. Finally, in mid-
1985, New York-based Citibank and Manufacturers Hanover Trust offered letters of credit to 
Detroit to back their short-term notes’ conversion to $438 million in long-term bonds. Given the 
risk Detroit presented, the interest rate the banks proposed was far higher than the industry 
standard and would end up costing the city over $600 million in interest by the time the principal 
came due in 2008. Realizing that this deal, though unattractive for the city, might be their only 
chance to refinance their short-term bonds, Marshall accepted the banks’ terms and Detroit 
prepared to convert and remarket their bonds.44  
The Thousand-Fold Calculation Error 
Although they did not submit comments on the Detroit resource recovery plant permit 
during the review process, the EPA did conduct an audit of the state’s permitting process for new 
sources of emissions as required by their enforcement delegation agreement with the state. This 
included reviewing a sample of twenty-nine approved permits from the previous year, including 
the permit for the Detroit project, as well as four other new permits during a twelve-month 
period. Overall, EPA staff found Michigan’s procedures demonstrative of the state’s “ongoing 
striving for excellence” and called staff analysis reports “noteworthy efforts to document all 
factors,” including impacts to public health and environment.45  
A year later, however, there were issues. Following the state’s own audit of the permit in 
November 1984, state Air Quality Division Permit Supervisor Gerald Avery wrote in a letter to 
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Mike Brinker and John Cunningham of Combustion Engineering that developments in resource 
recovery technology since the company had submitted their environmental impact statement in 
1983 made the pollution controls employed by the Detroit facility obsolete before it had even 
been built. Avery explained that his office determined CE’s use of electrostatic precipitators or 
ESPs did not “represent the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) technology for 
particulates or the best available control technology (BACT) for sulfur dioxide, hydrochloric 
acid, heavy metals, or chlorinated organics.” In order to meet both emissions standards, 
according to Avery’s analysis, the Detroit facility would need to add two more pollution 
controls. The first, a dry acid gas filter, provided “very efficient control of sulfur dioxide and 
hydrochloric acid emissions,” according to Avery. While he admitted that the adverse 
environmental and health impacts of hydrochloric acid were still “presently unquantified,” Avery 
also indicated that scientists and regulators were becoming “much more concerned” about these 
emissions and that future research into its public health impacts would likely mean Detroit 
officials would have to retrofit new pollutions controls into the incinerator in the future. Yet 
Avery’s assertions again reveal the lack of good data available to regulators amidst the still-
evolving field of resource recovery.46  
In addition to the dry acid gas filter, Avery suggested Combustion Engineering also 
install a fabric baghouse filter in the exhaust stack to control fine particulate emissions. These 
emissions, Avery explained, were “of most concern from a public health aspect since the fine 
particulate is what actually enters the lungs, and…contains a higher proportion of dioxins, 
furans, and heavy metals,” exposure to which had been linked to increased rates of cancer in 
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humans. Overall, the installation of both of these pollution control technologies rather than the 
proposed ESPs would, Avery contested, “result in significant additional control of dioxins, 
furans, chromium, arsenic, cadmium, and other potentially toxic heavy metals.” Avery further 
intimated that this should not have come as a surprise to Combustion Engineering, as they were 
already employing both pollution controls in their newest facilities in California and 
Connecticut. Whether the company considered the Detroit project already too large and 
expensive to add the more effective pollution controls or viewed the largely poor and African 
American population the increased pollution would impact as unimportant is unclear, Avery’s 
revelation does suggest that Combustion Engineering was well informed about the different 
types of pollution controls and their varying levels of effectiveness. In this way, company 
officials and engineers perhaps consciously chose to include ESPs in the Detroit project despite 
the fact that they would allow more emissions than other technology.47 
Yet Avery made another, even more disturbing revelation in his letter to Brinker and 
Cunningham. While reviewing the permit, Avery explained that state analysts had “made an 
error specifying the ambient concentration for…dioxins and…furans which represented an 
increased cancer risk of one in a million. The one in a million risk which the Permit Engineer 
used was assumed to be in milligrams per cubic meter, instead of the correct metric, micrograms 
per cubic meter. Therefore…the conservative screening analysis which was performed for the 
dioxins and furan should have only indicated that the risk was only less than one in a thousand.” 
This thousand-fold calculation error meant that the plant would be significantly more dangerous 
than regulators had projected. Avery did attempt, however, to temper any serious panic that his 
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letter might cause by reminding Combustion Engineering officials that his analysis was based on 
“many very conservative assumptions” about emissions projections, and that “the true risk from 
your proposed project is actually much less than one in a thousand.” Should Combustion 
Engineering incorporate the improved pollution control technologies he suggested into the 
plant’s design, Avery was confident that a re-evaluation of the plant and its projected emissions 
would reveal that “the true ambient impacts form this facility will represent a minimal risk to 
public health and welfare.”48  
 Avery’s letter came as an enormous shock to Detroit officials and their partners at 
Combustion Engineering, who scrambled to confirm what impact Avery’s assessment would 
have on their permit. Two months later, Michigan Department of Natural Resources Director 
Ronald Skoog wrote to city project manager Mike Brinker about Gerald Avery’s letter, 
suggesting that it was just that: “a letter. It is not an order…and it is not a modification to [your] 
permit.” Skoog went on to write that dry gas scrubbers, as Avery suggested, were indeed a more 
effective pollution control and would be required of all new resource recovery plants built in 
Michigan. Despite this fact, Skoog clarified that his department could not require a permit 
modification to incorporate this new pollution control technology because it had not issued the 
permit. Rather, the authority to rescind or modify the permit fell to the Michigan Air Pollution 
Control Commission. To that end, despite Avery’s assertions, Detroit had a “perfectly legal 
permit in hand” and could proceed with construction as planned. However, Skoog reminded 
Brinker that should air pollution regulations change or the facility’s equipment fail to comply 
with emissions standards once it started burning waste, his department could suspend the plant’s 
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operating permit until the city took “appropriate corrective action,” including adding the 
pollution controls Avery had recommended.49 In this way, Skoog revealed the inherent problems 
the Detroit incinerator faced in its development given the accumulation of bad or incomplete data 
and poor regulatory frameworks in the resource recovery field. 
Seeking clarity on the question of how much risk the Detroit resource recovery facility 
posed, the Department of Natural Resources requested a review of the analysis by the state’s 
Center for Environmental Health Science under the Department of Public Health. In his report, 
Toxicologist Dr. David Wade agreed with Avery’s characterization of his risk assessment as 
“conservative.” This was an accurate appraisal given that the Department based their analysis on 
a number of assumed conditions that represented most extreme operating circumstances, 
including that individuals would be exposed continuously for their lifetime, that the incinerator 
would always be operating – and, therefore, emitting – at maximum capacity, and that outdoor 
and indoor concentrations of certain pollutants were the same. By adjusting the assessment’s 
assumptions to reflect the “expected” concentrations of emissions rather than the maximum 
presumed by Department of Natural Resources analysts, Wade estimated the excess cancer per 
one million exposed individuals to be 7.7 rather than 35.6 as suggested by Gerald Avery.50  
In making his determination, however, Wade also emphasized the subjective nature of 
risk assessment, given the lack of good data. After admitting that his analysis was limited by the 
data supplied to him by the Department of Natural Resources, Wade explained that “in the case 
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of most of the RRF [resource recovery facility] pollutants considered, there is a lack of accurate 
data on the extent of human exposure and a correlation to observed adverse health effects.” As a 
result, he suggested a there were many “uncertainties” in the process and that most risk 
assessments were based on extrapolation and estimation. Furthermore, Wade suggested that the 
Department’s health risk assessment protocols were incomplete because they did not take into 
consideration potential exposure through ingestion or skin absorption and did not include other 
chemicals typically present in incinerator emissions, including confirmed carcinogens benzene, 
nickel, and formaldehyde. Wade ended his report by observing that the Department of Natural 
Resources needed to address “how much risk is acceptable” as it performed its assessments. “As 
you are well aware,” he continued, “there is no one answer to this question.”51 In other words, he 
and other officials had no precise answers.  
Wade’s comment suggests that state regulators applied the definition of acceptable health 
risk unevenly, adapting to different contexts as they saw fit. In a largely black and poor city like 
Detroit, state regulators were perhaps willing to accept more risk than usual. Historians have 
well-documented the uneven distribution of environmental burdens upon poor and non-white 
communities with little political power or redress. This sense of environmental injustice on a 
national scale crystalized in 1987 with the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial 
Justice’s study “Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States,” which reported that racial 
composition of a community – rather than class or geographic location – was the best variable 
for predicting the location of hazardous waste facilities and thus drew, for the first time, a direct 
connection between race and pollution. Many other sociological and historical studies followed, 
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documenting the activism of non-white communities against powerful alliances of private 
corporations and governments at all levels. 52 Yet the correlation between race and pollution is 
also reflective of deeper patterns of inequality across metropolitan space, with people of color 
historically being restricted – either directly through redlining or indirectly through housing 
prices – to areas considered “undesirable” near dumps, heavy industry, and chemical production. 
 These debates surrounding risk assessment and acceptability also made their way into the 
public discourse via local newspapers. After Avery’s letter and Skoog’s walk-back of Avery’s 
assessments became public in March 1986, Detroit Free Press staff writers Bob Campbell and 
Patricia Edwards reported extensively on the ongoing debates between the state and the city 
about the risk assessment and additional pollution controls. Ultimately, Campbell and Edwards 
revealed through conversations with Ronald Skoog and Governor James Blanchard’s 
spokesperson Tom Scott that the potential breakdown of Detroit’s tenuous $470 million 
financing package was the primary reason regulators did not demand the additional pollution 
controls recommended by Gerald Avery. Both Skoog and Scott stated that they were convinced 
by Coleman Young and Bella Marshall that adding the additional $17 to $30 million estimated 
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for the dry acid gas scrubber and the baghouses to the facility’s design could, as Young 
explained, “very well break the deal.” “We made this decision based on trying to save the 
financial package for Detroit,” Skoog explained to the Free Press reporters. “What is the 
alternative? There’s no way they’ll get a landfill sited anywhere around Detroit.”53 
Skoog also sought to diminish the controversy surrounding the excess cancer deaths 
attributed to the plant by emphasizing the inexact nature of the risk assessment process itself, 
describing it as “not very accurate.”54 Highlighting these internal disagreements within state 
government, the Free Press’s Bob Campbell further undermined the notion that scientific 
accuracy and objectivity ought to have characterized the assessment process in revealing the 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources and the Public Health Department used two 
completely different methods to estimate risk, one endorsed by the EPA and the other by the 
Centers for Disease Control. Yet the issue of which method was more accurate and could be 
trusted remained unresolved.55 With the objectivity of scientific analysis called into question 
through the discrepancies in the various risk assessments, the general public began to grow 
suspicious of the proposed resource recovery facility and the potential risk it presented to their 
city and their bodies.
 













“WE ARE ALL DOWNWIND:” ANTI-INCINERATOR ACTIVISM FROM THE STREETS 
TO THE COURTS, 1986-1988 
Laurie LaPine sat down in her apartment’s kitchen to read the Detroit Free Press. On the 
front page, directly above the fold, she saw a bold headline that startled her: “Burner is OK’d, 
Pollution from plant to raise health risks.” LaPine read that, despite state regulators’ warnings, 
the city of Detroit had just been granted a permit to build “the world’s largest trash-burning plant 
without extra pollution equipment.” Continuing, she read that the proposed facility would be 
located at the intersection of Russell and Ferry streets, less than two miles from where she sat, 
smack in the middle of the core city. She knew exactly what to do next. LaPine set out to spread 
the word.1 
Although Detroit had been working towards building their resource recovery facility for 
over a decade, the project had rarely been part of public discourse. Although local media 
uncritically reported on the city’s announcements over the years Gerald Avery’s letter 
documenting the state’s thousand-fold calculation error in determining the risk posed by the 
facility seemed to change that. Soon, local environmental activists centered in on the threat 
Detroit’s incinerator presented. Two anti-incinerator groups emerged, each with different 
approaches to achieving their common goal. The Evergreen Alliance looked to the radical 
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organizing past of their Detroit neighborhood in shaping their own anti-incinerator strategy. By 
contrast, the Detroit Audubon Society drew upon their long history of success in environmental 
restoration and conservation through the more traditional pathways of legislation, advocacy, and 
legal action. Despite their different strategies, both groups articulated similar concerns about the 
incinerator as a threat to human health and the environment. Both groups also pointed to 
regulatory failures at the state and federal levels as the reason for their resistance.  
Yet both sets of activists also, as this chapter will demonstrate, faced unique obstacles to 
success. Radical activists were limited by a number of barriers, including their inability to build 
an inclusive coalition that incorporated African American voices and perspectives, their 
decentralized antiauthoritarian organizing structure, and their commitment to their ideals over 
cooperation. On the other hand, activists who pursued political and legal means to stop the 
incinerator were blocked by a federal administration determined to scale back environmental 
protections. Because of the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s failure to provide 
adequate and vigilant oversight as required by the Clean Air Act, activists were forced to bring 
their concerns to court.  
Changes in the traditional liberal coalition that defined Detroit politics in the 1960s and 
70s – namely the decline in the strength of the labor movement – impacted anti-incinerator 
activism. In Detroit, the United Automotive Workers had long been a central group in various 
left-leaning movements since the early twentieth century. Yet the postwar shift of the white 
working class away from the Democratic Party, as well as conservative attempts to undermine 




risks that could undermine their own tenuous position. This made the union a more tentative 
partner for anti-incinerator organizers as they sought to build a broad and strong coalition.2  
Activists also faced structural shifts in municipal finance markets that ultimately 
restricted the potential for political or economic compromises. As demonstrated in previous 
chapters, the economic constraints posed by the onset of the urban crisis placed cities across the 
nation – but especially those in the deindustrializing areas of the Northeast and Midwest – in 
challenging situations as they struggled to maintain city services and infrastructure in the face of 
dwindling federal outlays and local tax revenues from a declining population. One strategy was 
to increasingly rely on private investment or public-private partnerships, as Detroit and many 
other municipalities did in constructing expensive and highly-technical resource recovery plants. 
Another strategy was to borrow money in the form of short-term notes or long-term bonds. 
Before the 1970s, municipal debt transactions were primarily conducted with traditional lending 
institutions – especially local banks – that would issue funds to cover budgetary shortfalls or 
infrastructure projects. Yet the ballooning of municipal debt in the 1970s and New York City’s 
calamitous fiscal crisis in 1975 alarmed traditional banks and made them leery of lending to 
cities. Cities turned to the individual and institutional investors of the bond market, but they too 
were nervous about increasingly unstable public debt and sought information about which 
investments were considered safe based on a city’s creditworthiness.  This allowed bond ratings 
agencies like Moody’s Investors Service, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch’s – which had existed 
since the Gilded Age – to fill that information vacuum and ultimately become, in the words of 
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geographer Jason Hackworth, “influential and intrusive gatekeepers” in a city’s financial 
operations.3   
When a city seeks to issue long-term debt in the form of bonds, it must hire a credit rating 
agency and provide that private institution with public financial records. Agencies use this 
information, along with its own independent research, to determine credit rating. Ratings are 
based on a city’s past financial history, its future economic prospects, and any previous history 
of mismanagement. These ratings – usually divided into investment-grade or speculative-grade – 
ultimately determine the market’s investment in a municipality’s bonds and, by association, their 
ability to provide essential services and rebuild infrastructure. In this way, the removal of 
traditional banks from municipal finance markets and the growing authority of credit ratings 
agencies marked an important shift in how cities operated in the twentieth century.  
Another key aspect of this shift was the transitioning of financial relationships from local 
banks that were often invested in a municipality’s long-term economic health and development 
to international corporations. Ultimately, this process placed cities in complex obligatory and 
suppliant relationships to private capital and forced them, at times, to value the preservation of 
their credit rating over the needs of residents. In order to support services and infrastructure for 
residents through access to the bond market, municipalities had to demonstrate their fiscal health, 
which during the urban crisis often meant cutting services, raising taxes, and instituting other 
austerity measures that negatively impacted residents’ lives.4 In Detroit, the city officials’ 
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concerns about their precarious credit rating motivated them to value protecting the city’s fiscal 
health over public health, for example, by contending that adding new pollution controls to the 
incinerator would unravel the project’s financing. As cities continue to rely on the bond market 
in the face of budget shortfalls – especially after the 2008 fiscal collapse – it is increasingly 
important to scrutinize the seemingly “natural” financial relationships as they directly impact the 
political relationships between local government and its citizens.5  
As more information about Gerald Avery’s letter detailing the potential health threats 
posed by the Detroit incinerator became public, local residents organized to oppose its 
construction and operation. Between 1985 and 1986, concerned citizens in Detroit and Windsor 
formed a loose anti-incinerator coalition they called People for Clean Air. Eventually changing 
their name to the Evergreen Alliance, the group eventually came to be made up of ten to twelve 
active organizers centered in the Cass Corridor area located less than two miles southwest on 
Ferry Street from the GDRRA site. The Corridor, as residents often called it, had been an 
intellectual and creative locus in Detroit since the 1950s and attracted artists, musicians, and 
writers until the mid-2000s. Home to counterculture rockers the MC5 and the radical anarchist 
newspaper The Fifth Estate, Cass Corridor was also a center for political and antiwar organizing 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  
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This activist tradition ultimately influenced the direction of the Evergreen Alliance and 
their struggle against the incinerator.  Alliance member and Fifth Estate contributor David 
Watson reflected on the group:  
The Evergreen Alliance was never exactly an organization (which, according to 
anti-organizational principles at the time, would have co-opted us, “reabsorbing” 
our activities to rationalize and improve capitalist domination and the industrial 
house of toxic cards). But it did function as a loose coalition with regular 
meetings, press releases, and committees. We kept it minimalist, voluntarist, and 
anarchistic, which also tended to satisfy many of our already radical and counter-
cultural neighbors who preferred a relatively structureless association. 
Sometimes we Cass Corridorites were proud to be little more than an 
undisciplined, angry, but technically and legally informed mob.6 
 
The name Evergreen Alliance reflected many of these same ideals. “[T]he word alliance speaks 
of our non-hierarchical structure. I envision the Evergreen Alliance as a community forum,” 
member Beth Miller wrote, while Evergreen “resonates of Green Politics, our indigenous habitat, 
to our connection to the tree of life, to our vigilance.” In this way, Evergreen spoke to both the 
group’s connection to the rising environmental justice movement, as well as a more spiritual 
connection to the earth and the natural world.7  
Emulating many of the same nonviolent demonstrative strategies of the civil rights 
movement and antiwar demonstrators, the Alliance’s central organizers planned marches, 
demonstrations, concerts, lectures, and “die-ins” in Detroit and across the Canadian border in 
Windsor, Ontario from 1986 to 1991. Over those five years, the organization boasted 
approximately fifty active members and hundreds of participants in their actions. The group also 
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enjoyed strong connections with Fifth Estate and its editor, Peter Werbe, who helped guide the 
group as they developed their vision. “Peter was like an elder statesman to us,” explained Laurie 
LaPine Kopack.8 Overall, the anti-capitalist and technology-suspicious sentiments of Werbe and 
other contributors at Fifth Estate had a deep impact in framing the Alliance’s attacks on the 
incinerator. Yet by contextualizing the facility within these broader and more complex critiques, 
the Alliance also made defeating “The Beast,” as they often called it, more challenging.  
One of the Alliance’s first actions stemmed from Laurie LaPine’s observation of the 
facility’s permit approval in the Detroit Free Press in March 1986. LaPine quickly mobilized her 
friends, including sisters Kathy Rashid and Marilyn Rashid and her boyfriend at the time, Ralph 
Franklin. The group sought to “raise the call” to other neighborhood friends and activists.9 Tom 
Stephens, then a law student at Wayne State University, remembers first learning about the 
incinerator from LaPine at a protest against United States aid to the Nicaraguan Contras in 
downtown Detroit: “She [Laurie] climbed out of a car and said to me, ‘Did you know they’re 
about to spend enough money for three Contra armies on an incinerator in our neighborhood?’ I 
had no idea.”10  
Within three days, the friends gathered in LaPine’s living room to discuss strategy and 
basic facts. “I don’t think any of us had ever used the words ‘solid waste management’ 
consecutively,” recalled Stephens. “We were working through the very basics of the issue. We 
obtained Paul Connett’s pamphlet Waste Management as if the Future Mattered and that was 
 








sort of the education.” Their first step would be to convince state regulators that the Michigan 
Air Pollution Control Commission needed to have a public hearing in Detroit in addition to the 
one already scheduled in Lansing. The day of the meeting, LaPine, Kathy Rashid, and Tom 
Stephens drove to the state capital to make the case to their state representatives and the 
Commission.11 Despite objections by a member and General Motors executive, who contended 
that holding a hearing in Detroit would “stir up the citizens,” the Commission agreed to hear 
public comment from Detroit residents at City Hall the following month.12  
 Yet the group’s initial success in winning a Detroit hearing was quickly tempered once 
they arrived at City Hall on April 9. Alliance members and other concerned residents protested 
outside the City-County Building carrying signs with slogans like “Burn politicians, not 
garbage” and “Trash the incinerator” before the hearing was to start at 7:30 P.M. Yet when the 
meeting started, police turned away over 100 people because the fire marshals declared the 
hearing room filled to capacity.13 The protesters who made it into the building were surprised to 
find most of the seats already filled. According to Laurie LaPine Kopack, “The meeting was 
packed with city employees so that there was no room for us...and I remember one or two telling 
us ‘We’re getting paid overtime to be here.’ It was a real battle to shut us out.”14 
Gerald Avery of the state Department of Natural Resources began the hearing by 
reviewing the permitting process, the Air Pollution Control Commission’s issuance of the 
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facility’s final permit in November 1984, as well as his own audit and letter to Combustion 
Engineering and Detroit officials challenging the Best Available Control Technology 
determination and suggesting that the facility would need additional pollution controls in order to 
begin construction. City officials disagreed with Avery and argued the electrostatic precipitators 
they intended to use were the safest technology available and that state regulators had been 
“dishonest” in its characterization of the plant as unsafe without the additional pollution controls. 
“[T]he bottom line,” Bella Marshall argued on behalf of the city, “is whether the technology is 
necessary. We will show that it isn’t.” To that end, Marshall and Dr. Kay Jones of the city’s 
environmental consultant Weston Engineering testified that other cities across the country had 
added dry acid gas scrubbers not because of the environmental protection they provided, but 
rather because of “political pressure, especially regarding acid rain.”15 Jones’s suggestion that 
acid rain and pollution controls were a political issue rather than an environmental one played off 
of contentious debates happening across the country as environmental scientists and 
policymakers argued over both the sources of acid rain and its impact on delicate freshwater 
ecosystems. Amidst the uncertainty, the Reagan administration questioned “scientific 
objectivity” to justify political inaction. When federally-funded studies proved inconclusive, 
officials said the problems were technical, not political.16 In connecting the acid rain issue with 
pollution controls in Detroit, Jones thus sought to politicize environmental regulation in the same 
way and characterize it as unnecessary government intrusion in private enterprise. 
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Jones’s statement set off nearly eight hours of “inflamed” and “raucous” debate as city 
officials and their consultants, state regulators, and the public heckled and shouted over each 
other’s testimony. At one point, shortly after 2 A.M., Detroit Director of Neighborhood City 
Halls Willie Fowler shouted down gubernatorial candidate John Lauve’s objections to the 
incinerator saying that Lauve’s petitions to remove current governor James Blanchard from 
office would be the first thing fed to the trash incinerator. One of the last commentators was 
Assistant State Attorney General and MAPCC Counsel Stewart Freeman, who suggested that the 
Commission had very little legal power to alter or revoke the permit. Furthermore, based on the 
evidence presented during the hearing, Freeman believed the city had a strong case and the state 
a very weak one. “I tell you frankly, you’re not giving me much to work with,” he conceded.17 
Members of the Air Pollution Control Commission were also not persuaded by Avery’s 
testimony and argued that if the new pollution controls were proven to better protect the 
environment and public health, they would require all plants across Michigan to install them. But 
the unproven nature of the technology at that time left most commissioners unconvinced that 
they should revoke Detroit’s permit.  
Yet disagreement and uncertainty prevailed even within the Commission, revealing the 
lack of proven and accurate information about rapidly developing incineration technology, its 
effects, and its regulation. “I personally am not convinced the Department of Public Health will 
be satisfied with this permit by the time this is ready to go,” Commission Chairman Lee Jager 
contended. The expert testimony provided by scientists, regulators, and consultants at the hearing 
was, he argued, based on models and assumptions that could not accurately predict how the 
 





incinerator might actually impact Detroiters, Windsorites, and other residents across southeast 
Michigan and Ontario. The truth was that the Detroit incinerator was the largest ever constructed 
and its actual impacts would be impossible to accurately know until it started to burn. Finally, 
just after 3 A.M., the Commission voted 9-1 to uphold Detroit and Combustion Engineering’s 
original permit. The decision came as an enormous blow to the community, many of whom felt 
as though the whole hearing had been a charade and an attempt by city government to undermine 
its own residents. “A travesty,” was how Irene Brown, one of the fifty protesters outside the 
City-County Building earlier that day, described the hearing. Yet she also promised that anti-
incinerator organizers, including the Evergreen Alliance, were not backing down: “We’re going 
to have sit-ins and the whole bit when they come rolling in with trucks to build it.”18 
Noticeably absent from the Detroit hearing were officials from the EPA’s Region V 
offices in Chicago. According to a letter sent to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources 
the following day, the three officials were prevented from attending the meeting due to 
mechanical difficulties with both their original flight and their alternative flight to Detroit.19 
Alongside the letter was the prepared testimony to be presented by Technical Analysis Section 
Region V Chief Joseph Paisie. Paisie’s testimony highlighted several “deficiencies” with the 
GDRRA permit following the EPA’s review in March 1986. First, Paisie suggested that the 
proposed facility might be located in a “nonattainment area” under the Clean Air Act, which 
Paisie admitted “raised a serious question” for regulators. Furthermore, EPA reviewers found 
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that state analysts had not performed an adequate evaluation to determine the Lowest Achievable 
Emission Rate for both particulate emissions and carbon monoxide required by state and federal 
law. In their review, EPA officials found seventeen other permits from eleven different states 
that demonstrated emissions rates lower than the rate determined for the GDRRA. Similarly, the 
EPA found state’s Best Available Control Technology analysis was “cursory” and the data the 
approved permit was based upon “unsubstantiated.” These three rules, however, were approved 
by the EPA in 1979 to regulate electric utilities that burned fossil fuels, not waste. According to 
Paisie, Combustion Engineering officials had earlier assured the EPA that the facility did not 
even have the capacity to fire the amount of fuel oil required to be considered under the NSPS 
regulations for electric utilities, even though they were in fact generating electricity at the plant.20 
In this way, the still-developing nature of resource recovery and the failure of regulatory 
frameworks to adapt to changes as they happened created a technical loophole that allowed the 
Detroit resource recovery facility to operate in a gray area.  
In addition to his uncertainty about what kind of facility the GDRRA ought to be 
qualified as, Paisie also noted that the federal Clean Air Act required that the owner or operator 
of new sources of emissions to prove that all of their other sources had to be in compliance or on 
a compliance schedule to meet state and federal air pollution limitations. Yet the City of Detroit 
did not meet this requirement: the Mistersky Power Plant that was owned and operated by the 
city was in violation of emission regulations for sulfur dioxide when the state issued the GDRRA 
permit. Despite this clear violation, Paisie suggested that the question of ownership in the case of 
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the GDRRA was murky, due to the complex contractual and financial relationship between the 
city and Combustion Engineering.21 In this way, the financial and legal mechanisms employed 
by the city and CE to build a piece of city infrastructure obfuscated the definition of ownership 
and made applying regulations to the facility even more challenging.  
Following receipt of Paisie’s written testimony on April 10, Bella Marshall went into 
“panic mode.” 22 Having just secured the Air Pollution Control Commission’s reaffirmation of 
Detroit’s permit to construct the previous day, she was stunned that a top EPA official now 
casted doubt on its validity. At stake was the approaching remarketing of Detroit’s short-term 
notes with the help of Citibank and Manufacturers Hanover Trust the previous year. That sale 
had earlier been held up by Gerald Avery’s letter at the end of 1985 and now the uncertainty 
placed upon the project by Paisie’s testimony would make those bonds even more difficult to sell 
to investors. Yet these tenuous financial arrangements were reaching their expiration date: both 
the letters of credit from both banks, as well as the GDRRA’s Energy Purchase Agreement with 
Detroit Edison – which would serve as 50 percent of the revenue from the facility – were all set 
to expire on May 9.23 
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Paisie’s letter ultimately sparked a series of meetings and communications throughout 
April 1986 between EPA staff and city officials. While representatives from the EPA were 
primarily concerned with the technical questions around pollution controls, Detroit officials were 
more worried about the financial implications of adding expensive equipment to the facility. 
Based on their contractual arrangement with Combustion Engineering, the city was responsible 
for covering construction modifications stemming from a “change in law” and though the laws 
had not themselves changed, the enforcement of those laws had. During the first of these 
meetings on April 10 between city officials and EPA Region 5 staff, Bella Marshall attempted to 
make federal officials understand Detroit’s precarious financial situation. Yet, according to 
Marshall, EPA staff were “not able to comprehend the magnitude of the existing situation.” In a 
later deposition, she recounted how EPA officials “gave us examples, like in the case of this 
private industry; somebody made some kind of flip remark like: Well, they always say they 
cannot pay but we really draw the line and they find the money. And I explained to them: This is 
not General Motors, this is not Chrysler, this is public money.”24  
Concerned that EPA staff did not fully grasp Detroit’s troubled financial state, Marshall 
presented a more complete picture of Detroit’s financial status in a fourteen-page report to 
Region V Air Management Division Director David Kee. Marshall ticked off a population 
decline of 25 percent, an unemployment rate of more than 14 percent, a reduction of 7,000 city 
employees, and a multitude of deferred infrastructure projects and delayed or eliminated 
services. This, combined with the precariousness of the project’s financing arrangements, made 
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the EPA’s request for additional pollution controls a near impossibility, Marshall explained to 
Region V Administrator Valdas Adamkus. Detroit, she argued, “could not make any additional 
financial commitments to the Project, particularly in light of the fact that other essential services 
were still not fully restored” and neither Citibank nor Manufacturers Hanover Trust was willing 
to take on the additional risk of backing the expensive equipment based on the city’s past 
financial troubles. “The position which the Authority and the Project find themselves in at this 
point is a very difficult one,” Marshall explained. “To indicate that a project of this size and 
complexity, structured as a result of virtually prevailing upon various financing sources to fund 
the Project, and finally obtaining the only available financing at a premium, could simply be 
undone, restructured, and successfully refinanced, is a factual, technical, and legal 
impossibility.”25 Yet Marshall never received a response, a sign she and Coleman Young took to 
be tacit agreement that there was nothing that could reasonably be done to add the pollution 
controls at this stage of the project.   
Following the disappointment of the Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission’s 
hearing, anti-incinerator activists turned to other tactics to forward their opposition to the 
resource recovery facility. Relying on the radical organizing traditions of the 1960s and 1970s of 
the Cass Corridor, members of the Evergreen Alliance staged their first public “Stop the Plant” 
demonstration against the incinerator in Detroit’s Eastern Market. The location was a strategic 
one: located less than a mile south of the proposed incinerator site, Eastern Market was the 
largest open-air market and wholesale center in the city and a major food source for restaurants, 
grocers, and residents. By staging their first protest there, Alliance members sought to raise 
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awareness of food as the primary absorption point of dioxin, a known incinerator emission and a 
dangerous bio-accumulating carcinogen that could persist and build up in the environment and in 
human bodies decades after being emitted. In this way, organizers intentionally chose Eastern 
Market to highlight the threat the incinerator posed to city residents and their health because, to 
Detroiters, it was synonymous with food and nourishment. From there, demonstrators marched 
down Russell Street to the future site of the incinerator beating drums, wearing respirator masks, 
and carrying signs with slogans like, “Experts Lie – Trash Plants Kill!” that evoked their feelings 
of betrayal after the Air Pollution Control Commission hearing.26   
The Detroit News characterized the demonstrators as “environmental terrorists.”27 The 
News sensationalized the Alliance’s nonviolent actions by associating them and their cause with 
both the violent radicalism of the New Left in the 1960s and 70s, as well as with the anti-
Western religious fanaticism of Islamic terrorism that had gripped headlines and American 
consciousness since the 1979 Iranian hostage incident.28 This misappropriated epithet from the 
city’s right-leaning newspaper drew sharp criticism from Detroit leftist communities. “The word 
‘terrorist’ is now the catch-all tag for anyone who challenges or opposes established laws or 
prescribed plans,” argued Peter Werbe, writing in the Fifth Estate about The News’s comment. 
“That one word does it all—obscures the facts, turning meaning on its head, and ‘sabotages’ the 
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intentions of people who are trying to defend their community, protect the earth, and simply 
breathe clean air.”29  
Alliance members’ understanding of the interconnectedness of environmental 
degradation and capitalism suggested one of their weaknesses: by considering the incinerator as 
one piece of a much larger global problem, the Evergreen Alliance was at times unable to focus 
their energies and act concretely given the vastness of the issue as they viewed it. Nor were they 
willing to accept compromise, especially after the bitter Air Pollution Control Commission 
hearing. To accept any concession from the city or CE that was not the total abandonment of the 
incinerator project would, in their view, mean co-opting their values and ideals as an 
organization. As a result, the Evergreen Alliance’s actions were more symbolic rather than 
action-oriented. To Alliance members, this was not a shortcoming but a confirmation of their 
identity as a loose coalition of neighbors organized around a shared goal. “I believe,” Beth Miller 
wrote to Alliance co-founder Tom Stephens, “that anyone who looks to the Evergreen Alliance 
to accomplish ‘practical’ activities will find themselves struggling unnecessarily for 
consensus.”30 Yet in maintaining this identity, the group failed to hold up the political and 
financial mechanisms – such as the bond remarketing or permitting questions – that were 
necessary to the project.  
While less focused on tangible solutions to stop the incinerator, the Evergreen Alliance 
effectively articulated their ideas in print. Werbe regularly allowed the Evergreen Alliance to use 
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The Fifth Estate and reach the paper’s established readership. Later in 1987, the Alliance also 
developed their own newspaper, Detroit Trash Incinerator: We Say No!, in which they more 
completely articulated their broad anti-capitalist, anti-technology, and anti-government discourse 
against the incinerator and American society more generally. The corrupting influence of 
capitalism lay at the center of most of their critiques.  
At the root of Detroit’s professed need for a trash incinerator was “the whole 
production/consumption system” that created more waste. The only solution, therefore, was not 
better pollution controls, but to “openly repudiate capitalism,” wrote George Bradford. Similarly, 
the use of technology and science to create solutions – or “technofixes” – to the problems of 
waste and pollution – again produced by capitalism – was likewise troubling in that it deferred 
the systemic change the Evergreen Alliance deemed truly necessary.31 The anti-authoritarian 
leanings of the Alliance also moved them to question the credibility of city and state officials 
associated with the project, especially those tied to corporate capital. As Alliance member 
Charles Willis observed “to a certain degree, it would be accurate to conclude that the incinerator 
project is the result of a sinister plot, involving evil politicians, corporate gangsters, and their 
hired hands.” All in all, the “horror represented by this incinerator” was only one aspect of a 
much larger, systemic problem, “an emerging picture of ecological disasters fostered by 
corporations, scientific-technological institutions, and government” and the only solution was 
radical action. We Say No! echoed this demand for a total reconsideration of the social and 
economic status quo with its closing call to arms against the interlinked onslaught of capitalism 
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against humans and nature alike: “DESTROY WHAT DESTROYS YOU! DEFEND 
YOURSELVES! DEFEND THE EARTH!”32   
In this way the Evergreen Alliance was one example of a long tradition of institutional 
distrust in extreme leftist movements. The Beats of the 1950s articulated a wide-ranging critique 
of triumphant American postwar culture, including militarism, racial segregation, anticommunist 
fervor, and consumerism, the youth-led counterculture of the 1960s amplified these critiques. 
Groups like Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) questioned the paradoxical nature of a 
government that professed equality yet treated African Americans like second-class citizens and 
sought to effect change through political campaigns and community organizing. Later in the 
1960s, SDS splinter groups like the Revolutionary Youth Movement and the Weather 
Underground articulated a more anarchist platform that rejected SDS’s attempts to effect 
political and social change from within existing institutions and instead endorsed a radical 
revolution against American imperialism and capitalism. Yet the failures of leftist organizing, 
perhaps best embodied by the schism of SDS, also influenced the Alliance’s suspicion of 
organizational hierarchies. In this way, the Evergreen Alliance carried on the radical intellectual 
traditions of the 1960s alongside concerns about the environment and public health in a way that 
was eventually called the environmental justice movement.33  
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The Detroit Audubon Society and the Conservation Tradition 
While the Evergreen Alliance primarily attacked the incinerator as a symptom of exploitative 
capitalism, the Detroit Audubon Society articulated their opposition through concern for human 
health and environmental integrity. Founded in 1939 by Evelyn Kelly and Grace Sharitt, 
Audubon focused on education, recreation, and conservation related to natural places and 
resources across the state. The Detroit branch was an offshoot of the larger Michigan Audubon 
Society founded in 1904, one year before the national organization coalesced out of various 
state-level societies. The long history of the Audubon Society in Michigan reflects the state’s 
conservation and recreation tradition that developed alongside its industrial growth in urban 
centers such as Detroit, Flint, Saginaw, and Port Huron.34 Throughout its history, the Michigan 
Audubon Society, and later Detroit Audubon, worked to pursue protective legislation for birds 
and other wildlife and to create natural reserves for the enjoyment of Michiganders. These efforts 
were often supported throughout the twentieth century by likeminded groups who supported 
conservation efforts for their own ends, from Progressive Era reformers who advocated for 
scientifically managed forest reserves in heavily-logged pine cutovers to the United Automotive 
Workers (UAW) and their allies in the Michigan United Conservation Clubs, which lobbied the 
state legislature on fish and game laws that balanced recreation with conservation from the 1940s 
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through the end of the century. While the Michigan Audubon Society fought for state level laws 
that protected songbirds from the booming millinery industry at the turn of the century, hunters 
and conservation scientists in the Progressive Era simultaneously pursued bans or shortened 
seasons for game birds as flocks dwindled precipitously.35 Later in the 1960s, the UAW’s 
Recreation Department and the Audubon Society were among the state’s first to raise awareness 
of the environmental impacts of massive suburbanization and industrial pollution.36  
In line with this long tradition of environmental advocacy, the Detroit Audubon Society 
pursued its own plan of action against the threat of the GDRRA incinerator. In contrast to the 
grassroots Evergreen Alliance, which was interested in probing the ideological underpinnings of 
what the incinerator represented, the Detroit Audubon Society drew upon their organization’s 
long history of successful environmental protection by working through institutional methods, 
like legislation, scientific inquiry, and legal action. In this vein, the organization first turned to 
scientific expertise in their fight against the facility. In April 1986, Detroit Audubon Society 
member Stephanie Ruttinger obtained a copy of Combustion Engineering’s risk assessment they 
had submitted to the state during the permitting process and sent it for reevaluation to Barry 
Commoner and Thomas Webster, both biologists at Queens College in New York City.  
Commoner, one of the nation’s most respected environmentalists, characterized the risk 
assessment as “inadequate,” full of “errors and inconsistencies,” and further contended that “the 
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project was developed in an irresponsible way.” A key point in Commoner’s findings that 
echoed earlier debates between Michigan Department of Natural Resources and the state’s Public 
Health Department concerned the methodology employed by CE to evaluate cancer risk from 
dioxins and furans. Since these were broad names for large groups of many similar compounds, 
the methodologies for assessing the risk they posed varied, taking some variants into account 
while leaving others out. For example, of the eight different methodologies that existed for 
measuring dioxins and furans, the lifetime maximum cancer risk per million individuals ranged 
from 3.6 using the EPA’s 1985 guidelines to 110 with the state of California’s 1983 method. 
Although Commoner did not reveal which methodology he used, he found CE’s risk assessment, 
in his opinion, “42 times too low.”37  
Commoner also refuted the notion that adding more effective pollution controls, like the 
baghouses and acid scrubbers sought by the EPA, would reduce the danger presented by 
incinerator emissions, contending there were “no tested control methods that can reduce dioxin 
to acceptable levels.” “[I]f the Detroit facility is built,” Commoner concluded, “there is a serious 
risk that it would be unable to operate within legal emission requirements, forcing it to close.” 
After hearing Commoner’s grim assessment of the GDRRA project, the 6,000-member Detroit 
Audubon Society voted to seek a one-year statewide moratorium on incinerator construction, 
including the GDRRA project, from the state.38  
Seeking to delay CE’s construction start-up of the facility, the Society released 
Commoner’s report, along with data from two other Roy F. Weston-led projects, to local media. 
 






The information from other the projects included a risk assessment for a proposed incinerator in 
Montgomery County, Maryland, in which a citizen review committee called Weston’s data and 
their methods for determining emissions levels “inadequate” and “flawed.” In the other, city 
planners in Minneapolis expressed similar doubts with Weston’s environmental and public 
health assessments related to the construction of a city incinerator. Yet city officials and their 
partners at Weston and CE were not dissuaded. “We’re not going to hold up a half-billion-dollar 
building project calculated to improve the environment in this state while Barry Commoner 
scratches his head trying to come up with an alternative,” Mayor Young told the Detroit Free 
Press. Dr. Kay Jones of Weston also disputed Commoner’s findings, defending his company’s 
risk analysis as “very conservative.”39  
Yet Commoner’s report and the Society’s actions brought the discussion of the Detroit 
incinerator and improved pollution controls to other local governments. On May 7, Warren City 
Council member James Fouts sent letters to leaders in twenty-one suburban communities around 
Detroit asking them to join in a lawsuit mandating Detroit add better pollution controls on its 
proposed incinerator. Just 15 miles north of Detroit, Warren was a dense working-class suburb 
known for its racial homogeneity, sizable property tax base, and political power in Macomb 
County. 40 As a result, Fouts’s concerns about “Detroit’s cancer-producing garbage” – a not-so-
veiled call back to the racist undertones used to describe cities and their lack of cleanliness that 
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had permeated urban redevelopment language in the 1960s – and its impact on his city brought 
the Detroit incinerator debate into the broader metropolitan region.41 While Roseville City 
Manager Thomas Van Damme expressed confidence in the Michigan Department of Natural 
Resources and EPA, Harper Woods City Manager James Liedein was less certain, contending 
that Detroit officials, state regulators, and the Detroit Audubon Society had all raised good 
points. “We just want them to have the lowest possible emissions,” Liedein explained, 
suggesting that the solution was a simple one.42  
This debate also revealed the complex and often fraught relationship between Detroit and 
its northern neighbors in Macomb County. Macomb had most directly benefitted from the 
relocation of light and heavy manufacturing from Detroit to spaces along the County’s many 
industrial corridors and workers who followed those jobs. Between 1950 and 1960, Macomb 
County’s population increased by 119 percent. Yet the area was hit hard by economic decline 
and manufacturing losses in the 1970s and 80s, moving one of Detroit’s most notable 
sociological observers to characterize the southern half of Macomb County as one of “many 
Detroits” as economic hardship spread across the metropolitan region. In this way, the suburban 
concerns about emissions from Detroit’s incinerator stemmed from anxiety about pollution as 
much as the spread northward of Detroit’s economic struggles and the relocation of black 
Detroiters themselves to Macomb County.43 
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Though the release of Barry Commoner’s report perhaps inspired new conversations, it 
ultimately did not have the desired effect in either the media or on city officials. The Detroit 
Audubon Society turned to another familiar tactic: legal action. On May 8, 1986, the Society, the 
Mackinac Chapter of the Sierra Club, the North Cass Community Union, and the Environmental 
Defense Fund delivered to the EPA, state Department of Natural Resources, the Michigan Air 
Pollution Control Commission, John Cunningham of Combustion Engineering Bella Marshall, 
and Mayor Coleman Young a notice of lawsuit against the Resource Recovery Authority in order 
to “bring the project in line with statutory requirements.” In their memo attached to the suit, the 
coalition cited familiar technical and procedural issues, including Gerald Avery’s letter 
acknowledging the state’s thousand-fold calculation error and the project’s failure to comply 
with Best Available Control Technology and Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate standards.44  
The coalition’s memo also presented place as an important criterion in the determination 
for better pollution controls. Given the proposed facility’s site “in an urban area on the Canadian 
border,” the coalition argued that both the location’s population density and its unique context 
along an important international waterway made potential impact from the facility far more 
dangerous to human health and environmental quality. As for the economic constraints Detroit 
used against adding new pollution control technology, the coalition argued that “the key concern 
is how much control is obtained for the amount spent, not the owner’s ability to pay.” Together, 
these statements demonstrate that the activist coalition considered more stringent pollution 
controls to be essential no matter the economic cost, especially considering the facility’s dense 
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urban location. “[S]hould CE fail to correct the deficiencies of the project,” the coalition 
concluded, “we intend to file an action against CE, the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery 
Authority, and other responsible persons and entities.”45 
Yet the citizen coalition also threatened to bring suit against the EPA within sixty days if 
the Agency chose not to intervene and demand additional pollution controls. By arguing that the 
GDRRA was not in compliance with the Best Available Control Technology and Lowest 
Achievable Emissions Rate requirements of the federal Clean Air Act, the coalition contended 
that the EPA Administrator was obligated to take action against the project, even though it was 
the state’s failure that led to the permit’s deficiencies. This was because of a technicality of 
language in the Clean Air Act, which stated that the Administrator “shall” or a state government 
“may” take action against a facility that did not conform to the Best Available Control 
Technology and Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate sections of the Clean Air Act’s Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration requirements. This specificity of language, according to the 
coalition, placed a mandatory legal obligation upon the Administrator to force the GDRRA into 
compliance. “EPA has a nondiscretionary duty [to enforce the Clean Air Act],” they argued. 
“Should it breach that duty, we intend to seek to compel its performance.”46 This notice placed 
additional pressure on the EPA to act in the Detroit case lest they become caught up in legal 
proceedings themselves. 
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The Evergreen Alliance’s and the Detroit Audubon Society’s attempts to pursue their 
objective through different yet simultaneous ends revealed a key shortcoming in the citizen 
opposition to the incinerator. The Evergreen Alliance was the intellectual descendant of a more 
radical form of activism that had defined the Cass Corridor since the 1950s; the Detroit Audubon 
Society was a part of a long tradition of wildlife and environmental conservation organizations 
that had operated within existing political and legal structures to protect wildlife and wild 
places.47 Their diverse approaches were untenable to each other. As one Evergreen Alliance 
member commented in Fifth Estate, the Detroit Audubon Society’s commitment to 
“respectability” and “realpolitik” over solidarity ultimately made that group “uncomfortable 
working with those who hold a more radical critique” of capitalism. In this way, the Detroit 
Audubon Society chose to “submit to proper procedure” rather than question broader economic, 
political, and social conventions as the Evergreen Alliance did.48  
Yet the two groups’ inability to cooperate was as much the Alliance’s unwillingness to 
compromise as the Detroit Audubon Society’s trepidation in adopting radical solutions. While 
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the benefits of a unified, broad-based coalition were undeniable, the Evergreen Alliance saw the 
path presented by cooperation as one that would ultimately force them to moderate their radical 
politics, work within the system they fundamentally opposed, and compromise their ultimate 
goal of preventing the incinerator from being built at all. The Alliance’s discomfort working 
“with people whose views we did not share” ultimately moved them to separate from the Detroit 
Audubon Society as the latter organization sought to build a legal coalition with the Sierra Club 
and the North Cass Community Union.49 
The Evergreen Alliance considered this a necessary lesson in the nature of organizing 
rather than a loss. This choice between compromise or maintaining their radical beliefs “remains 
a problem which anti-authoritarians must grapple with in order to work effectively with others in 
our neighborhoods and workplaces,” Alliance member Charles Willis contended. But in making 
the difficult choice to uphold their values, the potential reward was the radicalization of others. 
“Every social struggle,” he suggested “holds the potential for becoming a battle against the 
modern technological society as a whole.”50 
Yet coalition-building was not impossible, as demonstrated by the North Cass 
Community Union. Founded in 1978, the Union was focused on a variety of issues in the 
neighborhoods along the Cass Corridor, including mitigating crime, fighting gentrification, 
providing services to residents, and promoting community cohesion through its annual Dally in 
the Alley festival. Like the Evergreen Alliance, the group drew its vision and strategy from the 
radical past of the Cass Corridor neighborhood. While the Union resented the fact that “outside 
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interests,” like the Sierra Club and the Detroit Audubon Society, were telling them “how to live 
in our own city,” the Union also chose “by necessity” to join those organizations in bringing 
legal proceedings against the incinerator. “Let us keep in mind,” member Roger Bailey wrote, 
“that none of these groups were around when N.C.C.U. fought the early battles that led to the 
formation of our community” and that “their best interests may not be North Cass’s best 
interest.”51 Despite this skepticism, the North Cass Community Union clearly believed that they 
were more likely to be successful in their fight against the incinerator by joining in the 
coalition’s legal action despite the resentment the group felt towards these “outsider” groups.  
City officials actively worked to exploit the divisions between anti-incinerator activists in 
order to weaken their efforts and to marshal public support against the movement to block the 
project. After the Windsor City Council sent a resolution to city officials in Detroit on April 22, 
1986 expressing their “strong objection and outrage” to the incinerator citing health risks to 
Windsorites, Mayor Coleman Young responded by contending Windsor Mayor David Burr was 
“just being used by some of the Cass Corridor people,” referring to the Evergreen Alliance.52 
Young also attempted to characterize the mostly white Alliance as “outside agitators” from the 
suburbs trying to foster discord in Detroit.53 In discrediting them and focusing on persistent 
issues of race rather than the environment and public health, Young sought to demonize the 
Alliance and their efforts. Evergreen Alliance members themselves acknowledged their 
shortcomings in regard to race and attempted to attract more African Americans from across the 
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city into their movement. Members believed they shared common cause with all of the city’s 
residents, as the incinerator ultimately would impact everyone’s health equally. Alliance 
members organized a speaker’s bureau to conduct outreach to many of Detroit’s black churches 
and even went door-to-door in mostly black neighborhoods that would be most impacted by the 
GDRRA’s emissions to collect data about residents’ health.54  
For various reasons, however, the Evergreen Alliance’s attempts to draw Detroit’s 
African American residents into the organization were unsuccessful. According to Evergreen 
Alliance member Tom Stephens, longstanding divides between blacks and whites in the city 
created a significant barrier to forming a coalition with the black community, not to mention the 
strong loyalty African Americans felt towards Coleman Young. “Everything in Detroit is about 
race,” Stephens reflected. “[T]here’s no basis for the majority of people in Detroit to ally with a 
bunch of white radicals on environmental issues against Coleman Young. It just wasn’t gonna 
happen.”55 Alliance members Laurie LaPine Kopack and Tanya Sharon likewise agreed that 
structural racial issues in Detroit were a significant obstacle to the Evergreen Alliance, but also 
suggested that it was difficult to activate community groups against a threat that did not yet exist. 
“I think it wasn’t real yet,” explained Kopack.56 Ultimately, the Alliance’s lack of success 
reveals persistent racial divides – both spatial and social – in the Detroit region through the 
1980s. In 1990, the U.S. Census Bureau classified the Detroit metropolitan area as the most 
segregated in the United States. This stratification extended to how blacks and whites in the 
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region regarded each other. Poll data from 1968 shows that 21 percent of black respondents in 
Detroit agreed that most whites wanted “to keep blacks down.” Yet by 1987, black respondents 
who agreed with the statement rose to 59 percent, while 39 percent of white respondents also 
agreed.57 In this way, the Evergreen Alliance faced numerous structural challenges to building a 
widely inclusive coalition, in addition to the Young administration’s attempts to discredit them 
and their work. 
A Failure of Oversight 
On May 12, 1986, the EPA announced that a three month-long probe into the GDRRA 
permit by Region V Administrator Valdas Adamkus and his staff determined emissions from the 
GDRRA would violate the federal Clean Air Act provisions despite the state Department of 
Natural Resource’s assessment to the contrary. According to EPA calculations, the incinerator 
needed to reduce carbon monoxide emissions by 225 tons per year, particulate matter by 120 
tons per year, and sulfur dioxide by a considerable 3,100 tons per year. Given these findings, the 
Agency issued notices of violation to the DNR, the city of Detroit, and Combustion Engineering 
for failure to comply with the carbon monoxide and particulate emission standards. With that, the 
EPA moved to revoke the sulfur dioxide portion of the incinerator’s permit, and threatened to 
bring Detroit and  Combustion Engineering to court.58 Although the EPA had the legal authority 
to revoke review privileges from any local or state entity should they fail to adequately enforce 
the Clean Air Act, the Agency’s action challenged a permit that had already been granted by 
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state Department of Natural Resources and audited by the EPA (though it is unclear if Adamkus 
and his staff were aware of the audit at the time or if they were intentionally attempting to hide 
their previous confirmation of the permit approval). In this way, the EPA’s challenge to the 
Detroit incinerator permit served as a litmus test for the inherent authority of the Agency over 
state and local governments to whom PSD enforcement had been granted.  
Generally considered a fair and independent administrator, Region V head Valdus 
Adamkus was widely known for his very public battle with EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch 
Burford in 1983. At the center of the feud was her suppression of a report written by Adamkus’s 
regional office that accused Dow Chemical of polluting the waterways near their Midland, 
Michigan headquarters with dioxins. The incident ultimately contributed to Burford’s resignation 
in 1983 and served a major morale boost to an often-stifled EPA under the Reagan 
administration.59 Adamkus, who later served two terms as the president of Lithuania, was one of 
the few EPA officials during the Reagan years to be recognized by environmental groups, 
especially those in the Great Lakes region, as an ally.60 Under his watch, Region V filed more 
enforcement orders than any other EPA office and developed a reputation as one of the most 
independent and aggressive offices in the nation.61 
The EPA’s threat to revoke a portion of the GDRRA’s permit to install placed Detroit in 
an extremely precarious position. Having received no response from Adamkus or anyone else in 
the Region V office to her April 23 letter detailing the city’s troubled financial status, Bella 
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Marshall and city finance officials had removed the short-term variable rate notes it had issued in 
December 1984 from a joint escrow account with CE and remarketed them as long-term fixed 
rate bonds with the backing of Citibank and Manufacturers Hannover Trust. With the financing 
process initiated, CE was set to start construction at the project’s Russell-Ferry site on May 14.  
Given the many uncertainties surrounding it, the Young administration’s choice to move 
forward with the GDRRA project in May 1986 was troubling. Having received no reply from 
EPA officials absolutely confirming the permit’s validity, the decision to initiate financing 
arrangements for the project was risky if the EPA questioned the permit, as they were now. Nor 
were city officials apparently considering the facility’s long-term costs to taxpayers or the 
potential for economic risk presented by the still-unproven technologies and a profit structure 
that relied heavily on massive volumes of waste. The contract Detroit had negotiated with 
Combustion Engineering in the late 1970s stipulated that the city would be liable for the cost of 
new technology or infrastructure related to a change in environmental regulation.62 Furthermore, 
though CE was financially responsible for unplanned mechanical failures at the plant, any 
unscheduled closures for repairs at the facility would cost the city too. Even if the GDRRA was 
closed, Detroiters would not stop producing trash and the city would still be responsible for 
collecting it, transporting it 30 miles to a backup landfill in Sumpter Township, and paying the 
tipping fee to dispose of it. Finally, Detroit would be forced to pay CE a fee should they fail to 
deliver the agreed upon tonnage of waste every year. Yet as Detroit’s population continued to 
decline from its peak in 1950 – from 1.5 million in 1970 to 1.2 million in 1980 and even further 
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to 1 million in 1990 – the city was contractually bound to build a facility for a population and a 
waste volume that no longer existed. In this way, Detroit bore enormous financial risk from the 
project, especially once construction was complete. Inevitably, those costs would be passed on to 
residents, either in the form of higher taxes or waste disposal fees – despite already boasting the 
highest taxes in the state – or in the assumption of more debt, which would negatively impact 
their credit rating and make it more difficult to finance other necessary city services and 
improvements.  
Detroit was not the only American city to grapple with the complex questions of long-
term cost as they related to resource recovery. Inspired in part by the infamous garbage-barge 
Mobro 4000 which was rejected from off-loading its cargo of more than 3,000 tons of Long 
Island garbage at ports from North Carolina to Belize over seven months in 1987, reporters at 
Newsday launched a months-long investigation into resource recovery in 1987. Ultimately, the 
team (known within the bureau as “the Garbage People”) found that cities and towns along the 
East Coast – especially in Massachusetts and Long Island – that had been sold on resource 
recovery as an alternative to rising landfill disposal rates were ultimately “pressured into a 
solution that may be an enormous environmental and economic gamble.”63 While the tipping 
fees and transportation costs to dispose of municipal waste at an incinerator might be lower than 
at a shrinking landfill, the bonds and other financing mechanisms used to construct high-tech 
resource recovery plants generated long-term costs shouldered primarily by taxpayers. In 
Hempstead, Newsday reported city officials were forced to raise garbage disposal taxes 137 
percent once the new resource recovery facility opened. Elsewhere in Long Island, disposal fees 
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rose 350 percent for some households.64 These drastic increases were also likely in Detroit’s 
future: in their weekly newsletter Waste Not!, Paul and Ellen Connett estimated that the GDRRA 
project would cost the city of Detroit $1 billion after all of the bonds and interest were finally 
paid off.65 Overall, incinerators were “being built with little regard for financial consequences,” 
suggested Richard Firstman of Newsday.66 
That was perhaps true for the municipalities, but not for the companies building and 
financing the facilities. Three of the largest companies in the United States – Wheelabrator 
Environmental Systems, Ogden Martin System, and Combustion Engineering – reported nearly 
$7 billion combined in resource recovery-related business in 1987, while underwriters for 
resource recovery bonds reported more than $110 million in profits in 1984 and 1985 alone.67 
One trade periodical noted in 1986 that potential resource recovery market was valued at 
approximately $100 billion and that “entrepreneurs are showing a willingness to invest in the 
development of more efficient and reliable technologies.” This potential could only be realized if 
waste disposal costs around the country continued to rise due to decreased landfill space. 
Consensus at two separate resource recovery conferences in Washington D.C. suggested 
resource recovery would be “competitive” with traditional landfills “once garbage disposal costs 
 
64 Thomas J. Maier, “Trying a European Import” in Rush to Burn: Solving America’s Garbage Crisis? (Washington 
D.C.: Newsday, 1989), 82. 
 
65 Paul and Ellen Connett, “Connecticut: Combustion Engineering's 2000 tpd Incinerator in Hartford Shuts Down 
due to Major Boiler Rupture,” Waste Not, #30, November 15, 1988. 
 
66 Richard C. Firstman, “High Stake Risk on Incinerators” in Rush to Burn: Solving America’s Garbage Crisis? 
(Washington D.C.: Newsday, 1989), 3-4. 
 
67 Bob Porterfield, “Firms at the Top of the Heap” and “Incinerators Hot on Wall Street” in Rush to Burn: Solving 




reach $25 a ton.”68 Yet this meant that municipalities sending their waste to incinerators were, in 
some cases, paying more in tipping fees than if they had continued relying on landfills in the first 
place. It also meant that the resource recovery industry and cities were highly motivated to 
encourage Americans to create more waste and to prevent the growth of curbside recycling, 
which threatened to divert valuable waste away from incinerators. In Detroit, the City Council 
passed a “flow control ordinance” in October 1985 that funneled all residential waste to the 
planned incinerator and left little room to develop a city-wide recycling program.69 
Many Detroiters were thrilled by the EPA’s intercession in the GDRRA permit 
controversy. The North Cass Community Union, a member of the citizens’ coalition that 
threatened to bring legal action against the GDRRA, voiced it’s support for the “impending legal 
action…to invalidate the permit for this plant. Let the voice of the people be heard!”70 Yet 
members of the Evergreen Alliance did not think the EPA represented the “voice of the people” 
and were concerned that the Agency’s intervention would ultimately allow the plant to move 
forward. Claiming they had convinced members of the Detroit Audubon Society and Sierra Club 
not to compromise on any outcome that was not the facility’s complete shutdown, the Alliance 
suggested that with the EPA’s endorsement of better pollution controls for the facility “there is 
the danger that these groups will retreat to their previous position, the state will pick up the 
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difference, the plant will be built with the control technology.”71 The Evergreen Alliance sought 
a complete shutdown.  
Yet the city would not enter into any sort of compromise with the EPA easily. On July 7, 
the GDRRA and Combustion Engineering filed suit in the Eastern District Court of Michigan 
seeking a declaration from the court that the EPA had “exceeded its authority” in attempting to 
revoke the GDRRA permit and to bar the EPA from any further attempt to interfere with what 
they argued was a legally-approved permit. At a status conference a month later, attorneys for 
both Detroit and the EPA agreed to expedite the case, given the uncertainty that the legal action 
created for Detroit, and would take one month to collect evidence for their respective cases. Yet 
as the discovery deadline approached, Detroit officials learned of the EPA’s 1985 audit of the 
GDRRA permit during the Agency’s annual review of state Department of Natural Resources. In 
the audit, EPA officials “commended the Michigan DNR for…the demonstrated competence of 
the staff, as well as for the quality of its NSR [New Source Review] program, policies, and 
procedures.”72 According to lawyers for the city, the audit was only provided when they “learned 
of its existence from other sources and asked for it specifically, although they had requested in 
discovery any information that EPA possessed regarding the permit.” Ultimately, the audit 
contradicted earlier statements made by EPA lawyers that the Agency had not reviewed any 
material related to the GDRRA permit until after Gerald Avery revealed the DNR’s thousand 
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fold calculation error in December 1985.73 In a statement to the Detroit Free Press, EPA 
spokeswoman Virginia Donahue argued that the permit was a “surprise to EPA management and 
attorneys” and that it had not been intentionally withheld from city officials.74 Their position 
now undermined, EPA Region V officials indicated that they would be willing to enter into a 
settlement. Yet Detroit’s demand for “finality” regarding their permit’s legality, including a court 
order that ultimately barred the EPA from any future interference with the project, was viewed 
by the Agency as unacceptable and talks between the parties quickly broke down. 
Following the discovery of the 1985 audit and the breakdown of settlement talks, the 
EPA announced that it would “reluctantly” end its attempt to revoke the sulfur dioxide section of 
the GDRRA’s permit and admitted that there had been a failure of regulation on their part, 
though the news release did not specifically mention the discovered audit report. On September 
22, Region V Administrator Valdas Adamkus issued a statement “strongly urging the city and 
the State to install environmental controls that will protect the health and environment of the 
people of Detroit and the surrounding communities. I regret we cannot do more.”75 “Sour 
grapes,” was how Mayor Coleman Young characterized Adamkus’s response. “Since they now 
know the public record reveals their environmental and procedural approval of the plant, they 
wish to end the lawsuit.”76 While a victory for the Young administration, the EPA’s decision to 
 
73 Judge Barbara Hackett, “Memorandum opinion and order granting plaintiffs' motion for costs and attorney fees,” 
in GDRRA v. Adamkus, 86-CV-72910-DT (ED Mich 1986). 
 
74 Bob Campbell, “City wins fight over trash plant,” Detroit Free Press, September 23, 1986. 
 
75 “EPA Drops Part of Action Against Detroit Incinerator,” EPA Environmental News Release, September 22, 1986 
in BHC MS: Coleman Young 233:28 Law Dept. – Detroit v E.P.A. 1986, Detroit Public Library, Burton Historical 
Collection. 
 




end their revocation of the GDRRA permit as a result of their own botched oversight was a 
major blow for anti-incinerator organizers. “It kind of blows you out of the water,” admitted 
Detroit Audubon Society member Grant Ruttinger. “They [the EPA] made a big mistake and 
we’re all going to have to pay for it.”77  
 The same day the EPA withdrew its legal proceedings against Detroit, the city filed suit 
in the Eastern District Court of Michigan, arguing the EPA’s attempt to change the terms of the 
permits, “were illegal, invalid and beyond the scope of any power granted to any regulatory 
agency.”78 City officials claimed the Agency’s overeach of their regulatory power and the 
resulting uncertainty around the GDRRA permit resulted in a loss of investor confidence in their 
remarketed $438 million in resource recovery bonds. In a deposition given by incinerator 
financing firm Smith Barney, Harris, Upham, and Co., Managing Director Robert Randol 
declared, “the taint placed on the permit’s validity and the Project by the EPA’s actions had and 
continues to have a direct adverse impact on the Project and the bonds issued to finance the 
Project.” Randol also noted that the uncertainty about the permit resulted in higher interest rates 
to the GDRRA and made resale of the bonds in the secondary market extremely difficult for their 
backers at Citibank and Manufacturers Hannover Trust. Investor doubts surrounding the 
marketability of the city’s resource recovery bonds also further eroded Detroit’s credit rating for 
future projects since they had pledged the “full faith and credit” of the city behind those bonds 
regardless of their success in the market. Finally, Randol suggested that the EPA’s conduct in 
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questioning a legal, state-approved permit put all future resource recovery projects at risk, not 
just the GDRRA. In this way, the EPA’s mandate to protect the environment and human health 
was called into question because of the financial hardship that mandate imposed on the 
regulated.79  
Back on the Streets and in the Courts 
 Despite their disappointment at the EPA’s retreat, Detroit’s citizen activists ramped up 
their respective efforts against the incinerator. In March 1987, the Evergreen Alliance embarked 
on a nine-day series of actions they called the Festival of Life, “an effort to gain greater public 
support and to raise consciousness with respect to the environment and solid waste.” The events 
and actions planned for the week were reflective of this mission, as well as the long artistic 
tradition of the Cass Corridor. While two of the days involved direct action, the remaining events 
were concerts, poetry readings, and art exhibitions at venues along the Corridor, including the 
Bagley Café, Saint Andrew’s Church, and the First Unitarian Church, suggesting the key role of 
churches in providing free event and meeting spaces to community residents who were not 
registered members of the congregation.80 They also organized a protest march from the Kern 
Block along Woodward Avenue downtown across the I-375 expressway and north through 
Lafayette Park before ending at Eastern Market.  The group’s choice to end the march there 
harkened back to their first anti-incinerator action following the disappointing Air Pollution 
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Control Commission hearing and again underscored the connection between the incinerator, air 
pollution (especially dioxin), food, and public health.81 
In pursuit of their own agenda, the Detroit Audubon Society, the Mackinac Chapter of the 
Sierra Club, the North Cass Community Union, and the Environmental Defense Fund filed suit 
in Wayne County Circuit Court against the City of Detroit, the GDRRA, and Combustion 
Engineering on April 15, 1987 for two violations of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act 
or MEPA. This made good on their threat nearly a year earlier to take legal action in order to 
demand additional pollution controls. According to the coalition, the incinerator violated state 
law because both the emissions and ash produced by the facility would ultimately harm the 
environment. Second, the coalition alleged that the City of Detroit had failed to fulfill its duty 
under MEPA to both fully consider all the potential waste disposal alternatives before moving 
forward with the GDRRA and to duly take into account all modifications to its design that would 
avoid or reduce environmental pollution, including the additional pollution controls suggested by 
the Michigan Department of Natural Resources.82  
The same day, the Province of Ontario also brought legal action under MEPA against the 
GDRRA for its failure to install the recommended pollution control equipment in order to protect 
“the common airshed of Michigan and Ontario from particulate matter, heavy metals, acid gases, 
chlorinated organic compounds and other air pollutants.”83 But some anti-incinerator activists 
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were not optimistic. Given the failure of the EPA’s suit to compel Detroit’s strict compliance 
with the Clean Air Act, they saw legal action as an ultimately unproductive path. For example, in 
the anonymous and irreverent publication Detroit Freek Press, activists opined that the “suit’s 
chances, considering the corrupted state of ‘environmental’ law, and the right-wing ideology of 
the judge assigned to the case (Barbara Hackett), are pretty slim.84  
 On June 2, activists from the international environmental organization, Greenpeace, 
arrived in Detroit to lend their weight to the anti-incinerator movement following an invitation 
from the Evergreen Alliance. Their action began when three members – Paul Walker from 
Midland, Michigan, Teresa Concannon of Chicago and Richard Harvey from Chicago – each 
scaled building cranes at the incinerator construction site at 4:30 that morning. Equipped with 
rock climbing gear, hammocks, and 36 hours-worth of provisions, two of the climbers unfurled a 
banner that read “BAN THE BURN” and tied it across the cranes. Four hours later, police 
arrived and arrested Greenpeacer Steve Loper, who communicated with Walker and Concannon 
via radio from just outside the construction site gates.  
 Over the next hour and a half, three officers from Detroit’s rappelling rescue team 
climbed the cranes and, guided by a helicopter overhead, secured two of the three protesters and 
lowered them in a quickly rigged pulley system down to police waiting below. Unable to be 
reached by the city’s rappelling crews as he sat atop the tallest crane, Harvey was arrested at 10 
AM after Officer Anthony McGowen dramatically lowered himself from the helicopter circling 
overhead. McGowen tied a tow rope to Harvey and both were lowered to the ground. The 
following day in the Free Press, Bella Marshall criticized the group, arguing they risked lives 
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and wasted tax dollars for “a media show.”  The city must not tolerate such opponents of the 
incinerator she said, and she reminded readers that the plant was not unsafe, and that “no one has 
presented a scintilla of evidence to the contrary”85 
Yet Greenpeace’s planned actions against Detroit’s incinerator only escalated. The next 
day, two activists, Kenn Hollis and Scott Sibley, scaled the Ambassador Bridge between 
Windsor and Detroit at midday, carrying a banner that read: “Mayor Young: More cancer isn’t 
the answer. Stop Detroit’s Incinerator.” Starting from the Canadian side of the bridge, the two 
activists walked across to the Detroit side where they hung their banner and then camped out 
overnight on one of the bridge’s crossbeams. Although strong winds that day blew off most of 
the banner, leaving only “Stop Detroit’s” hanging by the evening rush hour, the choice to stage 
their protest on the busiest vehicular border-crossing in the United States grabbed attention. Such 
dramatic and highly visible actions were part of Greenpeace’s new media-focused strategy that 
co-founder Robert Hunter nicknamed “mindbombs,” meaning direct action aimed at global 
media in order to change public sentiment.  Not “storming the Bastille…but a storming of the 
mind,” Hunter called it.86 
Following the arrest Hollis and Sibley on the morning of June 4, Greenpeace’s action 
continued with a rally outside of the City-County Building. Two dozen supporters, including 
some Evergreen Alliance members, carried picket signs and chanted “We don’t want Coleman’s 
furnace to burn us.” The group also invited Dr. Paul Connett, a chemistry professor and 
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incinerator specialist at St. Lawrence University, to speak. Connett emphasized reduction and 
recycling as the key to economically and environmentally effective waste management. In a 
story for Newsday’s investigation into resource recovery, Connett suggested that sorting 
recyclable materials out of their waste streams ultimately made better economic sense for cities 
than creating more waste since the tipping fees landfills and incinerators charged municipalities 
was based on weight. “It’s not what you make from recycling,” Connett suggested, “it’s what 
you save.”87 He echoed these economic considerations to protesters in Detroit, arguing that the 
city’s choice to burn its waste “smacks of economic and not environmental interests.”88 
Connett’s critique was directly on point: by encouraging the generation of more waste to keep 
the GDRRA operating at full capacity and prohibiting recycling, Detroit’s argument that the 
facility was an environmentally-sound solution to the region’s waste crisis was untrue. 
Greenpeace’s demonstration ended with a symbolic “die-in” – a common tactic used by 
environmental activists that both suggested the nonviolent sit-ins of the civil rights movement 
and enacted protesters’ worst fears of the incinerator’s impact on human health. Some draped 
over retaining walls and others face down on the concrete, picket signs scattered on the ground, 
activists lay motionless under the stony gaze of Marshall Fredericks’s iconic Spirit of Detroit 
sculpture, with its inscription from Corinthians: “Now the Lord is that Spirit: and where the 
Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.” The images of “dead” bodies in yet another incinerator 
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story on the front page of the next morning’s paper must have shaken some Detroiters. At the 
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Following the die-in, Greenpeace’s “Great Lakes Toxics Campaign” Coordinator, Joyce 
McLean, published an open letter to Mayor Young. She framed the incinerator as more than a 
threat to clean air, but as an environmental justice issue. Citing a 1985 joint report from the U.S. 
National Research Council and the Royal Society of Canada, McLean noted that residents along 
the Detroit-Windsor corridor had “‘appreciably more’ toxic chemicals in their bodies than 
anywhere else in North America.” While she emphasized the inequitable burden Detroit 
residents already bore in regard to pollution, she also argued that environmental injustice was an 
issue that cut across geographic divides of city-periphery, pointing to the concentrated, highly-
toxic ash from the incinerator that would be landfilled southwest of Detroit in rural and poor 
Sumpter Township. She ended her letter declaring that clean air and water were an inherent right 
of all people (a principle, incidentally, that was not widely recognized until the United Nations 
appointed the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment in 2012.)90 “The 
citizens of Detroit deserve the right to clean air,” she wrote to Mayor Young. “All Detroit 
citizens have a right to expect you to protect the safety of their environment.”91 
McLean’s letter reflects a growing awareness in the public discourse about the uneven 
burden of pollution and environmental degradation across the country. In 1982, black activists in 
North Carolina made national news when they attempted to stop trucks full of PCB-laced soil 
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from being dumped in a landfill the state had sited in their community.92 A year after 
Greenpeace’s McLean suggested that the Detroit area bore an unequal burden of the nation’s 
pollution, the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice published their study 
“Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States,” which found that racial composition of a 
community was the best variable for predicting the location of hazardous waste facilities and 
drew, for the first time, a quantifiable connection between race and pollution.93 Although they 
did not recognize it at the time, all three Evergreen Alliance members interviewed for this project 
saw their work as a part of this nascent movement.94 
While Greenpeace’s tactics certainly drew local and even national attention to the city’s 
plan to build and operate the world’s largest incinerator, there was no identifiable long-term 
impact their presence had on bolstering the anti-incinerator movement. In fact, residents of the 
metropolitan region appeared to be heavily divided on Greenpeace and their tactics. Like the 
Young administration, the Detroit Free Press sought to drive a wedge between anti-incinerator 
activists by condemning Greenpeace’s actions as doing “the environmental cause no favor.” 
“Such groups as the Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund are doing less dramatic 
and more substantive work toward assuring a safe plant,” the paper argued.95 Yet other residents 
voiced their support for the radical activists, their courage, and their message. Speaking directly 
to the Free Press’s attempts to differentiate between “good” and “bad” environmentalists, 
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Evergreen Alliance member Thomas Stephens wrote, that the newspaper’s “narrow-minded 
condemnation of Greenpeace’s direct action civil disobedience tactics reflects an indefensible 
rejection of basic democratic values…. This type of action is part of a long and honorable 
tradition dating back at least as far as the famous Boston Tea Party and is in no way inconsistent 
with the litigation tactics used by other environmentalists.” Kim Ostheimer of the village of 
Franklin in Oakland County agreed, arguing Metro Detroiters “should applaud [Greenpeace] for 
having the courage to take action.”96  
Others were more critical of Greenpeace. “I agree that it should be unnecessary for the 
type of behavior shown by Greenpeace individuals,” explained Michael Maddison of Windsor, 
but he also argued that their message was an important one given the threat of the incinerator: 
“[W]e don’t want your waste contaminating Canada…Good neighbors do not contaminate each 
other’s property.”97 Radical anti-incinerator activists were also dubious of the impact Greenpeace 
had on the controversy. “While the actions of Greenpeace did propel the incinerator into the 
media spotlight for a week or so, seemingly, no long-lasting effects have resulted,” argued Cass 
Corridor activists in the parody newspaper the Detroit Freek Press. “The theatrical nature of the 
acts lent themselves to ridicule and many people were attracted to the stunt-person aspect, rather 
than to the political content, of the protest.”98 While their “mindbomb” tactics perhaps forced 
some Detroit metro residents to take notice of the issue for the first time, Greenpeace’s actions in 
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1986 and later in June 1988 when protesters climbed the iconic Renaissance Center to protest the 
incinerator did not seem to substantially help further local anti-incinerator activists’ efforts to 
close the facility.  
Though it’s uncertain what tangible impact Greenpeace’s actions had to strengthen the 
opposition to the GDRRA, local groups did gain another ally in their fight not long after the 
activists’ four days of protest. On June 30, members of the United Automotive Workers (UAW) 
Southeast Michigan Community Action Program, the union’s political and social action 
committee for the metro Detroit region, voted to publicly endorse better pollution control 
equipment for the facility. “The UAW always leans on the side of the safest technology in the 
factories where we work and in the communities where we live,” explained Odessa Komer, Vice 
President for Conservation and Recreation. In letters to EPA National Administrator Lee Thomas 
and Michigan Governor James Blanchard, Komer and Vice President Marc Stepp further argued 
that state and federal agencies should ultimately pay for the added costs presented by the 
additional pollution controls because of mistakes those agencies made in approving the GDRRA 
permit in 1984.99 Yet the union did not stand against the project overall and even defended 
Coleman Young, arguing that the uncertainty fostered by EPA officials around the project forced 
“Mayor Young to dangle like a villain in midair.”100 In characterizing Young as a victim in the 
controversy, UAW protected their important political relationship with the mayor, while putting 
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the governor on notice. According to Governor Blanchard’s environmental adviser, Dave 
Dempsey, the union’s position was “significant” to the state.101  
The UAW’s entrance into the incinerator controversy represented a return to its 
environmental activism of previous decades. Through its Conservation and Resource 
Development Department, both union leaders and rank and file members participated in cleanups 
of local waterways, organized neighborhood anti-air pollution leagues, and endorsed stricter 
regulations on industrial polluters through the 1960s. These activities declined, however, as the 
UAW lost some of its strength amidst the high unemployment and deindustrialization of the 
1970s and the rise of anti-union conservative politics in the 1980s. Still, by the mid-1980s the 
UAW was still an important political voice in Michigan and especially in Detroit.102 Yet the 
following day Governor Blanchard refused to honor the UAW’s request, explaining that he 
preferred to allow the incinerator to continue to be built as planned and to pursue improved 
pollution controls only if post-operation tests demonstrated the facility was not in compliance 
with the Clean Air Act.103 In taking such a stance, Blanchard was also echoing Coleman Young’s 
concerns that adding additional costs to the project at that late stage would jeopardize the 
project’s finances overall. The governor’s refusal to consider the UAW’s request immobilized 
the union’s attempts to bring its political weight to bear on the issue. 
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The Evergreen Alliance, meanwhile, continued their work to educate and mobilize the 
community about the incinerator. Equally important, they expanded their scope to address 
environmental justice issues more broadly. In May 1988, the group organized a four-day 
“Regional and International Mobilization to Save the Great Lakes,” including talks by Love 
Canal activist and Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste founder Lois Gibbs, The Late, 
Great Lakes author William Ashworth, anti-incinerator scientist Paul Connett, and Greenpeace 
Great Lakes Coordinator Joyce McLean. This conference reflected a key moment in the 
Evergreen Alliance’s maturation. The concept of “mobilization,” Alliance organizers explained, 
“evolved out of a growing awareness among the anti-incinerator activists to link up the many 
different assaults on the environment in this region,” including “the Fermi II nuclear reactor, 
other incinerators, toxic and nuclear wastes, and the development of the riverfront.” In bringing 
these different though related issues together, Alliance members looked to foster a “liberatory, 
earth-oriented community” in Detroit and beyond and indicated a shift in the Alliance’s goals 
towards forwarding a much broader and deeper concern for environmental degradation and 
social justice that went beyond the single issue of the Detroit incinerator. Yet the group’s anti-
authoritarian and anti-capitalist ideology continued to underpin its concern for the environment 
as they pointed to “politicians and corporations” as the source of both pollution and inaction in 
strengthening protection of the Great Lakes ecosystem.104 
In their newly written “Vision,” the Evergreen Alliance characterized the incinerator as a 
“manifestation of a systemic crisis,” the source of which was “industrial production and the 
market economy.” “We want to disengage ourselves,” the group went on, “from any economy 
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that profits from contamination, oppression, and war.”105 Throughout 1987, the Evergreen 
Alliance continued to spread this message through demonstrations, presentations, and benefits, 
including a “Cycle & Recycle” protest that crossed the Ambassador Bridge to Windsor to 
emphasize the international impact of the incinerator’s emissions and a “Ban the Burn” protest 
outside of Cobo Hall, the city’s convention center, where participants chanted “Coleman’s Joke 
– Killer Smoke!” as Mayor Young spoke at the Detroit Press Club luncheon.106 Although the 
incinerator continued to rise at the Ferry and Russell site, Alliance members persevered in their 
work to raise awareness and prevent the facility from burning even one bag of the city’s trash.  
Yet all was not well within the Evergreen Alliance. Some of the group’s female members 
felt that they were not being heard and that “the guys,” especially those closely associated with 
the Fifth Estate, “were taking up all the air.”107 Seeking a more supportive community, some 
women of the Alliance went on to organize a separate group, Women (sometimes also styled as 
Womyn) Empowered Against Violence to the Environment, or WEAVE. According to the 
group’s newsletter, WEAVE was “an ecofeminist group which works to empower itself and to 
organize community events which demonstrate our commitment to restoring the delicate balance 
of life on Earth.” In contrast with the Evergreen Alliance, the goal of WEAVE was not to attract 
new members or change minds, but to “act as a catalyst” for other women to “heal” themselves 
and their communities. The creation of WEAVE out of the Evergreen Alliance mirrored other 
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debates about inclusivity and social justice that were happening nationally in environmentalist 
circles.108  
Community was a key organizing principle for these women, and their place in Detroit 
was central to their discourse. Just as women were wounded and abused by capitalism, politics, 
and other male-dominated spheres, so too, they argued, was Detroit. “When we think about 
Detroit as a city, a physical space,” explained Marilyn Rashid, “most of us who live here must 
admit that it is not a beautiful place. It is, rather, a wounded landscape.” Yet in being a wounded 
place, Detroit also had the potential to heal itself if not subject to the “corporate greed and the 
bureaucratic power” represented by the incinerator. Rashid pointed to “families of wild ring-
necked pheasants,” wildflowers, grasses, and trees as evidence that when “land is left alone” it 
could regenerate itself “in spite of…exploitation and destruction.” The same rejuvenation, the 
women of WEAVE argued, could also happen to Detroit. “The earth fights back,” Rashid 
claimed, “communities of caring people fight back too.”109 The women of WEAVE, then, saw 
the rejuvenation of the environment as a symbol for their own healing and that of their city. 
While the women of WEAVE never viewed themselves in opposition to the Evergreen Alliance 
regarding the Detroit incinerator, the dissatisfaction of Alliance women reflected a splintering of 
political and cultural views within the group that foreshadowed its eventual disintegration as 
members turned their efforts to other causes.  
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Losing the Legal Battles 
As the Evergreen Alliance continued its grassroots activism against the incinerator, the 
movement against the incinerator was dealt a major blow. On December 17, 1987, Justice 
Barbara Hackett ruled in favor of Detroit in the city’s litigation against the EPA. Hackett had 
only been appointed to the federal bench a year earlier by President Ronald Reagan. A trailblazer 
for women in the judicial system, Hackett was also active in Republican politics at the local and 
state level. Though described by many of her colleagues as a fair and respected judge, Hackett’s 
legal background leaned heavily pro-business. She first served as a legal assistant to the 
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Company and later became counsel to her husband’s law firm, 
which represented railroad companies.110  
The questions at the heart of the case were threefold: the first considered if the GDRRA 
could be defined as eligible under the Equal Access to Justice Act and, therefore, could seek fees 
and other expenses related to their legal action against the EPA. The second question considered 
if the EPA acted “in bad faith” under United States common law, which meant Combustion 
Engineering could also seek attorney fees. The final question centered around whether the EPA 
was “substantially justified” in its actions against the GDRRA. In her decision, Hackett 
characterized the EPA’s attempt to revoke the Authority’s permit as an “unreasonable 
government action” and categorized the GDRRA as eligible to seek damages under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act because, at the time of litigation, its net worth was purportedly zero. This 
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was accurate since the resource recovery facility had not yet started burning the city’s waste, and 
so, had not sold any steam to the region’s electric utility, Detroit Edison.111  
Second, Hackett identified multiple instances in which the EPA had acted “in bad faith.” 
First, she suggested that the Agency attempted to hide their 1985 audit of the GDRRA permit. 
Once the audit was revealed, she also argued the EPA endeavored to make the city’s legal action 
against the Agency moot by withdrawing their May 1986 letter questioning the validity of the 
permit. Finally, the EPA called the GDRRA permit into question before the reissuing of the 
long-term bonds, but then did not actually revoke the facility’s permit. “[T]his emphasizes the 
EPA’s attempt to make a stand without taking a position,” Hackett argued.112  
In regard to the third question, Hackett explained that the EPA had rested its argument 
throughout litigation on the fact that it possessed “the inherent authority” to withdraw a facility’s 
permit at any time. “However,” she reasoned, “it is well established that as creatures of 
Congress, administrative agencies have no ‘inherent power’, but only that power specifically 
delegated to them.” Therefore, the EPA “had no justification, factual or legal, for its action.” In 
response to the EPA’s contention that it had to take legal action against the GDRRA because the 
Detroit Audubon Society and the other community groups threatened to sue the Agency for 
allowing “deficiencies” in the permit, Hackett castigated the EPA for seeking to “appease 
community groups” by revoking the facility’s permit without any substantive evidence. “The 
procedure used by the EPA,” she suggested, “violates all notions of fundamental fairness.”113  
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Hackett’s ruling in favor of the GDRRA and CE reflected the judicial activism that was 
common throughout the federal court system at the time. The Reagan administration’s Justice 
Department had earned a reputation for an unprecedented level of philosophical vetting for 
prospective appointees to the federal bench. Daylong personal interviews with candidates and 
direct questions about where they stood on key conservative issues, like corporate regulation and 
abortion rights, ultimately led to the appointment of more than 400 judges to the appellate and 
district court systems who the administration identified as in line with their political agenda. 
Central to this agenda was the rolling back of federal regulations protecting the environment 
from corporate and municipal polluters, substantially gutting the authority of the EPA and its 
important gains of the previous decade. The environmental impact of the Reagan presidency, 
though massive, was only one part of what former Attorney General for President Dwight 
Eisenhower Herbert Brownell characterized as a “shocking ideological politicization” of the 
federal court system. The legacy of legal conservatism that began in the Reagan years continued 
to have a significant impact on the nation’s court system and environmental regulation for 
decades.114  
Two months after Judge Hackett’s decision, the activists who sought to prevent the 
GDRRA from operating received another major blow. On February 24, 1988 Hackett ruled 
against both the Province of Ontario and against the coalition of anti-incinerator activists who 
sought to stop construction of the GDRRA. In her decision, Hackett contended that Ontario 
lacked standing in US District Court to bring their suit against Detroit. While Hackett concurred 
with the broad ecological view of shared watersheds and airsheds that flowed freely across the 
 




international boundary of the United States and Canada, she disagreed that the protection of 
Ontario’s natural resources was within the purview of the Michigan Environmental Protection 
Act (MEPA). That act, rather, was only concerned with addressing threats to Michigan’s natural 
resources. Air and water might not be confined by international boundaries, Hackett admitted, 
but laws were. Having based their entire suit on the environmental protections provided by 
MEPA, Ontario had no authority, according to Hackett, to seek judgment from her court.115  
The justice went on to dismiss the activists’ case on technicalities as well. In her 
judgment, Hackett suggested that in bringing legal action two years after the GDRRA’s permit 
had been lawfully approved, the activists were “improper[ly] attempting to revisit the 
administrative proceedings concluded in 1984” and were “squarely at odds with the permitting 
process.” In this way, Hackett argued that in seeking judgment from the court on a procedure 
created by Congress and enforced by legislative bodies and regulatory agencies, the activists 
sought to overrule the separation of powers doctrine, which, according to Hackett, lay “at the 
heart of our constitutional form of government.”116 By dismissing both cases through a series of 
legal technicalities, Hackett withheld judgment on whether or not CE and the GDRRA were in 
violation of environmental regulations, clearing the way for the incinerator.   
 As September 1988 approached, Detroiters in the Cass Corridor looked forward to the 
annual Dally in the Alley community festival. The Dally, put on annually by the North Cass 
Community Union for more than a decade, was a staple of Corridor life and gave residents a 
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chance to come together in celebration of the strong cohesion and collectivism of their 
neighborhood. The Dally’s annual official poster contest drew entries from local Corridor 
residents and celebrated the artistic tradition of the area. The 1988 edition of the poster featured 
an artist’s rendition of a brick wall littered with graffiti that articulated the community’s most 
pressing issues, as well as its radical bent towards solving them: “NO SLUMLORDS,” “BE 
REALISTIC. DEMAND THE IMPOSSIBLE!,” “COMMUNITY UNITY,” and “STOP THE 
INCINERATOR.”  Despite the legal setbacks of the past year, Corridor activists were still 
focused on the Detroit incinerator as a threat to their neighborhood’s health and well-being.117 
Nine days after celebrating the Dally, EPA Region V Administrator Valdas Adamkus 
sent a letter to state Air Quality Division Chief Robert Miller formally withdrawing all aspects of 
the Agency’s opposition to the GDRRA permit. Despite his “grave concerns” about the state’s 
decision to not compel Detroit to install the additional pollution controls in the GDRRA, 
Adamkus admitted there was “insufficient basis” for the EPA to seek revocation of the permit 
and they would therefore withdraw their intent to invalidate it. Adamkus, however, suggested 
that the EPA’s decision to step away from the permit dispute did not preclude the state, county, 
city, or other local governmental unit “from taking whatever steps it deems necessary and 
appropriate to protect the environment.”118  
Yet Adamkus’s optimistic invitation for state or local government to enforce 
environmental regulations where the EPA had failed was unrealistic, especially given Justice 
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Hackett’s recent decisions upholding the GDRRA permit. Furthermore, Adamkus’s call to “do 
the right thing” placed the onus of enforcing federal regulations on lower levels government – a 
task most local units lacked the expertise and staff to be successful in, especially given the likely 
threat of litigation from the City of Detroit. Adamkus’s letter ultimately meant that local activists 
would have to wait until the facility began operating to see if the GDRRA would comply with 
the emissions limits imposed by the Clean Air Act. 
- - 
On December 8, 1988, the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery facility began operations, 










 Though anti-incinerator activists in Detroit were unsuccessful in their work to prevent the 
Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority incinerator from operating, members of the 
Evergreen Alliance continued to advocate and demonstrate against the plant and, in some cases, 
won major victories alongside environmental regulators at the state and local levels. In its first 
few years of operation, the Detroit incinerator experienced some of the same dangerous 
mechanical issues that plagued other facilities across the country. The enormous plant also failed 
multiple compliance tests, just as regulators and activists predicted, that ultimately threatened 
Detroit’s ability to operate the facility. Yet a lack of transparency on the part of city officials and 
investors, as well as the continued economic decline and disempowerment that forced city 
government to make economic choices rather than those that centered residents, meant that the 
incinerator would ultimately be allowed to burn Detroit’s trash for more than three decades with 
little accountability to resident or regulators.  
 In November 1988, weeks before the facility started burning waste, Sierra Club member 
and Observation Representative Anne Woiwode wrote to the new Michigan Department of 
Natural Resources director, David Hales, seeking clarity regarding the state’s position on testing 
protocols for the ash produced at the Detroit incinerator. Specifically, Woiwode sought 
assurances that managers at the facility would treat every new load of ash as a hazardous 




testing proved that it was not.1 Hales responded that the Detroit incinerator would be “expected 
to comply with ash testing and management requirements” mandated by state and federal law. 
Yet Woiwode was not satisfied with the Department’s enforcement plan, suggesting that the last 
time state regulators attempted to compel compliance – Gerald Avery’s 1986 letter questioning 
Combustion Engineering’s Best Available Control Technology and cancer risk assessment – was 
an “unmitigated disaster.” “We would be fools not to expect that the Authority will quite 
possibly thumb its nose at any attempts by the Department to impose a stricter protocol for the 
disposal of the incinerator ash,” Woiwode asserted.2  
 Woiwode’s concerns about the safety of the ash produced at the facility manifested in 
January 1989. Less than a month after the Detroit incinerator began burning its first load of 
household waste, a mechanical malfunction in the boiler stacks failed to dampen the ash as it was 
burned. Instead of falling to the bottom of the boiler in heavy, wet clumps, tons of fine, flaky ash 
filled the main powerhouse of the facility and spilled out into the surrounding neighborhood. 
Workers complained of itchy eyes and skin, rashes, nosebleeds, headaches, swollen throats, and 
coughing, leading over fifty electrical contractors and construction personnel to walk off the job 
in protest of the unsafe conditions on January 10. The following day, thirty Evergreen Alliance 
members protested outside the plant gates in solidarity with the workers, who they characterized 
as the “first victims” of the incinerator to local media.3  
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In the midst of the walk-off, some of the electrical contractors collected ash samples and 
delivered them to the Southeastern Michigan Coalition for Occupational Safety and Health. 
Analysis confirmed that the ash contained dangerously high levels of lead, cadmium, nickel, and 
mercury. Yet officials at Combustion Engineering insisted that the impacted workers had merely 
been exposed to “dust associated with the combustion process.” The incident, however, was 
reported to the Wayne County Air Pollution Control Commission, the board responsible for 
overseeing the Detroit incinerator’s compliance testing. Ultimately, the state Department of 
Public Health cited Combustion Engineering for eighteen health code violations, including 
excessive airborne lead exposure, failure to require respirators, and failure to inform workers 
about health hazards, and levied a total of $5,000 in fines.4  
Yet the incident also highlighted new concerns about the ash the incinerator produced by 
burning the city’s trash. At question was whether the ash contained high levels of lead and other 
heavy metals that could ultimately seep into and contaminate the groundwater beneath the City 
Sand and Landfill site where the ash would be dumped. If levels of these materials was too high, 
the ash would be categorized as a “hazardous” waste, necessitating special handling that would 
balloon disposal costs from $2.25 million per year to more than $21 million and ultimately make 
the project “economically unfeasible,” according to city lawyers.5 Though extreme, such an 
outcome was not unprecedented. In 1988, the Grosse Pointes Clinton Incinerator in Macomb 
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County and the Jackson County Resource Recovery Facility were both shut down by the 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources after multiple tests found dangerously high levels of 
lead and cadmium in the ash. While tests conducted by city officials at the Detroit plant found 
the ash to be “eminently safe,” according to Mayor Young, these findings were not accepted as 
valid by the state Department of Natural Resources or the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency.6  
Ultimately, the state Department of Natural Resources and city officials signed a consent 
decree stating that the ash would be classified as a hazardous waste, but would be treated with 
lime in order to render it safe for burial in a special, ash-only “monofill” landfill.7 Yet the ash 
debate also highlighted the inequitable burden Detroit’s project had on poor and minority 
communities across the metropolitan landscape. The landfill where the facility’s ash would 
ultimately be disposed of was located forty miles southwest of Detroit in the largely rural and 
poor community Sumpter Township. While the northern half of the township was predominantly 
white and more suburban, the southern half where the incinerator’s landfill was located was 
characterized by a higher than average concentration of African American households. Yet the 
hazards and nuisance brought by landfills were not new for this community: Wayne County had 
 
6 Bob Campbell, “Ash may chill new city incinerator,” Detroit Free Press, February 26, 1989; Bob Campbell and 
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long relied on a landfill in this same area for years.8 One resident identified as Freddie, “an 
African American man [and] disabled veteran,” complained of chemical smells or rotting 
garbage stench coming from the landfill. “There are times when we wake up in the morning with 
clogged noses or throats,” he went on. “The area is permeated with a rotten odor.” Freddie also 
suggested that the landfill was there because the rural community lacked the economic and 
political influence to oppose it.9   
Freddie was correct. Beginning with the United Church of Christ’s Commission for 
Racial Justice’s Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States report in 1987, environmental justice 
advocates had demonstrated the concentration of Locally Unwanted Land Uses or LULUs in 
low-income communities of color with little political or economic power to oppose them.10 Yet 
in Sumpter Township, residents did try to fight back. On February 26, 1990, Sumpter Township 
resident Judy Davies and more than 100 of her neighbors rallied outside of the Township Hall to 
oppose the permit for the new “monofill” site, citing issues stemming from the landfill where 
incinerator ash had been sent for the past year. “The stench is horrendous,” Davies explained. 
“Then there’s the truck traffic, day and night, seven days a week. The noise, the litter, the low 
land values…” Yet these community protests were ultimately overruled by the Township 
Council, which several multiple landfill permits associated with various 1990 county solid waste 
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plans.11 Decades later, Sumpter Township continues to be a center for solid waste disposal in the 
state. Beginning in 2002, the Canadian city of Toronto shipped one millions tons of waste 
annually to the Carleton Hills landfill in the township. In 2017, that amount grew by more than 
500 percent.12  
Although the ash issue was finally resolved, in September 1989 the Wayne County Air 
Pollution Control Division issued violations to the City of Detroit and Combustion Engineering 
for failing emissions tests after excessive levels of mercury and hydrogen chloride were 
recorded. Over the next four months, Division Director Alan Greenberg requested a documented 
plan for compliance from Combustion Engineering and the operations manager for the Detroit 
incinerator, Michael Brinker, including plans for additional pollution control measures similar to 
those sought by state regulators and activists in 1986 and 1987. Yet Brinker and other city 
officials balked at the idea of retrofitting the $438-million plant. Instead, they sought to eliminate 
harmful chemicals from the incinerator’s emissions by changing the composition of the waste 
entering the facility at the consumer end by instituting city-wide hazardous waste drop-off 
programs and battery recycling services. Yet such programs relied on residents to shift their 
deeply formed habits concerning waste, as well as extensive neighborhood engagement and 
educational initiatives in order to be successful.13  
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While Greenberg and regulators with Wayne County continued to negotiate with city 
officials as they sought to bring the facility into compliance, environmental activists saw the 
continued failures of the plant as proof that the incinerator could not operate “safely” as 
regulators and city officials had contended for years. “It’s one screwup after another,” explained 
Alex Johnson of the Detroit Audubon Society, “The whole plan has some serious flaws.” In fact, 
the Society, along with its allies in the North Cass Community Union, the Sierra Club, and the 
Environmental Defense Fund had shifted their position on the incinerator by the fall of 1989. 
During the court battle with Combustion Engineering and the City of Detroit, the coalition had 
argued that only improved pollution control technology, like baghouses and acid scrubbers, were 
necessary to make the plant operate safely, they had since called upon officials to abandon the 
incinerator project entirely and develop a city-wide recycling program.14 
Members of the Evergreen Alliance, meanwhile, continued to work against the 
incinerator both through public demonstrations and through political advocacy and legal action. 
At a Detroit City Council meeting to address the emissions issues, Alliance member Scott Craig 
gave assertive testimony that also suggested that Combustion Engineering and other corporate 
interests had misled city officials, marking a notable shift in the activists’ arguments. “It is our 
contention that the City of Detroit was sold a bill of goods by a company which, at that time, had 
no experience in building or operating incinerators,” explained Craig. “These ‘experts’ didn’t 
really know what they are doing when they told us they could produce a plant that would be 
safe.” His comments also revealed that the Evergreen Alliance was also seriously considering the 
economic implications of the incinerator, rather than simply the environmental. The facility’s 
 




failure to meet compliance standards and operate normally ultimately presented “a serious threat 
to the economic foundation of this City,” Craig contended, given the city’s extensive outstanding 
bond debt on the plant. “[T]he time has come…to cut our losses and look for a way out of this 
project before it causes irreparable damage.”15  
Throughout During testimony to the Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission in 
December, Wayne County staff had endorsed a four-month extension to the incinerator’s trial 
operation period to allow city officials to implement their proposed plan to remove hazardous 
materials from the waste stream.16 Yet by April 1990 Detroit officials still had not implemented 
any elements of the program nor had they submitted a finalized compliance plan to the country 
Air Pollution Control Division. Meanwhile, the incinerator continued to fail compliance tests for 
mercury emissions, with some readings as high as 400% over the allowable emissions limits.17 
Without any effort to mitigate emissions on the part of the city, the state Commission voted 6 to 
4 to temporarily shut down the Detroit incinerator. This decision was vocally criticized by Mayor 
Coleman Young, who told the Detroit Free Press that the Commission members wanted a 
“sacrificial lamb to lay at the altar of the environment. And they got a big one – Detroit.” Young 
went on to explain that he had been assured by two members of the Commission that they would 
vote in favor of a proposed deal that would grant Detroit a nine-month extension to bring the 
 
15 Presented to a Meeting of Detroit’s City Council, Human and Economic Risks Posed by the City’s Trash 
Incinerator, March 16, 1990 in Thomas W. Stephens Collection, Box 3 Folder 10, Walter P. Reuther Library, 
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University. 
 
16 Minutes of Meeting, Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission, December 5, 1989 in Thomas W. Stephens 
Collection, Box 3 Folder 11, Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State 
University. 
 
17 Summary of stack emissions test results for the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority boilers when 
burning refuse-derived fuel at maximum capacity in Thomas W. Stephens Collection, Box 3 Folder 10, Walter P. 




incinerator’s emissions into compliance, turning the outcome to be 6-4 in the city’s favor. “We 
had talked to the governor’s staff about an agreement that would allow us to continue…Two of 
those voting against us were the governor’s appointments. Now you figure that one out,” Young 
went on. “Somebody double-crossed somebody and we want to know who it was.”18  
Environmental activists from Detroit Audubon, the Evergreen Alliance, and the Sierra 
Club all cheered the Commission’s ruling. “This is a real victory for the environment,” explained 
Dennis Piper of the Sierra Club. “Detroit is going to have to get serious about recycling.”19 That 
Earth Day, four days after the vote to shut down the incinerator, the Evergreen Alliance led a 
“New Orleans style funeral procession” accompanied by a marching band from Wayne State 
University to the “then-calm beast” along with thirty-eight coffins, representing the thirty-eight 
deaths by cancer risk assessments conducted in 1986 claimed the facility would cause. Once at 
the facility’s gate, thirty-eight volunteers lay in the coffins, as onlookers mourned and an 
officiant read what they had died from, each representing a different health concern exacerbated 
by the incinerator. The action, which included enormous decorated fish, paper flowers, and other 
over-the-top pageantry featuring demonstrators dressed as Mayor Young, Governor Blanchard, 
and the incinerator, brought more than 600 people to fill the streets. The group’s mood was 
celebratory despite the funerary theme, and “friendly greetings and warm hugs were in 
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abundance.” Once their funeral was complete, the group disbanded to refrains of “When the 
Saints Go Marching In” to enjoy the “unusually untainted air” and spring sunshine.20  
The optimism of the moment was short lived, however. Just one month later, the 
Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission voted at an emergency meeting to reverse their 
decision to close the facility. Immediately upon the vote, activists attending the hearing exploded 
in outrage, some even rushing the table where the Commissioners sat. The following night, 
eighty Evergreen Alliance members and other environmental activists camped out at the 
facility’s gates and mockingly “performed street theater outside…the big burner.” Despite this 
setback, activists were determined to continue their efforts to close the facility, pointing to recent 
success by anti-incinerator advocates in Eastern Europe as proof that closure was possible. 
“People all over the world are rising up in defense of the Earth and against everything these state 
an industry functionaries represent,” wrote North Cass Community Union member Larry Talbot, 
“If we can stop this one, the world’s largest, it will be the beginning of the end for incineration 
everywhere.”21 
Later that year, city officials and stakeholders from Combustion Engineering met with 
regulators from the Michigan Department of Natural Resources to discuss a consent agreement 
that would ultimately allow the incinerator to continue burning waste, despite its failure to 
comply with emissions requirements. In return, Detroit officials agreed to retrofit the facility 
with the pollution control technology that activists and EPA regulators had called for four years 
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earlier, at a cost of $175 million. The state, however, gave engineers at Combustion Engineering 
six years to install the equipment. In the meantime, the incinerator could continue operating 
without the emissions controls. City officials also agreed to “bypass” or landfill a substantial 
amount of the waste that was brought to the incinerator in an attempt to decrease mercury 
emissions by decreasing waste volume. This bypass, however, would direct 45 percent of the 
waste that came to the facility back to a landfill as opposed to the planned 15 percent at an 
additional annual cost of more than $3.5 million. In this way, the thin line of profitability the city 
had relied upon in their defense against additional pollution controls in court against the federal 
EPA in 1987 had completely collapsed.22  
The state Air Pollution Control Commission’s vote to shut down the facility also 
complicated Mayor Young’s newly-announced plan to sell and lease back the incinerator in a 
complex financial transaction that would raise $54 million to help balance the city’s 1991 budget 
shortfall. In a transaction called a “leaseback,” the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority 
would sell the incinerator to capital subsidiaries of tobacco giant Philip Morris and General 
Electric. In exchange for the direct cash investment, Philip Morris would receive $200 million in 
tax credits from federal resource recovery subsidies passed under the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The 
new owners would then lease the incinerator back to the city, which would continue to dispose of 
the city’s waste as planned. Yet Goldman Sachs, coordinators of the leaseback transaction on 
behalf of the city, raised concerns in February 1991 that the operating plan permitted by the 
consent agreement with the state ultimately threatened the proposed sale. “The investor’s 
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motivation for acquiring the facility is based on the return on its investment,” representatives 
from the bank wrote to Detroit Finance Director Bella Marshall. Specifically, the bypass 
requirement mandated by state regulators made the facility, according to the federal Internal 
Revenue Service, “not yet placed in service” and, therefore, ineligible for tax credit benefits 
sought by Philip Morris and GE.23 Without a bypass waiver from the Michigan Department of 
Natural Resources, the leaseback could not proceed, an outcome that Bella Marshall 
characterized as “catastrophic, both environmentally and economically.”24 
State regulators agreed that preventing the leaseback transaction would do more harm 
than good for Detroit, and approved the bypass waiver. With the approval, Philip Morris and 
General Electric paid $54 million to the City of Detroit to help plug the city’s 1991 municipal 
budget deficit. Though the sale led Moody’s Investors Services to confirm the city’s credit rating 
of “Baa” rather than lower it, the company warned that “unrealistic budget assumptions and the 
continued weakening of the city’s economy” meant that Detroit’s financial status had reached a 
“critical juncture.”25 Meanwhile, the many compliance issues that persisted at the Detroit 
incinerator from 1988 until 1991 ultimately soured many state and local officials on resource 
recovery as an effective waste disposal strategy. “The storm warnings are out,” as state 
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environmental advisor David Dempsey pointed out, “We should answer the social, 
environmental, and economic questions before we embark on building more incinerators.”26  
 In 1998, the state deemed the incinerator to be in compliance and cancelled the 1991 
consent agreement. Yet many of the regulatory structures that had previously held the facility to 
account at both the state and the local level, as well as provided a forum for public comment, 
have been disbanded. In 1991, Michigan’s new governor, Republican John Engler – a staunch 
opponent of regulation – eliminated the state Air Pollution Control Commission, the body 
responsible for revoking the incinerator’s permit after multiple failed emissions tests.27 In 2001, 
the Wayne County Air Pollution Control Division, which had refused to accept the in-house 
emissions tests offered by Detroit and Combustion Engineering officials and was disbanded and 
its oversight authority transferred to the already overburdened state Department of 
Environmental Quality.28  
The incinerator continued to be a target of environmentalists and grassroots activists in 
Detroit and nationally for the next three decades. When the facility came up for another five-year 
renewal of its operating permit by state regulators in 2002, a coalition of made up of Detroiters 
Working for Environmental Justice, the Michigan Environmental Council, the American 
Lung Association of Michigan, and the Sierra Club used the opportunity to advocate for a 
new city waste plan that incorporated curbside recycling and the closure of the incinerator. 
“Economically, it’s a boondoggle,” explained activist and Midtown business owner Jackie 
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Victor. “Environmentally and healthwise, it’s a disaster. I couldn’t imagine this in the middle of 
Bloomfield Hills or Ann Arbor…Why are we acting like this is normal?” Yet, city officials, 
citing familiar economic considerations for keeping the facility operating, opposed such calls. 
“Those bonds still out, and someone has to pay them,” said Bob Berg, spokesman for Mayor 
Kwame Kilpatrick. “It’s not a matter of going in and turning off the lights in the facility and 
having it go away. You can’t just default on bonds.” The state agreed and granted another 
operating permit.29  
In the late 2000s, major demographic shifts in the Cass Corridor neighborhood where 
anti-incinerator activism had centered during the 1980s contributed to new and heightened 
awareness of the incinerator. Between 2011 and 2016, the white population in Cass Corridor – 
now called Midtown – grew by nearly 10 percent, driven – according to observers – by “surging 
interest and demand” in residential units in the neighborhood.30 At the same time, debt service on 
the original bonds for the incinerator came to term in 2009, prompting the Energy Investors 
Fund, which had purchased Philip Morris’s majority stake in the incinerator two years earlier, to 
seek a new buyer for the facility. The likeliest purchaser was, of course, the city itself. EIF’s 
proposed price of $45 million for the plant, however, was too steep for Detroit, especially in the 
midst of the unfolding financial crisis.31 In July 2008, Deputy Mayor and Greater Detroit 
Resource Recovery Authority chairperson Anthony Adams suggested during a City Council 
meeting that city officials were instead investigating policies to “move toward a greener Detroit.” 
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This aligned with earlier votes by the City Council to pursue a new waste disposal strategy 
focused on recycling and landfilling.32  
But again, economic considerations ultimately took precedence. Contracts with Detroit 
Edison for electricity from the facility through 2024 meant that city could lose more than $25 
million held in a joint escrow account if they shut down the plant. Furthermore, agreements 
between the city and the Authority gave the latter power to set municipal waste management 
policy through 2021 and compelled Detroit to continue sending city trash to the facility unless 
landfill operators could dispose of it more cheaply.33 In this way, environmental activists once 
again felt as though city officials failed to take public health impacts into consideration and 
ultimately left citizens “in the dark, as deals that will ultimately serve corporate interests 
over the public's are being cut behind closed doors instead of out in the open.”34 In the end, 
the incinerator operator, Covanta Energy, purchased GE’s 30 percent share in the facility 
and renewed their operating agreement.  
Under the new owners and operators, performance and maintenance at the facility 
declined markedly. After assuming ownership in 2010, Detroit Renewable Power – a partnership 
of industrial holding company Atlas Holdings and steam company Thermal Ventures – received 
thirteen Notice of Violations over odor from the Michigan Department of Environmental 
Quality. In 2013 alone, the state logged 114 odor complaints against the incinerator compared to 
just four in 2008. And 2012, equipment malfunctions led to a six-week backlog of waste at the 
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facility, eliciting one complaint from a local resident who described the stench as “chokingly 
disgusting.”35 In addition to the odor complaints, investigators at the Detroit Free Press found 
that the facility had exceeded air pollution emissions over 750 times from 2013 to 2018. State 
regulators, however, only fined Detroit Renewable Power for eight of those violations, at a total 
cost of $149,000. "That's really the tool we have to try to bring them into compliance," 
explained Todd Zynda, the Department of Environmental Quality's inspector for the 
incinerator.36  
In the mid-2000s, new grassroots organizations like Zero Waste Detroit launched another 
wave of activism directed against the incinerator. Though the group and their environmental 
allies did win some notable victories against the facility, including City Council approval for a 
new city-wide curbside recycling program in 2009, and effectively raised local and national 
awareness of the facility as organizers of the thousand-person demonstrations against the 
incinerator during the 2010 United States Social Forum, activists continued to encounter some of 
the same issues as the Evergreen Alliance and Detroit Audubon Society. While environmental 
groups had, for the most part, learned to cooperate in pursuit of their shared goals, they 
continued to be frustrated by a lack of corporate and political transparency, as well as the 
underlying economic motivations of both city officials and corporate entities. In what was 
perhaps the most apt metaphor for the decades-long grassroots struggle by Detroiters to close the 
incinerator, Metro Times reporter Curt Guyette once suggested that image of Sisyphus, 
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“condemned by the Greek gods to forever roll a boulder uphill only to have it roll back down 
again,” might be appropriate as a new logo for Zero Waste Detroit.37 
 Although Coleman Young was able to put funds from the leaseback sale towards the 
city’s 1991 budget deficit, the long-term costs would continue to reverberate through city 
finances over the next two decades. Amidst the international outcry against the Detroit 
incinerator, Ontario’s Environment Minister, Ruth Grier announced a ban on all future municipal 
incinerators in September 1991. Grier suggested that incineration was a “superficial solution” 
that encouraged consumers to create more waste and, through burning, created new and even 
more harmful compounds, like mercury, dioxins, furans, nitrogen oxide, and carbon dioxide. 
“Incineration is an environmental sleight of hand,” she explained, “which gives the illusion of 
making waste disappear when, in fact, it reappears in different and often more hazardous 
forms.”38 This was true in Detroit’s case, but even more deeply than Grier had intended when she 
made her comments. In incinerating the city’s trash, Detroit officials perpetuated the illusion that 
waste simply disappeared, obfuscating any apparent negative impact to the environment. The 
incinerator also hid a pernicious legacy of corporate capitalism and credit ratings companies.  
Coleman Young and city officials sought the leaseback agreement with Phillip Morris and 
General Electric as a strategy to avoid an $88-million budget shortfall and additional 
deterioration to the city’s credit rating. Yet in doing so, they bound the city and its taxpayers into 
a financial relationship that ultimately cost over $1.2 billion and contributed substantially to the 
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city’s bankruptcy filling in 2010.39 Today, even former Evergreen Alliance members suggest that 
Mayor Young had been misled by companies and other financial stakeholders as to what was 
best for the city’s long-term economic and environmental sustainability. “He was sold a bill of 
goods,” explained Ralph Franklin, while Donele Wilkins suggested that the mayor had been 
“bamboozled.”40 
-- 
I was leaving my job as a Sustainability Graduate Assistant at Loyola University Chicago 
when my mother texted me with the news: “The incinerator is closing down. Did u know this?” I 
didn’t. Like me, most of Detroit was caught by surprise at Mayor Mike Duggan’s announcement 
that the incinerator would be shut down, forcing Detroit and other suburban communities to send 
their municipal waste to landfills.41 “It’s closing is a blessing,” said a statement on Zero Waste 
Detroit’s website. While the closure was the ultimate goal of nearly three decades of activism – 
including my own, as I envisioned this dissertation acting as an amicus curiae for the facility’s 
lease renewal hearings scheduled for 2022 – it was still a shock. And despite this success, there 
is still much work to be done. This dissertation tells one story of environmental degradation on 
the part of a cash-strapped city that looked to corporate capital for a solution, and its failure to be 
held to account by regulators at various levels. Although the activists in this story were not 
successful in closing the facility at the time, they were a compelling voice that inspired new 
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generations of grassroots activists who continue to advocate for cleaner air and safer 
communities in Detroit.  
As we face our own global environmental catastrophe in the form of rapidly advancing 
climate change and political powers concerned more with deregulation and denial than with 
progress, this dissertation is a reminder that we must also be that compelling voice advocating 
for a better, safer place for all. We must identify and articulate the threats against us and the 
planet, and we must build inclusive coalitions to fight the fight together. Most of all, we must 
interrogate corporate power and envision different economic and political systems that value 
people over economic considerations. While this might sound like an overly optimistic 
contention, I would point to historian Steven Stoll’s suggestion that environmental history 
presents the best opportunity for historicizing and, therefore, confronting the inevitability of 
capitalism. “Our task as environmental historians is to bring historical truth to self-evident truth 
and open the deepest and most closely held assumptions to scrutiny,” he concludes.42 In 
confronting the systemic forces – both economic and political – that drew Detroit into a web of 
longstanding financial obligations to corporations and companies rather than its citizens, I also 
suggest that these forces are not inevitable. I do this in the hope that leaders and residents of 
Detroit – unconstrained from the “self-evident” facade of capitalism, itself a sort of sleight of 
hand – can envision alternative paths towards a more equitable and sustainable future.
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